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WP7: Individual values and motivations to engage against corruption

Main research report: citizen action against corruption: patterns, drivers, entry points for mobilisation

Lead authors: Dr. Dieter Zinnbauer and Santhosh Srinivasan, Transparency International

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# Contents

Work Package: WP7, Individual values and motivations to engage against corruption ........................................ 1
Main research report: citizen action against corruption: patterns, drivers, entry points for mobilisation ...... 2

### Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................... 6

### Introduction and rationale ...................................................................................................................... 12

### Research approach .................................................................................................................................. 14

### Research objectives ................................................................................................................................. 14

### Research activities ................................................................................................................................... 14

### Research in detail ..................................................................................................................................... 16

### Citizen Survey (S1) ................................................................................................................................. 17

#### Theme .................................................................................................................................................. 17

#### Scope and approach ............................................................................................................................... 17

#### Key findings .......................................................................................................................................... 17

### Stock-take social accountability (S2) ...................................................................................................... 28

#### Theme .................................................................................................................................................. 28

#### Approach ............................................................................................................................................. 28

#### Key findings .......................................................................................................................................... 29

### Helpline data (S3) ..................................................................................................................................... 37

#### Theme: who is approaching NGO corruption reporting centres? Client profiles for advocacy and legal advice centres (ALACs) ................................................................. 37

#### Background and approach .................................................................................................................... 37

#### Findings: who is approaching the Transparency International corruption help centres? .................. 38

#### Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 45

### Social media analysis in the United Kingdom and Romania (S4) .......................................................... 46

#### Theme .................................................................................................................................................. 46

#### Background and rationale ..................................................................................................................... 46

#### Methodology ......................................................................................................................................... 47

#### Key findings .......................................................................................................................................... 48

#### Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 61

### Focus groups (A1–3) .............................................................................................................................. 64

#### Theme .................................................................................................................................................. 64

#### Scope and approach ............................................................................................................................... 64

#### Key findings .......................................................................................................................................... 65

### Reflection on focus groups as a research method in anti-corruption research ........................................ 72
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study Portugal: whistleblowing and official online corruption reporting (B1)</th>
<th>74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background and rationale</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key findings</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study United Kingdom: citizen participation in open government (B2)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context and scope</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key findings</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action research: social design for health service integrity in Lithuania (C1)</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key findings</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges and limitations for further research</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action research: mobilising public support for anti-corruption activities in Montenegro (C2)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key findings</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some final notes</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual acts of resistance against corruption</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is reporting corruption and why?</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer up: motivations, beliefs, drivers</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are norms important?</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal ambition versus practised reality: a considerable gap closed by actual exposure to corruption</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greed, need and the government</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The force field of classic collective action and innovative social accountability</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going it alone?</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resigned inertia or optimistic activation? A split right down the middle</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration is key – but hard</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No failure, no magic, yet an exciting present and promising future ........................................ 114
A few final ‘to-do’s’ ............................................................................................................... 115
Annexes ................................................................................................................................ 117
Annex 1 Survey questions ..................................................................................................... 117
Annex 2 Interview numbers – LiTS ..................................................................................... 122
Abstract

People engagement has become an important strategic pillar for those reforming governance from the inside, as well as for anti-corruption organisations advocating reform from the outside.

Work package 7 of the ANTICORRP research initiative puts the focus firmly on gaining a better understanding of the types of citizens who take action against corruption and the circumstances under which they do so, as well as the impact they achieve and the kinds of evidence-based promising pathways that are on the horizon for future such engagements. This research report summarises the findings of several complementary research strategies, examining in particular the role of the citizen as (a) a direct victim and witness of corruption, and thus a potential refuser, reporter, litigant or whistleblower on corrupt acts, and as (b) a potential volunteer in social accountability initiatives, donating his or her time, expertise and voice to help monitor budget spending, lifestyles, public works projects, etc.

A mixed-method approach was adopted that contained the following elements (the abbreviations at the start are used throughout the report to refer to specific research activities).

- S1: a large scale citizen survey to probe a representative sample of citizens across Europe and in select comparator countries on their experience of, attitudes to and engagement against corruption (Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International Secretariat).
- S2: a stock-take based on desk research on the evidence base for social accountability mechanisms and their efficacy in tackling corruption and strengthening accountability (Transparency International Secretariat).
- S3–4: an analysis of primary data from an international network of anti-corruption helplines (S3) and from the social media sphere (S4) in two countries, the United Kingdom and Romania, in order to better understand who reports about what types of corruption issues and whether social media serves as a channel for citizen engagement on corruption issues.
- A1–3: a series of focus groups in three countries (Macedonia: A1; Romania: A2; and Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH]: A3) primarily with people who have stood up against and reported corruption, in order to better understand their motivations for doing so and the constraints that such reporting faces.
- B1–2: in-depth case studies of a major public corruption-reporting mechanism in Portugal (B1) and an in-depth exploration of an open data initiative in the United Kingdom (B2), in order to examine how the concrete interfaces for corruption reporting and the technical tools for engaging people in connection with open government initiatives work in action.
- C1–2: qualitative in-country experiments to test how innovative feedback systems in the health sector could be a step towards more integrity (Lithuania: C1) and how people respond to different mobilisation strategies (Montenegro: C2).

Given the considerable number of different research activities and the many different ways to slice up the evidence, this research report opts for profiling each research module separately, describing the approach, methodology and major findings, then concluding with a more integrated discussion of the insights derived in relation to a set of key research questions.

There is also a separate deliverable (d7.3) for this work package, which extracts and presents the major policy-related insights, while the more detailed individual research reports for each research stream (submitted jointly as d.7.5) and the first academic article on crowd-reporting corruption resulting from the
Research (d7.6) already come with their own synopses and provide focused overviews of the relevant research results. To assist in navigating the research, research reports and summaries, an overview of all WP7 research streams and deliverables is given here.

Against this backdrop of a very rich and varied evidence base and already existing synopses for specific themes, activities and purposes, the remainder of this abstract flags only very selectively some of the many pertinent findings that speak directly to the overarching research question that WP7 has set for itself in the context of the overall ANTICORRP work programme: what is the role and future potential of citizen action in the context of viable and effective anti-corruption policies? What types of corruption and what contexts are particularly amenable to citizen action? What drivers and levers can be harnessed?

Patterns of engagement – corruption reporting

Survey evidence suggests that people across Europe consider reporting corruption as the second-most useful action (second only to refusing to pay bribes) that citizens can take against corruption. More than one-fifth of individuals who experienced corruption claim to have reported it, resulting in a conservative estimate of more than 6 million reports in total for a base population of more than 640 million for the surveyed countries in Europe/central Asia. Corruption reporting was lowest in Baltic countries such as Latvia and Lithuania, as well as in other post-Soviet countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, where fewer than one-tenth of the people experiencing corruption reported it to relevant authorities.

Reporting rates varied considerably by service, from close to four in ten people claiming to have reported experienced corruption in relation to courts, unemployment benefits or social security to only half that rate of reporting when dealing with the police, education or health services, suggesting that situations in which the element of extortion, discretion in service quality or intimidation is high are associated with lower reporting, while services in which entitlements are clearer or expectations for fair treatment (courts) invite more reporting. Focus group research complements these insights around bribery and highlights that office patronage, the unfair hiring of kin and cronies, appears to be a type of corruption that provokes the most committed push-back by other civil servants who are directly affected by it and perceive this as a particularly egregious violation of a sense of fairness.
Neither gender, nor urban versus rural nor age factors seem to have a very significant association with actual reporting or willingness to report. Analysis of NGO-provided anti-corruption help centres, on the other hand, shows that clients are disproportionately male and from urban areas, while the social media analysis also found that men outnumber women by two to one in conversations related to corruption on Twitter in the United Kingdom.

What drives and inhibits reporting?

Survey data suggests that difficulties in reporting, the fear of retaliation and a suspected lack of impact are the main reasons for non-reporting; these factors are also largely confirmed by focus group discussions.

Norms, both descriptive and prescriptive ones, appear to play less of a role than is often assumed, however. On average, around 40 per cent of respondents indicate that they feel personally obliged to report corruption, and a not insignificant 21 per cent state that they actually have reported corruption when subjected to it. This rather sizeable revealed willingness to report contrasts sharply with low expectations that others will do the same, which stands at just 3 per cent. This discrepancy between expressed and perceived willingness to report – a situation of pluralistic ignorance – suggests some interesting intervention points for campaigns and awareness raising.

The focus group research suggests that motivations for reporting and persistently following through on a corruption related case are underpinned by an amalgamate of individual and social, ethical and material, principled and highly personal factors that are deeply intertwined and defy the hyper-rational incentive/preference calculus that is often applied to explain related actions. From a strong desire to be respected, to a sense of professional duty to regard for future generations – a panoply of motivating factors are found to be in play, and not all of these, such as regaining (self-)respect, are currently fully leveraged for mobilisation strategies.

Social media: propelling citizen action against corruption to the next level?

Several research streams also speak to the role of social media in supporting citizen action against corruption. The emerging picture is rather nuanced and cautions against an overenthusiastic embrace, as well as against a too critical dismissal of social media as an important factor.

A first exploratory trawl of corruption conversations in the social media sphere in the United Kingdom and Romania finds the topic of corruption to be one of the most widely referenced societal challenges, with close to 1 million references in less than six months, putting it ahead of unemployment and inequality. On the other hand, the analysis also confirms that big institutional voices retain a significant, largely dominant role in the debate around corruption, though the pool of opinion leaders has expanded somewhat and also includes some new voices, particularly in Romania. Spikes in related corruption conversations are clearly driven by related events (such as the Anti-Corruption Summit in the United Kingdom) and scandals (such as the Panama Papers). At the same time there is little evidence of either a high-volume, highly visible and more sustained policy debate around corruption, nor an indication that this suite of channels is used for swapping stories about personal experiences with corruption, which could potentially serve as an interesting complement to official reporting hotlines.

Evidence from the action experiment in Montenegro on the efficacy of different anti-corruption campaigns suggests that mixed-media strategies that combine social media with conventional outreach forms work best. Similarly, the analysis of data from NGO-run anti-corruption helplines finds social media and other electronic communication mechanisms as relevant but not more important or more popular than other modes for outreach and communication. In addition, a review of online platforms offering crowd-reporting mechanisms for corruption incidences finds a very mixed evidence base that points to significant difficulties in sustaining interest and converting reports into effective pressure for reforms.
The place of citizen action in institutional anti-corruption reforms: a symbiotic relation with much room for improvement

One of the overarching objectives of the ANTICORRP initiative is to produce evidence on and examine plausible pathways for anti-corruption reforms. A central question for this work package that is focused on citizen action is thus to examine what place citizen-centric initiatives have in the context of broader institutional reform strategies. Several research streams confirm the dynamic and important interplay between citizen action against corruption and formal anti-corruption institutions, as well as broader institutional structures. Effective anti-corruption institutions shape reporting behaviours, encouraging more reporting in weaker institutional settings and acting as something of a substitute in stronger institutional settings, in which such institutions are trusted to tackle bribery and do not strongly incentivize additional reporting by citizens.

Likewise, there is no isolated, self-standing, bottom-up mechanism, no NGO reporting hotline, social audit or feedback system, that does not respond to and is not shaped by and most effective when used in tactical synergy with formal institutional mechanisms, such as responsive anti-corruption commissions, government-run reporting windows or public service providers, and the broader institutional framework of anti-corruption laws, freedom of information rules, etc. that supports these institutional actors.

Social accountability appears to work best when it accords with political will and encounters responsive office-holders – a central tenet from the social accountability stock-taking exercise. NGO reporting hotlines are typically more used as a last resort rather than as a first point of call, as suggested by the focus groups and survey work. And the very exploratory social design experiments in Lithuania, with light-hearted service feedback systems in hospitals, raise tentative hopes that integrating such feedback systems very literally on site into the operations of public hospitals can play a part in better revealing expectations about service quality and promoting a conversation around professional values that could foster more integrity in the longer run in what are high-corruption-risk environments.

At the same time the intricate interplay between citizen and government action also unfolds the other way round: the longer-term efficacy of formal anti-corruption institutions and related reforms will hinge on an active, watchful, supportive citizenry and civil society that support reformers in their struggle against vested interests, test, use and catalyse the use of reporting systems, disclosure initiatives and participation options and complement official with civic action when the former falls short.

Several research streams also indicate that the interfaces between government and citizen action against corruption provide ample room for improvement, require constant refinement and will have to evolve iteratively via trial and error, informed by accompanying research strategies that are more open and rapid than many conventional research approaches. Examples include the in-depth case study from Portugal, which demonstrates the need to make official reporting hotlines more user-friendly and trustworthy, embed such mechanisms in strong provisions for whistleblower protection and establish much more interactive features that provide aggregate and individual information on case follow-up, turnaround times, outcomes and so on. The latter seems particularly pertinent given that our survey data suggests that more than 6 million incidents of corruption were reported across Europe and central Asia during a recent 12-month time period, without much systematic information from government being made available in terms of follow-up and outcome.

As another example for strong demand for better citizen–government interfaces, the data dive and related case study on open data in the United Kingdom underlines the need to step up collaboration between governments as holders of public data and the entrepreneurial intermediaries that seek to harness and curate such databases for practical applications and easier public access. This multifaceted interplay between citizen and government action strongly suggests that governments should genuinely recognise the
hugely valuable and productive role that citizens can and will play in tackling corruption, and that they can be enormously helpful in facilitating such citizen engagement beyond the essentials of protecting freedom of expression and association.

Making citizen engagement work better: new horizons for practice and research

The research summarised in this report also points towards a number of ideas and areas for further innovation.

The role of business as a potential ally and change agent for social accountability initiatives, for example, seems quite under-explored at the moment, and moving beyond external support in the direction of experimenting with a set of innovative funding models for collective citizen action can also be flagged as an area for further investigation. A recurring idea from a number of research streams could be summarised as the outward versus inward strategy: in addition to the current centripetal approach, of trying to bring people into pure-play anti-corruption initiatives, it might also be worthwhile to explore the opportunities that come with a centrifugal stance of taking slivers of citizen-focused anti-corruption engagement out into the world and making it resonant with and integrative of other outlets for civic engagement and other struggles for social, environmental and political justice. For example, one of the main suggestions from the social accountability stock-take is to embrace a richer concept of citizens: one that recognises that most people face time and resource constraints and/or lack interest in engaging with anti-corruption initiatives, but are nonetheless deeply embedded and invested in a variety of civic networks and community organisations built around their identities, beliefs, social roles and personal passions, which could provide the basis for a more effective mobilising and organising structure. The focus group research at individual level suggests that professional values might deserve more attention for mobilising corruption reporters, while the invocation of values of fair treatment, dignity and a positive self-image might constitute a good complement for current narratives that seek to encourage people to take action primarily by stressing social damage or altruistic impact.

On the research side, our understanding of (anti-)corruption dynamics has evolved significantly, underpinned by new research approaches, data sets and learning collectives. This work package has sought to experiment with unconventional or rarely used additions to this research repertoire, and also to identify a number of interesting areas and questions for future research.

In Romania, Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina a total of 11 focus groups were carried out, primarily with users of anti-corruption support centres, to get a better view of the motivations and experiences of people who have taken a stand against corruption. The focus group method proved quite useful in terms of producing a richer account that complements related survey research, yet it turned out to be rather difficult to recruit a broader range of people into such focus groups and provide a trusted space for discussing what is, after all, a sensitive issue.

The research approach in Lithuania was innovative in two ways: it construed an action experiment around a social design intervention to raise service integrity in hospitals; and it took a tactical, indirect approach to promote a reflection on values, entitlements and service standards rather than seeking to address corruption head-on, following in some ways the much-referenced admonition by Danny Kaufman that fighting corruption by fighting corruption might not always be the best strategy. Although the work was very exploratory it did provide some early and encouraging indications that expanding this type of experimentation might be warranted, as might connecting anti-corruption activities more strongly to insights from behavioural science and social design practice.

To gauge the utility of open government data, a practical data dive exercise was carried out in the United Kingdom. Not only did it yield a very practical picture of the sobering limitations and poor quality of the data sets but it also functioned as a miniature focus group, providing a good sense of the user journey and how users felt about and experienced this type of data trawl. Given that it generated interesting insights on several levels, the conclusion is that such action-oriented data usage initiatives genuinely offer themselves as a promising research and learning approach for the future.

Equally exploratory was the idea to analyse the chatter about corruption on social media, with a view to achieving a better understanding of what makes people either take action on or remain disengaged from corruption. This approach turned out to come with a quite a few challenges, from data and tool limitations to cost issues. The verdict on the use of social media analysis in the field of anti-corruption activities is therefore still uncertain. Given the significant and growing relevance of social media conversation for all kinds of political engagement and mobilisation issues, however, it is all but essential to continue experimenting in this space and make use of the rapidly improving analytical tools available.

Moreover, future research on citizen engagement in terms of corruption might benefit from paying closer attention to the ripple and peer (non-)effects of citizen action against corruption and to instances of pluralistic ignorance, whereby discrepancies between perceived and actual norms exist. Both strategies may offer interesting cues for longer-term transformational opportunities.

The inclusion of some more open-ended, ethnographic approaches may well also prove to be a helpful complement to the current focus on randomised controlled trials and surveys, which face a number of limitations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would be advantageous to acknowledge more fully that tackling corruption is not a technocratic win-win exercise of unlocking new development opportunities but, rather, is about taking on power and vested interests, with frequent setbacks, unforeseen counter-strategies and uneven progress more the rule than the exception. Such a recognition raises serious questions about applying common assumptions about the external validity, and even replicability, of research methods and about standard expectations concerning the impacts, scalability and sustainability of the intervention itself. Tackling corruption is not a hand-washing intervention, and research strategies need to be adjusted to this, focusing not on construing projects around interesting research questions but on fitting research for continuing, adaptive learning and iterative improvements around existing efforts to make a difference. This is neither a new nor a very original observation, but it is perhaps the most noteworthy and the most consequential for future research on confronting corruption.
**Introduction and rationale**

Work package 7 of the ANTICORRP research initiative puts the focus firmly on better understanding which types of citizens take (or do not take) what kinds of action against corruption under what circumstances, with what impact and with what kind of evidence-based promising pathways on the horizon for future such engagements. This analysis of citizen action against corruption is a very timely and topical endeavour.

Strategies for tackling corruption have advanced considerably during the last decade in tandem with and partly informed by our evolving understanding of the phenomenon of corruption itself. While earlier reform efforts put the focus squarely on improving legislative frameworks and the institutional checks and balances required for integrity, attention has more recently shifted towards the role of citizens themselves as a fifth pillar (in addition to the three branches of government and the media, frequently referred to as the fourth estate) in helping prevent and sanction corruption. Consider, for example, the bold claim that prefaces a recent authoritative overview of research on whistleblowing, one of the roles that citizens can assume in helping tackle corruption: ‘In the modern age of institutions, whistleblowing is now established as one of the most important processes – if not the single most important process – by which governments and corporations are kept accountable to the societies they are meant to serve and service.’

People engagement has thus become an important strategic pillar for inside governance reformers, as well as outside anti-corruption advocacy organisations. Of course, citizens have always been accorded an important role in governance reforms in at least two major respects: as voters and their ability/willingness to punish corruption at the ballot box; and as potential participants in broader social movements for social justice, democratisation, etc. Both anti-corruption policy practice and research had for quite some time focused on these two areas. More recently, however, a wider array of citizen action against corruption has come into focus, propelled by a number of often interrelated trends, including: rapidly evolving information and communication technologies (ICTs); the professionalisation of civil society organisations as tactical intermediaries; an expansive normative and practical paradigm of citizen-centric governance and co-production; the era of open government and big data; the lived experience of widespread and highly visible public protests focused on corruption in a number of countries; the growing sense that legal and institutional reforms require extra pressure for effective enforcement and efficacy; and the perceived decline (real or not) of some traditional watchdog institutions, such as conventional local media outlets. All these dynamics have contributed to a growing enthusiasm about the role and potential of citizens to help tackle corruption and given rise to a much richer repertoire of citizen engagement and actions against corruption that considers the citizen as

1. Voter, to hold corrupt governments to account at the ballot box

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2. Participant, in public anti-corruption protests
3. direct victim and witness of corruption, and thus potential refuser, reporter, litigant or whistleblower on corrupt acts  
4. volunteer in social accountability initiatives, donating time, expertise and voice to help monitor budget spending, lifestyles, public works projects, etc.
5. norm bearer and norm propagator, and thus potential driver for changes in organisational cultures and sentiments towards corruption
6. civic co-producer of services and governance, which may be able to route around or reduce corruption risks, for example when peer-to-peer lending, banking, transport or authentication techniques route around corruption risks in the public provision of these services, or when radical decentralisation via self-produced electricity, water purification, etc. provides individualised alternatives to established services.

The research agenda for WP7 focuses squarely on roles 3 and 4 in this list. The reason is that role 1 has already been extensively researched, role 2 is being actively investigated in the context of broader social movement studies, while role 5 is more of a cross-cutting engagement opportunity that intersects heavily with 3 and 4 anyway, and is as such also covered by the analysis. Role 5 is still too new and would only merit a very speculative approach but cannot really be examined in a thorough empirical way for the time being.

In contrast, roles 3 and 4 represent the most interesting areas for analysis at the moment, since these are practices that are (i) already very widespread, (ii) are being dramatically reworked by the dynamics outlined above and gifted with new potentials and opportunities, and (iii) are the most immediate and targeted actions that aim directly at preventing or sanctioning specific corrupt acts, and therefore have the most immediate impact on remedial action, effective law enforcement, corrupt practices and thus also on related norms and beliefs (role 5).

This research synthesis report documents the different research strategies that have been pursued to make progress on contributing some new insights for answering this overarching questions, discusses the most pertinent insights, draws out policy implications and offers ideas for future research and experimentation in this area.

In more detail: section B presents an overview of the research approach. It describes the set of more specific research objectives and then introduces the different research strategies that have been selected to address them. The overall research mix consists consist of a multi-country representative citizen survey; a desk-based stock-take exercise, quantitative analysis of helpline data and social media, focus groups, in-depth mixed methodologies case studies and two action research experiments. Section C summarises all eleven individual research exercises in more detail. It describes the respective methodologies and rationales, elaborates on relations to other research streams and presents the key findings and insights.

Section D provides some final notes and thoughts. Rather than attempting the unrealistic task of conclusively summarising this vast and deep pool of insights, this final section just flags a few particularly

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5 From a legal and policy perspective it is at times very important to distinguish whistleblowers as organisational insiders from the broader category of corruption reporters that also includes outside witnesses and others. Whistleblowers face particular risks of intimidation and retaliation (threat of job loss, pressure by colleagues etc.) and thus deserve very specific legal protections. Yet, in practice the distinction is often not quite as clear cut and for the purpose of this research study both categories are used interchangeably where a strict definitional distinction is not necessary.
pertinent insights and groups them around the two clusters of individual corruption-reporting and collective anti-corruption action. Even with such a somewhat bounded focus on certain aspects of citizen action against corruption, the task for research and subsequent synthesising and translating messages back into policy language is still a highly daunting one. It is therefore important to note that most of the individual research streams also come with separate, more detailed research reports that are being submitted as part of a case study repository that represents a separate deliverable.

Research approach

Research objectives

Under the broad umbrella of advancing our understanding of citizen action against corruption, WP7 set out to address the following more specific research questions.

- To gain a better understanding of how citizens experience and react to daily corruption and of how they can be further mobilised to resist bribe-paying and take action against corruption.
- To review and synthesise the multi-disciplinary state of knowledge on how individual attitudes and motivations vis-à-vis corruption, civic and political engagement are formed and under what circumstances they are translated into action.
- To develop an empirically representative evidence base on EU citizens’ attitudes and perceptions towards different forms of corruption, with a particular focus on their motivations, strategies and perceived constraints in taking action against it or refraining from doing so.
- To explore the socio-economic profile, motivations and focus of concerns of citizens who have reported corruption concerns to helplines across Europe.
- To gain a detailed understanding of successful individual strategies deployed by citizens to resist corruption.
- To gain a better understanding of how innovative social accountability tools based on collective citizen action (such as budget monitoring and social audits) can support the fight against corruption and how their potential can be fully utilised.
- To review the empirical evidence base on the scope use and impact of key social accountability mechanisms around the world.
- To examine in more detail how and with what degree of success these tools are actually being used across Europe.
- To further examine the efficacy and potential of related innovative interventions through field experiments.

Research activities

The research objectives cover a vast thematic area, from micro-level psychological factors and incentives for individual predispositions, beliefs and incentives related to engaging against corruption to meso-level organisational forms and institutional embedding of citizen actions to macro-structural enabling and containing factors, patterns and profiles of anti-corruption action. In addition, citizen action against corruption in itself can take many forms and shapes. In order to do justice to this enormous breadth and
depth, a mixed-method approach was pursued containing the following elements. The abbreviations at the start are used throughout the report to refer to specific research activities.

- **S1**: a large scale citizen survey to probe a representative sample of citizens across Europe and in select comparator countries on their experience, attitudes and engagement against corruption (Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International Secretariat).
- **S2**: a stock-take based on desk research on the evidence base for social accountability mechanisms and their efficacy in tackling corruption and strengthening accountability (Transparency International Secretariat).
- **S3–4**: an analysis of primary data from an international network of anti-corruption helplines (S3) and from the social media sphere (S4) in two countries, the United Kingdom and Romania, in order to better understand who reports about what types of corruption issues and whether social media serves as a channel for citizen engagement on corruption issues.
- **A1–3**: a series of focus groups in three countries (Macedonia: A1; Romania: A2; and Bosnia and Herzegovina: A3) primarily with people who have stood up against and reported corruption, in order to better understand their motivations for doing so and the constraints that such reporting faces.
- **B1–2**: in-depth case studies of a major public corruption-reporting mechanism in Portugal (B1) and an in-depth exploration of an open data initiative in the United Kingdom (B2), in order to examine how the concrete interfaces for corruption reporting and the technical tools for engaging people around open government initiatives work in action.
- **C1–2**: qualitative in-country experiments to test how innovative feedback systems in the health sector could be a step towards more integrity (Lithuania: C1) and how people respond to different mobilisation strategies (Montenegro: C2).

It is important to keep in mind that ANTICORRP and all its work packages were conceived five years ago, in 2011. Given the rapidly evolving research and policy landscape in this area, it was therefore imperative to make incremental adjustments to the envisaged research strategy along the way. For example, a social media analysis (S4) was not directly planned at the outset but emerged as important complementary area of enquiry in addressing the research objectives and informing other deliverables. Likewise, the publication of a number of social accountability stock-take reports over the last few years provided the opportunity to reposition our own stock-take exercise as a meta-review that takes advantage of and productively complements the extant reviews. Emerging evidence from these stock-take exercises pointed towards the pivotal role of the government–civil society nexus and strongly suggests the need to pay more attention to the interplay between formal institutions and social accountability initiatives. For this reason, we decided to refocus one social accountability case study (B1) on examining an official corruption-reporting mechanism as a complement to other civil-society-focused cases. Finally, social design at the service of changing norms and behaviour based on the latest social psychological insights and experiments has arrived in full swing in the development and governance arena. Often referred to simply as the ‘nudge’ approach, this crossover between psychology and development has spawned a thriving research and policy community, culminating so far in the World Development Report 2015 on mind, society and behaviour. We have taken advantage of this new source of creative energy and expertise and carried out a design intervention in the health sector of Lithuania (C1) to gain initial insights on the viability of such an approach.

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Research in detail

Given the considerable number of different research activities and the many different ways to slice up the evidence we decided to present each research module separately describing approach, methodology and major findings and then conclude on an more integrated discussion of insights related to a set of key research questions. Detailed research reports are available for all these research activities as part of separate deliverables for this work package with the exception of S3.

S1, is available as full dataset (deliverable D7.1) and will also form the basis for a separate research report by Transparency International to be published in Q4 2016, which is however not a part of the ANTICORRP WP7 deliverables.
Citizen Survey (S1)

Theme
Citizen perceptions, experience and attitudes regarding corruption and taking action against corruption.

Scope and approach
A representative household survey – the TI Global Corruption Barometer Europe 2016 – has been carried out in 42 European, central Asian (ECA) and a number of key comparator countries (total of more than 50,000 survey respondents). The bulk of the fieldwork was carried out between Q4 2015 and Q2 2016. Depending on the country context, the survey was conducted face to face using computer-assisted technology in the majority of countries, and by phone via random digital dialling in a smaller set of countries.7

A catalogue of more than 20 question based on the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)8 and further developed in collaboration with survey experts and the ANTICORRP consortium was implemented to probe (i) experience with corruption in specific service environments; (ii) perceptions of corruption with regard to specific institutions; (iii) some normative attitudes about corruption issues; and (iv) experiences and attitudes in relation to reporting corruption and taking other actions against it. The full survey questionnaire is included in Annex 1.

The survey strikes a careful balance between consistency and agility. On the one hand it includes a core set of tried and tested questions that have been part of the Global Corruption Barometer in previous survey rounds, in order to ensure comparability, traceability over time and the availability of the largest uninterrupted time series of data on corruption experiences and perceptions across the world. At the same time, the survey also includes a set of new questions directly targeted on probing in more detail citizen engagement with corruption, such as information on actual reporting versus the conventional approach of asking about the willingness to report.

The data set itself is the main related deliverable of the work package and will be available fully and publicly for further research. Given the richness of the data and also the possibility of comparing over time and with other regions and comparator countries, we have for the purpose of this work package only carried out a very limited analysis geared towards our research objectives. A more comprehensive report on the overall descriptive insights from the survey will be compiled and published later this year, and we will use much more of the data in the coming months and years for further analysis. In addition, we also strongly encourage other researchers to take advantage of this data opportunity.

Key findings
A dominant assumption within the accountability and anti-corruption literature is that citizens are willing to engage and fight corruption when faced with it. Corruption is characterised as predominantly a principal–agent failure, in which better monitoring of agents (civil servants and bureaucrats) by the principal (citizens) would lead to reduced corruption. Another assumption is that citizens are inherently motivated to make their voice heard to establish higher levels of accountability. Many recent studies have questioned

7 All technical details are further elaborated in Deliverable D7.1. Data collection for parts of this was carried out on occasion of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and its third ‘Life in Transition Survey’ (LITS III), www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/data/lits.html. However the GCB is a separate survey component and both design and analysis remains the sole responsibility of TI and does not in any way reflect the opinion of the EBRD.
these assumptions, however. Recent literature looks at corruption through a collective action lens. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), Bauhr and Grimes (2014) theorise that, in endemic corruption settings, citizens are more likely to participate in corrupt transactions than resist them as they see corruption as the only way to ‘get things done’. Bauhr (2016) also suggests that citizens’ willingness and intent to act against corruption is also contingent on the form of corruption. She hypothesises that citizens are more willing to take action against corruption when corruption is needed to obtain ‘fair’ treatment (‘need’ corruption) as opposed to corruption used to obtain special benefits (‘greed’ corruption).

In this report, we take advantage of the European regional survey of Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer survey to better understand some of the key drivers behind citizens’ motivation in taking action against corruption, especially their reporting behaviour when faced with corruption. We treat corruption reporting as the key anti-corruption behaviour, since it has the greatest relevance to respondents, particularly in many ECA countries, where bribery and corruption are still widespread. The GCB 2013 indicated that a majority of respondents (69 per cent) said they would report a case of corruption. Numbers on actual reporting are much lower, however. We attempt to understand the gap between stated willingness to report and actual corruption-reporting behaviour.

The question we are most interested in is:

Did you report any of the incidents where you or a member of your household made an unofficial payment or gift to a government official/someone in authority?

We also investigate the question on people’s willingness to report corruption, captured through the question:

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: if I witnessed an act of corruption, I would feel personally obliged to report it.

Similar to the analysis in Peiffer and Alvarez (2014), we use questions on perceptions on corruption to test their effect on people’s propensity to report. The perception of corruption being rampant in society could be one of the drivers affecting people’s reporting behaviour. According to Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), when people perceive corruption to be rampant it dampens their motivation to act against it. To assess people’s perception of levels of corruption in their country, we use the GCB question that asks people their perception of how often others like them have to make unofficial payments or gifts to obtain public services. The survey asks respondents to provide their opinions for eight commonly used services. People’s perceptions of their government’s effectiveness in fighting corruption can also have an effect on their reporting behaviour. For this, we use the GCB question on how well or badly their government is handling the fight against corruption. When people perceive their government to be fighting corruption

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well, they may have greater levels of trust in their institutions, thereby increasing their willingness to report cases of corruption.

Individual experiences with corruption also play a dominant role in shaping people’s propensity to report corruption to authorities. We test this using the total number of bribes an individual has paid over the past year across the eight different services they are asked in the GCB. As in Peiffer and Alvarez (2014), we expect the more bribes an individual has paid, the less willing he or she will be to report or take any action against corruption. We also test the effect that coming into contact with public institutions/services has on reporting corruption. People who are in more frequent contact with public services may have more to gain from having a corruption-free environment. Therefore, we test how this influences people’s reporting behaviour.

In line with the terminology used by Bauhr (2016) of ‘need’ and ‘greed’ corruption, we investigate the effect the two different forms of corruption have on reporting. We take advantage of the question that asks respondents whether they were asked to pay a bribe or whether they offered to do so. Using this question, we are able to construct a variable for ‘voluntary’ bribe payments as opposed to ‘extortionary’ bribe payments.

In addition, we also control for the influence of gender, age, education and location as possible drivers for people’s behaviour in reporting corruption.

The following sections of this report are structured in the following manner. First we analyse the questions on corruption/bribery experience, especially people’s reported experience with bribery when they come into contact with one of eight common public services. We focus specifically on the question that asked respondents if they had reported a case of bribery to the relevant authorities, if they had paid a bribe to obtain a specific service. In addition, the survey also carried several questions aimed at understanding people’s perceptions around corruption reporting in their country. These questions explored people’s views on how prevalent it is to report corruption in their country and reasons why people may not report corruption. Additionally, the survey also asked respondents their views on things ordinary people can do to fight corruption, including the option of reporting a case of corruption, among others. Finally, we complete the analysis by investigating people’s own willingness to report corruption if they have been to witness it.

In the following sections, we start by providing descriptive summaries of the various questions as stated above. Further, we follow this up by investigating some of the possible drivers for actual corruption reporting, as well as willingness to report, through a logit regression analysis. The final section provides a brief discussion of the findings.

Incidence of corruption and actual reporting behaviour
Citizens in Europe, especially in eastern Europe and transition economies, continue to face corruption, particularly in the form of undocumented payments to receive key public services. Some 13 per cent of households utilising public services across ECA countries reported having paid undocumented payments in order to receive a service over a 12-month period. This figure is similar to the findings of the special Eurobarometer survey on corruption in 2014, which found that 13 per cent of citizens in new EU member states had experienced corruption.\(^\text{14}\) According to the GCB 2016 the rate of bribery was high in many eastern European states, central Asian transition economies and the western Balkans, with over one in five individuals paying a bribe to receive a public service. Of those who experienced corruption only 21.5 per

\(^{14}\) European Commission, Corruption: Special Eurobarometer 397 (Brussels: European Commission, 2014).
cent reported it to the appropriate authorities. This reporting rate was higher than the findings of the special Eurobarometer survey from 2014, which found an overall reporting rate of approximately 12 per cent.\textsuperscript{15} Corruption reporting was lowest in Baltic countries such as Latvia and Lithuania, as well as in other post-Soviet countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, where fewer than one-tenth of the people experiencing corruption reported it to relevant authorities.

\textbf{Exhibit 1 Percentages of overall bribery rate and corresponding reporting rate per country}\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Bribery rate and reporting corruption}
\end{figure}

Latvia (4.5 per cent), Armenia (5.1 per cent), Lithuania (5.6 per cent) and Belarus (8 per cent) were the countries with the lowest reporting rates, similar to the findings of the special Eurobarometer survey on corruption.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} European Commission (2014). It should be noted however that the set of countries surveyed is not fully identical with the GCB coverage and that the GCB asks about reporting by household members, whereas the Eurobarometer asks only about reporting by surveyed individuals.

\textsuperscript{16} The following countries have less than sixty reported bribery cases in the respective samples so the actual reporting rate in these countries may fluctuate quite significantly and should be interpreted very carefully: Cyprus, Georgia, Germany, Slovenia, Spain and Portugal.

\textsuperscript{17} European Commission (2014).
Reporting by service

Reporting rates for bribes paid to access various services also differ across Europe. Reporting corruption to authorities was highest among people who had paid undocumented payments to access unemployment benefits or services from a court. Approximately 40 per cent of people who had paid a bribe to obtain services from these institutions also reported them to the authorities. At the other end of the spectrum, however, reporting bribe payments to obtain medical services were the least reported. Only 14 per cent of people who had paid a bribe to get medical treatment said they had reported it to the authorities.

Exhibit 2 Percentage of respondents reporting corruption by service

![Graph showing reporting rates by service]

Interestingly, people’s reasons for reporting behaviour also seem to depend on whether a bribe was extorted or whether a bribe was volunteered by a respondent. For example, in services with high reporting rates, such as obtaining unemployment benefits and the courts, respondents also faced higher levels of extortion – that is, they were asked to pay a bribe to receive a service. While a high percentage of respondents paying bribes for medical treatment paid bribes voluntarily, 32.6 per cent of respondents who paid a bribe to receive medical treatment did so without being asked for it and/or to express their gratitude. This is in line with Bauhr’s (2016) classification of ‘need’ versus ‘greed’ corruption influencing people’s propensity to take action against corruption.

Perceptions and beliefs regarding corruption

Reporting on corruption is associated with people’s perceptions of reporting behaviour in their country. Predominantly, only a small number of people perceive their peers to be reporting cases of corruption to the authorities.
Among the reasons given for citizens not reporting corruption, fear of the consequences of reporting seems to be the greatest obstacle. More than one person in four (28.8 per cent) surveyed across Europe gave fear of retaliation as the main reason why people do not report cases of corruption. The special Eurobarometer survey on corruption also found a similar proportion (31 per cent) of respondents citing fear of the consequences being a barrier for citizen reporting on corruption. Surprisingly, almost 50 per cent of respondents even in high-income countries in western Europe such as France, Switzerland and the Netherlands stated that fear of retaliation was the main cause for not reporting corruption. Corruption being a topic that is too difficult to prove was the second most perceived reason, with no action being taken the third most perceived reason for not reporting.

**Can ordinary people fight corruption?**
The survey also asked respondents about things ordinary people can do to fight corruption. The overall outlook across Europe is one of pessimism. Almost one in three respondents said there is nothing ordinary people can do to fight corruption in Europe. This figure was higher in the central Asian republics, where almost 40 per cent of respondents expressed their inability to do anything against corruption. Citizens in western Europe were more optimistic, with only 17.5 per cent saying they cannot do anything to fight corruption.

**Exhibit 4** Response rates across different regions of Europe on things ordinary people can do to fight corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Caucasus</th>
<th>Balkans</th>
<th>Baltics</th>
<th>Eastern Europe and central Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordinary people cannot do anything</strong></td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refuse to pay bribes</strong></td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Personal willingness to report corruption

The survey also asked respondents’ personal willingness to report a case of corruption if they witnessed it. Citizens in most countries expressed their desire to report corruption and stated that they would be willing to report corruption if they witnessed it. There were a few notable exceptions, however, especially in the central and eastern European states of Armenia, Belarus, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia and the Slovak Republic, where respondents were pessimistic and a majority said they would be unwilling to report corruption.

Exhibit 5 Percentage rate of people’s stated willingness to fight corruption per country

Personal willingness to report corruption also does not vary much when we disaggregate it by gender or location of respondent. Women are as likely as men in their willingness to report corruption when they witness it. Similarly, respondents in rural areas are as likely as their urban counterparts in their willingness to report corruption.
Drivers motivating citizens’ reporting of corruption

In this section we investigate some of the main individual-level drivers that may influence citizens to report a case of corruption. We investigate drivers for actual corruption reporting. The GCB survey in Europe asked respondents whether they had reported any undocumented payments they had made in the previous year across eight different services. Utilising this question, we constructed an indicator for corruption reporting that classified respondents as ‘Reporters’ or ‘Non-reporters’ based on whether they had reported at least one case of corruption to the authorities if they had paid a bribe to obtain a service in the previous year.

We followed three lines of enquiry for testing drivers/factors that influenced people’s corruption-reporting behaviour. We tested the effect of people’s perceptions of corruption and bribery in the country and perceptions of governmental effectiveness in tackling corruption on people’s reporting behaviour. We also investigated the effect of corruption experience on corruption reporting and, finally, the effect of voluntary bribe payments on corruption reporting.
Experiencing bribery seems to be the biggest driver motivating people to take action against corruption. People are most likely to report a case of corruption if they are more exposed to bribery. Survey respondents or their households that paid a higher number of bribes to obtain public services over the previous year were significantly more likely to report these instances to authorities. Interestingly, people who offered to pay bribes rather than being asked to pay bribes were significantly less likely to report corruption. This finding provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that people who deliberately engage in a corrupt transaction are less likely to cry foul about corruption and make a report against it. This could also be viewed with a moral lens, whereby the bribe-payer feels implicated in the act of corruption and therefore will be less prone to complain about it. On the other hand, people who are coerced or extorted for a bribe, as well as those who have been exposed to a higher number of corrupt transactions, are the most likely to report corruption. Interestingly, people’s perception of corruption does not seem to be a big driver for reporting corruption. Although people who perceive corruption to be high in public...
service transactions tend to report more often, this result is not statistically significant when controlling for exposure to a higher number of corrupt transactions. Additionally, when controlling for voluntary bribe payments, people’s perception of their government’s effectiveness in fighting corruption is a significant driver for greater reporting of corruption. In other words, respondents who perceive their government to be doing well in tackling corruption are significantly more likely to report corruption when they are extorted to pay money to obtain public services that are otherwise free of cost.

Further to investigating what motivates people to report corruption cases, we also analysed people’s stated willingness to report corruption if they were to witness it. We tested the effects of the same individual-level characteristics on people’s willingness to report corruption. Perceptions of governmental effectiveness in handling corruption positively influence people’s willingness to take action against corruption. This relationship is not statistically significant, however. The analysis was carried out first on the full sample of respondents, and then limited to those who had experienced paying a bribe in the previous year. In the full sample, experiences with a higher number of bribe payments significantly dampened people’s willingness to report corruption, controlling for people’s perceptions of corruption and their government’s effectiveness in tackling it. We also controlled for a host of socio-economic and demographic factors. The education level of respondents is also a significant influencer of their willingness to report corruption. People with a higher degree of education were significantly more willing to report a case of corruption if they witnessed it, keeping all other factors constant. ¹⁸

When limiting the analysis to bribe-payers only, people’s perceptions of their government’s effectiveness in fighting corruption becomes a significant motivator for their willingness to report. In other words, respondents who have experienced a higher number of corrupt transactions in the previous year are significantly more willing to report corruption if they trust their government to be taking the initiative in fighting it.

¹⁸ The effect here might however, and capture income effects that in this first analytical cut could not be unpacked in more detail, since only individual incomes are recorded in the GCB, and they need to be translated into relative country-level income group classifications to allow for further analysis.
Exhibit 8 Logit regression results on factors influencing people’s stated willingness to report corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness to Report Corruption to the authorities (odds ratio)</th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>Bribe payers only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of high levels of corruption</td>
<td>0.96**</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness in fighting corruption</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bribes paid by respondent if came in contact with services</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of contacts each respondent or household had with services</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic/demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of primary respondent</td>
<td>1.03***</td>
<td>1.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of primary respondent</td>
<td>0.99**</td>
<td>0.99*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of respondent (Urban)</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>41,635</td>
<td>41,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;
Stock-take social accountability (S2)

Theme
Taking stock and looking forward: social accountability research and practice.

Approach
Social accountability initiatives in many forms and shapes have proliferated as part of anti-corruption efforts. They are designed to help monitor, audit and track input to and feedback on open government and service provision, and to detect and sanction or deter and prevent corrupt actions. Social accountability in an anti-corruption context is thus a transmission mechanism for people engagement and people empowerment. It is underpinned by the ambition to harness the growing public frustration and anger with corruption and channel its energy and collective power into targeted transformational anti-corruption reforms. Such great hopes for and proliferating practice in social accountability have also motivated us to include a stock-take of the emerging research and evidence on social accountability as an important task in our work package on citizen action against corruption in 2011, when the ANTICORRP research consortium was put together.

What has changed in the last five years, however, and what has come as a positive surprise, is the really rapid development of an increasingly expansive and professionalised research and learning community around social accountability. The last five years have witnessed not only a rapidly growing number of primary research projects dedicated to examining the impacts of social accountability mechanisms but also the growth of several large learning collaboratives aimed at compiling and synthesising the fast-growing body of primary evidence. These efforts have also spawned a number of impressively comprehensive and very contemporary synthesis reports. Against this backdrop, we decided not to reinvent the wheel and revisit the vast primary evidence base that has already been so expertly dissected, inspected and synthesised from a variety of perspectives. Instead, we sought to add value to this thriving literature by taking

- one step back, and synthesise the syntheses, together with somewhat expanding the scope of the evidence base to some related areas of social action that are closely related to but are typically not considered under the social accountability umbrella
- one step out, and provide an overview of the related learning and research landscape, the approaches to research, learning and project design that are practised and promoted

And, all along, we have sought to offer some speculative ideas and perhaps slightly provocative observations, to help enrich and inspire the conversation on the future research, policy and action agenda for social accountability.

More specifically, the stock-take is organised into four parts.

1. A summary of key insights from the existing synthesis reports.
2. Resulting ideas for future social accountability activities and promising and/or overlooked things to try out.
3. Implications for the design of social accountability initiatives.
4. A fresh look at social accountability research strategies.

As such, this stock-take is based on a continuous scanning exercise that, essentially, started at the inception of ANTICORRP to inform the design of other related research streams in this work package and that has
added new relevant studies and synthesis reports throughout the ANTICORRP project lifespan. One segment of the stock-take that has focused on the empirics of technology-related crowd-reporting mechanisms has already been spun off and developed into a conference presentation (Oxford Internet Institute, September 2014) and a peer-reviewed academic article that will be submitted as Deliverable D7.6.19

Key findings
Given that the stock-take is already covered in two separate WP deliverables (a 40-page report as Deliverable D7.2) and the peer-reviewed journal article D7.6, the following sections present only a very brief and selective overview of key findings that have directly motivated the design of other research streams in this work package.

The synthesis literature on social accountability is sprawling. Yet there is a rather striking degree of agreement. Most overviews coalesce around a set of central insights and findings that are quickly gaining the status of basic truths in social accountability.

Conceptual frameworks – a rich tapestry of typologies
The term ‘social accountability’ has a long and distinguished history and has been deployed in many different contexts for very different purposes. The 2004 World Development Report (WDR: published in 2003) was, at that time, the most visible planting of an ideational and conceptual flag for social accountability in the policy community. Since then (and partly reaching back much further) theoretical and conceptual elaborations of the concept have grown rapidly, creating a very colourful landscape of different typologies and definitions. The most recent and pragmatic definition that has gained currency in the literature comes from Fox (2015), who invites us to see social accountability as ‘an evolving umbrella category that includes: citizen monitoring and oversight of public and/or private sector performance, user-centered public information access/dissemination systems, public complaint and grievance redress mechanisms, as well as citizen participation in actual resource allocation decision-making, such as participatory budgeting’.20

Given the definitional pluralism that surrounds social accountability, it is not surprising that many different approaches have emerged to slice up the concept, situate it in broader notions of governance and accountability and develop conceptual frameworks around it. The WDR 2004 employed the terms of long and short routes of accountability, emphasising how social accountability operates more directly (people holding service providers directly to account) as compared to classic public accountability, when citizens hold elected office-holders to account via elections with regard to their performance in overseeing and ensuring the performance of public service delivery – the long route.21 Somewhat concurrently, the World Bank also popularised the notion of supply and demand sides of good governance, which acknowledges that more effective accountability can be driven either top-down or bottom-up, but that both are very much intertwined: the government institutions and their capacity to provide/responsiveness to improve

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accountability (supply side), on the one hand, and on the other side the demands by citizens and the pressure for more accountability that they can generate (the demand side).  

Others have further stressed and diversified this interplay by distinguishing between horizontal, vertical and diagonal mechanisms for accountability. There are checks and balances that formal political institutions exercise upon each other (horizontal), the classic political accountability that citizens can exercise through voting to hold their leaders to account (vertical) and the many interesting permutations in the middle that involve the interaction between both formal institutional accountability mechanisms and alternative citizen engagement instruments to generate accountability (diagonal). These latter two typologies have firmly shifted the focus onto the interrelated nature of citizen-led and government-provided accountability mechanism. Fox et al. offer another interesting way to think about and categorise social accountability interventions. Revisiting a number of seminal research exercises and widely quoted empirical studies, they propose to distinguish between initiatives that are more tactical in approach versus others that take a more strategic orientation. In this account, tactical social accountability is typically a one-tool intervention focused on citizen voice, more narrowly focused on a particular problem/accountability breakdown and often episodic in nature, while strategic social accountability is about longer-term, more comprehensive change initiatives. These strategic efforts bundle a set of interventions that seek to systematically change the enabling environment for accountability and harness the interplay of openings from above and mobilisation from below.

Does social accountability work? Or, what works and what does not in social accountability?

As with almost every development issue, the backdrop to this evidence trawl on what works in social accountability is a lively, largely unresolved debate about what should count as impact or, as ‘it works’, what should count as evidence and what should count as a viable research strategy to unearth it in the first place.

With regard to the range of impacts, many studies initially focused on some direct outcomes, such as reductions in leakage rates, bribery or staff absenteeism. This might have been partly related to methodological limitations, yet it has become clearer over time that this cannot do justice to the range of outcomes that social accountability mechanisms can yield over a longer time frame. Grandvoinnet et al., for example, give a good sense of the diversity of potential impacts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>State-society relationships</th>
<th>Social actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced corruption</td>
<td>Responsive public officials</td>
<td>Institutional channels for interaction</td>
<td>Improved provision of public goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive public officials</td>
<td>Better policy design</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Empowered citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better policy design</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td></td>
<td>State building</td>
<td>Inclusive social norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 9 Expanded impact of social accountability
Despite these contested issues and despite all the diversity in approach, focus and interpretation of all the evidence reviews, however, the overall, overarching message of all the synthesis is quite clear: the evidence is extremely mixed, no matter how it is sliced up. Some overview reports strike a more optimistic tone and highlight social accountability cases with demonstrable impact, but they are somewhat balanced out by others that paint a rather negative picture of high failure rates, while yet again others come down squarely in the middle, evidence on both sides in the ‘glass half empty and half full’ manner. With a bit of squinting one could perhaps read some kind of hype curve into these synthesis endeavours, with early overviews coming down more on the exuberant side, followed by a certain empirical disenchantment, then yet another more optimistic push when new tech and open governance have provided additional impetus to the field, while now one could feel as if some kind of balanced pragmatism (exhaustion?) has set in – but this is really a very subjective impression.

So, rather than passing a verdict on what works and what does not, it might be more helpful to draw the following conclusion: get on with it! There is a critical mass of solid evidence, soundly produced and showing significant positive impact for individual manifestations for, essentially, all types of social accountability mechanisms. The proof of concept that most kinds of social accountability interventions can work is certainly there, and that the incremental value for yet another big-picture summing up of the evidence in the hope of deriving some actionable prioritising of impactful interventions is rather limited.26

Information is not (sufficient) for power and accountability – yet it opens a huge design space
A lot of social accountability interventions are being built around information as a stimulus for change. It is therefore not surprising that many reviews sought to directly address whether this transmission mechanism from information to accountability holds. And the answer is consistent across all studies, that information alone is not enough. It must be the right kind of information in the right situation, and a lot of other enabling conditions need to be in place.

Joshi further unpacks and clusters some of these factors and arrives at a very comprehensive stylised causal chain of what conditions need to be met to turn information into action.

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26 To just quote one exemplary conclusion of a recent evidence paper: ‘There is a large body of evidence on social accountability making use of a good mix of methodologies. The focus on the impact of social accountability on corruption is, however, typically not the main focus of the studies reviewed. Nevertheless, the evidence does indicate overall that social accountability mechanisms can have an impact on levels of corruption, although the effect varies depending on the mechanism used.’ Department for International Development, Why Corruption Matters: Understanding Causes, Effects and How to Address Them (London: Department for International Development, 2015), p. 70.
Such a focus on the micro-causal chain of information transmission provides a bridge into a vast literature in social psychology that comes with many extremely useful insights on how to design disclosure and information interventions that respect cognitive load, help harness peer effects and shift attitudes and norms, and encourage and incentivise particular conduct.\(^2\)^

Two central insights from this rapidly growing literature are particularly relevant for social accountability interventions: (i) small tweaks in informational presentation can make a big difference in terms of impact; and (ii) the highly variable evidence once more does not suggest that there is a particular secret sauce that

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can be readily applied but, simply, that there is perhaps a larger set of plausible ingredients in the kitchen cabinet that can possibly add flavour and thus merit consideration.

**The cooling love affair with all things tech: a premature disenchantment?**

The meteoric rise of technology, particularly information and communication technologies, for empowerment and accountability has been closely related and perhaps inseparable from the euphoria with transparency as disinfectant. New ICTs in the hands of citizens were hoped to also offer new modes of mobilising and organising, of routing around accountability failures and of outwitting repressive controls on conventional media and public expression. The review literature very much concurs on clipping the wings of the tech hype. Technology has not turned out to be a magic bullet. It is more a tool of the already empowered and less a weapon of the weak. It succeeds where political will is already in place and only capability limitations need to be solved.

Yet the conclusion, close at hand, that technology will simply follow and amplify existing power asymmetries is problematic. There are a number of reasons to not take the interpretation of the current evidence base too far and throttle the zeal of those imagining new technologies for accountability.

From a very macro-structural perspective, analyses of how countries manage to improve their overall governance systems identify the diffusion of social media as one of the few factors with explanatory power. At the other end of the spectrum, the history of technology and the most detailed and insightful analyses of how technologies work their way into societies as produced in the field of science and technology studies recommend a much more granular view on the relation between technology and power. According to this large and established body of knowledge, which is rarely explicitly considered in accountability technology reviews, technology is not fully determined and not fully deterministic. It indeed mixes things up but it does so in often very unexpected, non-linear ways. New ICTs do shake up the interpretative domains and the framing and sense-making around social claims and political ideologies, do reshuffle opportunity structures with potential new entry points, allies and arenas for engagement and do expand the repertoire and resources of movement organisation. In this context, the much-cited political will as a necessary condition for the success of tech-centred accountability initiatives also looks more of an interesting concept, in flux and under construction, influenced by new technology practice as much as influencing it. Yet there is interesting evidence that suggests that this may not be always the case, particularly when it comes to digitally mediated action against corruption. Survey evidence points to the fact that poorer people do carry a higher corruption burden, might be more prone to corrupt transactions that are more extortionary than collusive in nature and thus exhibit a higher willingness to take action against corruption. And such a predispositions seem to translate into disproportionate action by the poorer segments of society when the conditions are right, such as when complaints hotlines are accessible.

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29 For a review of the evidence on the latter, see Zinnbauer (2015).
32 On the higher corruption burden for the poor, see, for example, M. K. Justesen and C. Bjørnskov, ‘Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in Africa’, *World Development*, vol. 58 (2014), 106–115. On less acceptance of corruption by groups with lower socio-economic status in Brazil and a review of the literature in other countries, see M. S. Winters and R. Weitz-Shapiro, ‘Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?’, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 45 (2013), 418–436. On how ‘need’ corruption is associated with a higher readiness to take action against corruption, see Bauhr (2016).
via text message and campaigns encourage reporting. One reason for such a disproportionately stronger embrace of new technologies for complaints by the more marginalised may also be the fact that such technologies offer alternative ways of engagement that are not fully aligned with and somewhat more uninhibited by status inequalities, social and physical distance – role expectations that can all conspire to erect high social thresholds for voice and particularly in-person complaints by the poor.

In short: the pendulum may have swung too far towards techno-pessimism, and the bulk of the scholarly review literature and assessment of technology for accountability (as well as the broader governance community of practice that engages in this area) could benefit from a deeper, more imaginative engagement with technology studies and the differentiated view on how technology interacts with power than this body of literature affords.

**Taking integration one level up and out**

The message for better integration of social accountability initiatives is emerging clearly and loudly from most of the recent stock-takes and reviews. There are calls for integrating bottom-up social accountability with top-down institutional accountability mechanisms, there are demands to integrate online and offline social accountability initiatives and there is a push towards integrating social accountability with a particular local-level focus into broader advocacy programmes that blend multiple interventions at international, national and local level to address accountability failures in a systems-wide scope.

Despite all the integration spirit, however, one cannot help feeling that social accountability is still a somewhat insular affair mainly driven by and involving actors from what could be called the governance communities: the donors, professionals, experts and volunteer wonks who do care about accountability, governance and, perhaps at its broadest, service quality as patients, clients, parents or citizens. Yet, other than in the area of participatory budgeting, which tends to attract a broad band of social justice players, there still seems to be a peculiar disconnect from a lot of much larger, resourceful social justice or other social movement initiatives. One example: the connections between social accountability experts and activists to their peers in the urban development or environmental justice community are surprisingly limited. Some of the most intense struggles for accountability and social justice are being fought in the urban arena by highly organised urban activists and related movements with a long tradition of participatory engagement, self-help and solidaristic activities that might not be practised or discussed under the label ‘social accountability’ but intersect heavily in mobilisation mechanisms, resources and partly also objectives. Likewise, struggles for environmental sustainability and justice succeed in mobilising large numbers of volunteers and considerable resources. The environmental governance frameworks in the making stand and fall with the enforcement and funding integrity that they manage to maintain. Bottom-up monitoring of these mechanisms is imperative, and the environmental movement has been a trailblazer in improving rights to information regimes. Yet neither the urban nor the environmental

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33 G. Grossman, K. Michelitch and M. Santamaria, ‘Can SMS-Mobilization Increase Citizen Reporting of Public Service Deficiencies to Politicians?’, working paper (2015). It should be noted that a more recent and larger experiment by some of the same authors was not able to replicate these findings, though: G. Grossman, M. Humphreys and G. Sacramone-Lutz, ‘Information Technology and Political Engagement: Mixed Evidence from Uganda’, working paper (2016).

34 Data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2013 points in a similar direction: respondents in rural areas with less internet connectivity are nevertheless more likely to indicate that they would use social media to spread the word about corruption than their peers in urban settings: Transparency International (2013), own analysis.

35 For an interesting review of initiatives that straddle the line, see D. Burns, P. Ikita, E. Lopez Franco and T. Shahrokh, Citizen Participation and Accountability for Sustainable Development (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2015).
movements for justice seem to be fully aware of the full social accountability repertoire that could be useful. And at the same time very few social accountability activists have reached out and sought to foster mutual learning, shared agendas and joint initiatives with these communities. There are tremendous opportunities for greening and urbanising social accountability – bringing these movements into existing social accountability schemes and supporting them into appropriating social accountability tools for their own purposes. This type of broader thematic integration of social accountability might also be worth exploring with regard to other social justice issues and movements.36

**Negative space and peer effects**

*When a fight breaks out, watch the crowd*

This perennial adage usually attributed to the late Elmer Schattschneider, eminent student of social movements, sounds like a great fit for future social accountability research. Initiatives tend to often suffer from low use, low participation, large drop-offs, etc. Yet most studies focus on looking at what happens, examining, for example, the characteristics and actions of participants in social accountability initiatives rather than looking at the by-standers, non-participants. Exploring more this surrounding space, namely what potential target users or participants in a social accountability initiative know about and think about the initiative itself as well as about the broader issues that are at stake, would help gain a better understanding of how to engage and mobilise. Very few studies so far have such an approach and done in-depth interviews or focus groups with non-users. Such an approach would also shed some light on the existence or potential for peer effects. There is an influential insight in collective action, social psychology and conceptual anti-corruption research that perceptions of what other people think can be very influential in shaping individual behaviour. This may take the form of free-riding, when a critical mass of other citizens is already believed to be involved in anti-corruption.37 Or it can lead to resignation and complicity when everybody else is believed to accept corruption and play along with it.38 Beyond initial survey-based correlation work, there is very limited additional in-depth empirical work yet on these effects, which can be particularly important in social accountability contexts. And the enquiry gets even more interesting when taking into account the importance of higher-order information asymmetries: beliefs about what other people believe about other people’s thinking can provide very interesting inhibiting or activating dynamics for taking action.39 Situations of pluralistic ignorance, for example, occur when the majority of people harbour the false belief that they are severely troubled by corruption while their peers seem to be tolerant of such practices.40 Such false beliefs about others can quickly lead to resignation, a falling in line with practices that are despised but look too difficult to change single-handedly. Simply unearthing such widely held beliefs as false and creating a deliberately public visibility of specific information so that everyone now

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36 On the disconnect between urban and governance practitioners, see D. Zinnbauer, ‘Cities of Integrity: An Overlooked Challenge for Both Urbanists and Anti-Corruption Practitioners – and a Great Opportunity for Fresh Ideas and Alliances’, available at SSRN 2288558. The observations about the environmental movement are based on participant observations while I was involved in developing programming and analysis around climate governance integrity for Transparency International.

37 Bauhr (2016).

38 Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013).


knows could be a powerful propellant for activating a dormant commitment for engagement and action. Such peer-effect strategies might be particularly interesting in the context of many social accountability interventions in which high-corruption equilibria and collective action challenges are particularly pertinent. Peixoto and Fox have hinted at this issue without fully elaborating on it when they highlight the importance of public displays of citizen feedback, and EGAP, a network of scholars focused on experiments in governance, for example, is beginning to build interesting related designs into its research approaches. It is very early days for considering negative space and peer effects, however, and many more ideas could be tried out and accompanied by related research.

Links to other research streams
The full stock-take (D7.2) discusses a much larger set of insights and possible future pathways for social accountability practice, design and research. The selected findings presented here are the ones that underpin the motivation and design for other work streams in this work package.

The design space that has opened up with insights around the information-to-action chain has motivated the innovative social design experiment in Lithuania (C1), which also dovetails with the need to integrate social accountability interventions more closely into the daily fabric and practice of specific professional communities, in this case in the health sector.

The caveat to not give up too quickly on technology-related social accountability and the promising yet overlooked avenue for looking at the negative space around social accountability have motivated the UK case study on open government (B2), which involved a data dive with potential open government users to gauge obstacles to involvement for potential yet so far uninvolved tech activists.

The focus groups A1–3, primarily with people who are actively opposing corruption, try to dig more deeply into motives for taking action, and elaborate on the practical strategies that these people use and also on how their surroundings shape and are shaped by their actions – or not.

The in-depth analysis of an official corruption reporting platform in Portugal (B1) responds to the call for examining social accountability more firmly with regard to the interplay of formal, institutional top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. The Portugal case thus contrasts with or complements nicely the analysis of NGO-run helpline data (S3) and engagement (A1–3).

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41 Peixoto and Fox (2016).
43 See, for example, the Feedbackback idea discussed here: http://ambient-accountability.org/post/130738095776/feedbackback.
Helpline data (S3)

Theme: who is approaching NGO corruption reporting centres? Client profiles for advocacy and legal advice centres (ALACs)

Background and approach
Since 2003 Transparency International, through its network of local affiliates, has been running a growing global network of anti-corruption help centres (ALACs). The idea is a simple one: lower the threshold of reporting corruption by providing citizens with relevant information on how to most effectively make their case and when appropriate accompany them in pursuing and – hopefully – resolving their case through the formal institutional processes at hand. ALACs thus operate on the premise that people confronted with corruption as victims or whistleblowers are prevented from reporting their case because they do not know where to turn to and do not have the expertise, time and expediency to pursue their case effectively by themselves. ALACs therefore have the potential to achieve impact at several levels: they can help individuals to get justice; they can help identify hot spots of corruption, sectorally as well as geographically; they can test and reveal strength and weaknesses in the formal institutional anti-corruption mechanisms; and they can help dispel the sense of impunity and that nothing can be done that is critical for achieving longer-term behavioural change towards more active action against corruption and for integrity. A wide variety of case examples have been documented that demonstrate impact around the world on all three levels.  

Since its inception in 2003 the ALAC network has expanded considerably, covering as of 2015 more than 100 offices in more than 60 countries with a total of more than 200,000 citizen contacts.

Despite the common name, ALACs very considerably in format, outreach and approach. They mix a great variety of contact channels, including office-hours and walk-ins, mobile roving clinics, radio call-ins, e-mail, telephone and mail according to the country context. They may target particular sectors or population groups. They may help gather evidence, tactically involve broader media coverage, work on individual cases or embark on strategic litigation. Some of them are focused on taking forward a small number of particularly important cases for a ‘lighthouse’ effect; others are providing a base layer of advice to a larger number and broader range of clients.

Although this diversity of ALAC models is highly desirable and essential for in-country efficacy, it poses certain challenges with regard to using the ALAC network as a research mechanism to gather evidence on corruption issues, identify patterns and compare/track related statistics across countries. Over the last few years a central database has been established with decentralised input interfaces to facilitate a semi-structured, standardised approach to capturing related statistics. While this data provides a unique, empirical window into the largest non-governmental corruption reporting network that spans all continents, the data input is still somewhat fragmented, the data depth is still evolving and the ultimate comparability – due to the extreme diversity of ALACs – is limited.

Against this backdrop we have opted for gathering and including some interesting headline statistics that give a first basic overview of what kind of people where seek assistance from ALACs in the European countries where ALACs operate.

Findings: who is approaching the Transparency International corruption help centres?

Age
Reporting to European ALACS is spread across all age brackets, from 25 years old onwards, and peaks in the age category 40 to 54 across the 15 countries. This is perhaps not surprising, since it is a generation that has grown up and come of age in tandem with the ascendance and maturing of classic non-governmental organisations. Keeping in mind that there are a large number of contacts for which the age group was not recorded, the age patterns are somewhat out of sync with the empirical backdrop, which in itself is rather inconclusive, however, and does not identify age to be a highly significant driver. Data from the Eurobarometer suggests that people in this middle-age bracket are more likely to think that they are affected by corruption, but that it is the older generation of those aged 55 and older that is more likely to indicate that they have actually reported corruption. Peiffer and Alvarez find younger people more likely to engage in anti-corruption activities more broadly. Yet more comprehensive analysis of the different factors influencing reporting behaviour, as carried out for our Global Corruption Barometer, shows a somewhat higher propensity of actual reporting by younger respondents, though the effect is not highly significant and disappears when other intervening factors are introduced (S1). Likewise, the broader literature on whistleblowing behaviour is inconclusive as to age effects, with plausible hypotheses and empirical evidence pointing in ambivalent directions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>15–24</th>
<th>25–39</th>
<th>40–54</th>
<th>55+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a good overview, see P. G. Cassematis and R. Wortley, ‘Prediction of Whistleblowing or Non-Reporting Observation: The Role of Personal and Situational Factors’, *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 117 (2013), 615–634.
### Exhibit 11: Contact by age

*Source:* Transparency International ALAC data.

*Note:* Baseline of 1,663, excluding 159 anonymous and 699 unknown.

**Gender**

The role of gender in shaping engagement against corruption is potentially significant, yet empirical evidence is inconclusive. The empirical literature on whistleblowing finds evidence and plausible explanations for both men and women being more likely to report wrongdoing, perhaps with a slight tendency for women to seem more likely candidates for reporting.\(^{48}\) By contrast, in the corruption literature, Peiffer and Alvarez in their analysis of 71 countries find that women are somewhat less likely to actively oppose corruption.\(^{49}\) A more narrow focus on corruption reporting, however, does not show significant differences. Although the 2014 *Special Eurobarometer* on corruption finds that women are more likely to state that they do not know where to report corruption,\(^{50}\) our *Global Corruption Barometer* (S1) does not suggest that there is a significant influence of gender on the general willingness to report corruption, nor on the propensity to actually report, when having been asked for a bribe.

Against this backdrop, it looks somewhat surprising that ALAC clients tend to be disproportionately men, by a factor of two to one.

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\(^{49}\) Peiffer and Alvarez (2015).

\(^{50}\) European Commission (2014).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>111</td>
<td>157</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>270</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>113</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>463</strong></td>
<td><strong>909</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,372</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 12 Contact by gender

Source: Transparency International ALAC data.

Note: Baseline of 1,663 data entered, excluding 106 anonymous, 50 not applicable and 135 unknown.
**Location type**

There is a clear concentration of European ALAC contacts from urban areas. At first sight, this is surprising, given that urban dwellers are not much more likely to express willingness to report and engage in actual reporting than their rural counterparts (S1). Another plausible reason might be the urban location of almost all ALACs. Yet neither the preferred contact channels nor the ways clients had learnt about the ALACs are tied to proximity or a particularly urban environment.

![Exhibit 13: Contact urban vs. rural](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Semi-urban</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td><strong>184</strong></td>
<td><strong>829</strong></td>
<td><strong>1241</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Exhibit 13: Contact urban vs. rural*

*Source: Transparency International ALAC data.*

*Note: Baseline of 1,663, excluding 12 others and 410 unknown.*
**Method of contact**

With regard to potential patterns in methods of contacts, it should be kept firmly in mind that the help centres vary greatly in terms of set-up and outreach. Some contact methods might be more promoted in certain countries than in others. Nevertheless, a clear preference for contacting ALACs via e-mail and internet/mobile app is evident, followed by first contact via phone and a remarkably sizeable number of contacts by conventional mail. While this focus on internet channels is not unexpected, its unrivalled significance is still somewhat surprising given that the age group of 40+ accounts for close to 70 per cent of all contacts when the age could be determined. Contact via SMS is as yet not very significant, despite the strong move of younger internet users towards mobile devices.

Overall, the patterns of contact suggest that such NGO-run help centres are well advised to rely on a multi-modal access model and open as many interfaces for contact as possible, while the popularity of e-mail presents high demands on data security architectures and data-handling procedures against the backdrop of an increasing number of hacking attacks, infiltrations and other disruptive online tactics and the growing readiness of states and other groups to purchase and deploy related tools.  

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>E-mail</th>
<th>Internet/mob app</th>
<th>Outreach activities</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>SMS</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
<th>Walk-in</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>615</strong></td>
<td><strong>245</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>419</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>1504</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 14 Method of contact

Note: Baseline of 1,663, excluding 45 others, 113 unknown and one blank.

How did you heard about ALACs?

How clients have learnt about the possibility to contact these help centres varies widely across countries, and there are many contacts (more than 50 per cent) for which this information is unfortunately not recorded. The focus on internet and social media as a source of information mirrors the preference for contacting ALACs by e-mail. What stands out is a rather sizeable number of clients who have heard about the ALACs via word of mouth, perhaps the most trusted source of information, and particularly relevant when it comes to a sensitive issue such as reporting on corruption. And the significance of word of mouth also attests to the relevance of social connections and is in line with findings that social capital typically correlates positively with civic engagement.52

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>From former client</th>
<th>Internet/social media</th>
<th>Outreach activities</th>
<th>Print media</th>
<th>Printed materials/leaflets</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>Word of mouth</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>99</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>106</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>374</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Baseline of 1,663, excluding 47 others and 835 unknown.
Summary

The Transparency International network of legal advice centres, which includes a presence in 15 European countries, is most likely the most comprehensive data source for who contacts NGO-run advice centres to seek assistance for corruption issues. Given the high diversity of help centre formats and the large number of incompletely coded cases for certain categories, this data must be considered very cautiously, and cross-country comparisons in particular are difficult to make.

The overall picture shows a network of European advice centres that attract a broad band of different age groups, with some focus on the 40 to 55 age bracket, and disproportionately more used by men and urban residents. Contact with these advice centres is sought through a variety of channels, with a focus on electronic means, and awareness about these centres appears to stem primarily from online, social media but also to a significant degree from word of mouth. All this suggests that NGO-run help centres for corruption reporting are well advised to build out professional online interfaces and data management structures without, however, neglecting traditional engagement and outreach mechanisms. They may also want to intensify their outreach efforts to female clients and carefully cultivate and protect their reputation and trust with the local user community, since personal recommendations are an indispensable source of referrals in what is a very sensitive issue to seek advice on.
Theme
Social media analysis as a research strategy to understand how people think and act about corruption – an exploratory study.

Background and rationale
Traditional research tools for assessing people’s perception of and experience with corruption rely heavily upon public opinion survey data. Nevertheless, there is a vast quantity of data and information that people share online, especially through social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook, where they provide their views on corruption. This data could potentially provide a complementary, more in-depth as well as nuanced understanding of the importance and influence of corruption on people’s lives. The technologies for carrying out such assessments – specifically for marketing purposes, but increasingly also for social science research – have been available for some time now, and this report aims to analyse discussions and opinions on corruption in the online sphere in two countries: the United Kingdom and Romania. The objective of this exploratory piece is thus twofold, with a methodological and content-oriented component to (i) gauge the possibility of such social media analysis to complement traditional research approaches in this area and (ii) examine if social media has evolved into a significant complement or substitute for traditional forms of anti-corruption activism. The latter is a particularly contested issue with regard to political activism more broadly, with scholars disagreeing on the extent to which social-media-related activism should be regarded as generative, uniquely leveraging, supplanting or simply as an appendix to – or even undermining – political action. Given the limited scope and scale of this exploratory project, it is not possible to exhaustively broach these questions, but, rather, to find interesting entry points for further discussion and research.

We chose the United Kingdom and Romania to undertake this social media analysis. Both these countries have had some high-profile corruption-related incidents in recent months and therefore qualified as good candidates for conducting such an analysis. For example, following the Panama Papers leaks, the United Kingdom came into the limelight for acting as a facilitator for dubious financial transactions through the use of shell structures. The United Kingdom also more recently took more of a leadership role by hosting the Global Anti-Corruption Summit in May 2016. Similarly, Romania has been on an anti-corruption drive in the past year, which has led to the arrests of several prominent national leaders. The United Kingdom is an established EU member (until the Brexit vote) whereas Romania is a relatively new member state (NMS) of the European Union. Finally, both countries have a sufficiently vibrant and unconstrained social media sphere and adequate ICT diffusion levels while at the same time having two very different media profiles. Romania’s media environment is rated as partially free, and the major conventional media outlets are closely linked to business/political interests. In the United Kingdom, the media environment is rated as free and exhibits a more competitive and diverse media ownership landscape.


**Methodology**

The main tool used for data extraction was Brandwatch, recognised as a leader among social listening platforms and one that covers over 80 million online sources.\(^{55}\) The period for data analysis was approximately six months, covering 1 January 2016 to 26 June 2016.

A query consisting of the keyword ‘corruption’ and some derivative and related vernacular expressions was drawn up in consultation with the Transparency International chapters in both countries. The tool then returned all the mentions (in tweets, blog posts, news articles) containing any of the words in this initial query alongside tags for other relevant information (e.g. the source of content, its geolocation, author). After this initial query was run, an iterative process was used to generate bifurcations with new subthemes and keywords that were being used to discuss issues around corruption. For example, the most prominent such event during the analysis period was the Panama Papers leak, which entered public discourse on 3 April 2016. Keywords such as ‘Panama papers’ or #panamapapers were subsequently added to our query about conversations related to corruption.

To get a better idea of how corruption ranked compared to other topics, queries on terms related to the economy, inequality and unemployment were launched in the two countries studied just in order to get the number of mentions that the tool records.

Despite the fact that Brandwatch is a comprehensive and advanced online listening tool, it has its limitations. First of all, data coming from more prosperous markets is more accurate. Because of how the tool gathers its data, and considering that it's likely to have more customers in the richer countries, the accuracy of the data in Romania might be lower than that in the United Kingdom.

It is worth highlighting that all Facebook mentions are geo-tagged in the United States. Thus, in order to obtain Facebook data for the United Kingdom and Romania, other methods had to be used. For the United Kingdom, a specific query with terms related to the United Kingdom was added alongside the corruption query. Data from Romania was not as abundant, and queries on Facebook data didn't return many results. Thus, the public Facebook pages of three news channels were plugged into the tool, and discussions there were analysed.

Finally, Facebook is the biggest social network worldwide, and it does not allow the mining of private discussions, profiles and groups. Therefore, this analysis uses only data that is publicly visible (for example, the Facebook page of a news outlet or a public group).

\(^{55}\) See www.brandwatch.com/brandwatch-analytics.
Key findings

Overall trends in online corruption chatter

Exhibit 16 Daily trend of mentions of corruption and other relevant expressions identified

This figure shows how daily corruption mentions fluctuated (standard deviations from the mean) in the two countries over the analysed period. Romania has a more volatile trend line, with activity declining during the weekends, while the United Kingdom has a more stable trend line, with two major peaks, one in early April (due to the Panama Papers) and one in early May (due to the anti-corruption summit held in London). The main reason for the greater volatility in Romania is the greater frequency of corruption scandals and arrests during this time period. In addition, news portals accounted for a larger share of mentions in Romania, and their activity is more intense during weekdays. In the United Kingdom, Twitter was the main platform, and its content is more evenly distributed throughout the week.

Social media and corruption chatter in the United Kingdom

Relative salience

Exhibit 17 Number of mentions retrieved for each of the four queries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Economy</td>
<td>1,606,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Corruption</td>
<td>995,390 (557,693 excluding the Panama Papers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unemployment</td>
<td>519,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inequality</td>
<td>196,264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the table above, corruption discussion online in the United Kingdom comes next only to discussions regarding the state of the economy. Since the beginning of 2016 close to a million mentions of
corruption or related keywords were recorded. Even excluding the Panama Papers mentions, discussions on corruption still surpassed those of unemployment and inequality. This provides some benchmark on the importance of corruption as a topic in the United Kingdom during the period covered through this analysis.

The chart below shows corruption-related mentions in the social media space, in addition to trends from searches on Google for corruption, the Panama Papers and David Cameron in the United Kingdom. There is a very high correlation between corruption mentions and searches for Panama Papers (R = 99.7%). This could be due to the very large impact that the Panama Papers scandal had on corruption discussions (around 43 per cent of mentions had a reference to the Panama Papers) in a very short time frame. We can also see that searches for corruption registered mini-peaks at other times due to the Google scandal, as well as the release of Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index report. The unfolding huge corruption scandal in Brazil (its former president, Lula da Silva, was at that time detained for questioning, but he was not arrested or charged) also registered an increase in the number of people searching for corruption as a topic on Google. This topic did not dominate the social media discussions as much, however.

Trends and fluctuations
The mentions in the United Kingdom on corruption were further broken down into several sub-topics, such as Transparency International, real estate, the European Union, the Panama Papers and David Cameron.\textsuperscript{56} We can see that mentions of the latter two keywords spiked at the beginning of April. Mentions including David Cameron also increased around the time of the anti-corruption summit in London. The European Union and the Brexit referendum were more frequently mentioned after mid-May, peaking during the last week analysed (the week of the referendum). Overall, 51,587 mentions of corruption and related expressions were recorded during the analysis period, which also included something about the European Union (around 5.4 per cent of the total).

\textbf{Exhibit 19 Breakdown of weekly mentions by sub-topics}

The Panama Papers story was the most-discussed corruption topic in the United Kingdom. It involved domestic actors and a major news story, the resignation of the prime minister of Iceland. Research shows that people are more likely to share news and information on domestic issues. Having a conflict in the story

\textsuperscript{56} In order to be categorised as a sub-topic, a mention had to include a keyword from the corruption query, as well as one related to the sub-topic. A single mention can have more than one sub-topic assigned to it. Thus, if we look at the total numbers, these will appear to be higher than the total number of mentions.
gives it an additional boost.\textsuperscript{57} The size of the story itself is also likely to have generated increased sharing on social networks. Research also shows that news viewing is strongly related to news sharing.\textsuperscript{58,59}

**Inclusive platforms for discussing corruption?**

With 851,684 mentions, Twitter provides a wealth of insights on how corruption is being discussed online in the United Kingdom. The table below attempts to provide an overview, providing a ranking based on the number of corruption tweets relative to the total tweets of the account, the number of followers and the reach of the account.\textsuperscript{60} The table shows that organisational accounts, and in particular newspaper Twitter handles, account for the largest share of very important and influential accounts. It gives an idea of who is tweeting regarding corruption in United Kingdom and whether the traffic is predominantly driven by organisational accounts. Several organisations, such as Oxfam, the Carroll Trust and the Tax Justice Network, are present in the table, including two individual accounts, such as the Twitter handle of Christian Amanpour, the CNN chief international correspondent.

**Exhibit 20 Top 20 most influential Twitter accounts mentioning corruption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Account type</th>
<th>Twitter followers</th>
<th>Twitter following</th>
<th>Twitter tweets\textsuperscript{61}</th>
<th>Corruption mentions\textsuperscript{62}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@TheEconomist</td>
<td>organisational</td>
<td>14,588,279</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>75,044</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@BBCBreaking</td>
<td>organisational</td>
<td>22,751,819</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28,394</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@guardian</td>
<td>organisational</td>
<td>5,670,858</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>252,326</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@BBCWorld</td>
<td>organisational</td>
<td>14,714,510</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>232,787</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@Independent</td>
<td>organisational</td>
<td>1,948,409</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>391,400</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@FT</td>
<td>organisational</td>
<td>2,386,196</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>126,266</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SkyNews</td>
<td>organisational</td>
<td>3,366,616</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>207,036</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{60} The reach score of a tweet is calculated by summing the influence of the author and all retweeters.

\textsuperscript{61} These are all the tweets of the account, not just those from the period analysed.

\textsuperscript{62} Corruption mentions are only for the period analysed.
Men dominate the discussion on Twitter, accounting for 68 per cent of accounts for which data is available. Men are especially over-represented when it came to topics mentioning the European Union, Putin, Iceland and offshore tax havens.

Exhibit 21 Breakdown of Twitter authors by gender
Main corruption issues
Hashtags are another good way to get a sense of how people were discussing corruption. The table below shows the ten most popular hashtags. The two hashtags used in relation to the Panama scandal were by far the most popular ones.

Exhibit 22 Top 10 hashtags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hashtag</th>
<th>All tweets</th>
<th>Retweets</th>
<th>Tweets</th>
<th>Impressions63</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#panamapapers</td>
<td>250,858</td>
<td>187,550</td>
<td>63,308</td>
<td>4,946,244,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#panamaleaks</td>
<td>66,907</td>
<td>49,594</td>
<td>17,313</td>
<td>664,447,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#corruption</td>
<td>17,011</td>
<td>8,311</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>118,693,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#brexit</td>
<td>13,049</td>
<td>7,824</td>
<td>5,225</td>
<td>48,637,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#anticorruption</td>
<td>10,356</td>
<td>6,875</td>
<td>3,481</td>
<td>360,517,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#dodgydave</td>
<td>7,814</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>36,593,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#cameron</td>
<td>7,312</td>
<td>4,473</td>
<td>2,839</td>
<td>42,265,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#resigncameron</td>
<td>7,279</td>
<td>5,228</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>36,901,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#votelive</td>
<td>7,003</td>
<td>4,784</td>
<td>2,219</td>
<td>21,541,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#corrupt</td>
<td>6,302</td>
<td>2,365</td>
<td>3,937</td>
<td>18,134,571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to Twitter, Facebook was also a popular platform for conversations and discussions around corruption. The chart below provides a summary of weekly corruption-related mentions on Facebook during the period of analysis.

63 Times a user is served a tweet in timeline or search results.
As mentioned earlier, geo-tagging mentions from Facebook was not possible, and thus a different query was used that adds mentions of the United Kingdom as well as of Brexit, in addition to those on corruption. The big downside is that these discussions are better defined as being about the United Kingdom rather than emerging from the United Kingdom. Using this method, 18,172 mentions were retrieved. The weekly trend is similar to the ones found on Twitter, but there are a few differences. The peaks related to the Panama leaks and the anti-corruption summit are still the largest, but the relative size of the discussions that are also due to the Brexit vote has increased. Further, we can see that the Panama Papers account for a smaller share of mentions, while discussions mentioning David Cameron account for a larger share. If we take a high-level overview of the topics discussed, we can see that themes similar to those on Twitter emerge on Facebook too. This time, however, mentions regarding Brexit and the European Union are more prominent.

**Social media and corruption chatter in Romania**

Absolute online mentions of corruption in Romania were, of course, much lower than in the United Kingdom, due to the different country sizes and the different level of social media usage.

**Relative salience**

Nonetheless, the relative salience of corruption versus other societal policy issues is more pronounced.
Exhibit 24 Number of mentions retrieved for each of the four queries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139,105 (112,879 excluding the Panama Papers and Hexi Pharma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>104,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This relative significance is squarely in line with related survey data.

Exhibit 25: Topics in Romania

In the United Kingdom, the chatter online on corruption was primarily dominated by the Panama Papers and anti-corruption summit, while Romania has been rocked by several corruption scandals in the recent past. Monitoring the online sphere in Romania, we see two large peaks in Romania. One is due to the Panama Papers, while the second is due to a national scandal involving the healthcare system. A Romanian journalist, Cătălin Tolontan, revealed that a pharmaceutical company called Hexi Pharma was allegedly supplying diluted disinfectants to Romanian hospitals. There were already suspicions of wrongdoing following a large number of deaths due to hospital-acquired infections after a big fire in October 2015, and following this event a whistleblower contacted the journalist to reveal the wrongdoings.

Trends and fluctuations
Main corruption issues

The other smaller peaks in the chart above were mainly due to local corruption-related events, such as the following.

- Requests from the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) to the Senate judiciary committee to start judicial procedures against a former deputy prime minister, Gabriel Oprea.

- Corruption charges being brought against senators Doina Tudor and Gabriel Oprea, as well as deputy Nicolae Paun.

- The National Liberal Party announcing a new candidate for the capital, Bucharest; claims that he is corrupt, or that his opponents are corrupt, emerge.

- The constitutional court ruling that the Romanian secret service cannot provide technical assistance in phone-tapping for prosecutors. The majority of the cases involved related to corruption charges.
Also unlike the United Kingdom, traditional media websites account for a much larger share of the mentions recorded in Romania. Furthermore, a lot of the sites that are tagged as ‘general’ and ‘blogs’ are actually online news sources.\(^{64}\)

**Exhibit 27 Breakdown by media type**

![Mentions of corruption by media type](image)

In terms of main topics, the National Anticorruption Directorate takes a central role. Even the other topics are closely related to the DNA. These include mentions of specific people convicted by the DNA or the name of its chief prosecutor (Laura Codruța Kövesi). The names of a former president (Băsescu) and Romania’s current president (Klaus Iohannis) also show up, as does the Hexi Pharma scandal. Interestingly, the Panama Papers don’t seem to stand out as one of the bigger topics identified.\(^{65}\)

\(^{64}\) As a caveat, it should be borne in mind that the top Twitter accounts for corruption are tied to news organisations, and so this is more a difference in medium than one of origin of content items.

\(^{65}\) It should be highlighted that the tool’s performance in properly identifying topics of interest in a less widely spoken language (such as Romanian) will be lower than in English.
Inclusive platforms for discussing corruption?
As already stated above, news platforms recorded most of the corruption mentions in Romania. Comparatively speaking, Twitter and Facebook recorded much smaller number of mentions related to corruption. The table below shows the top 10 news sites in terms of mention volumes.

**Exhibit 29 Top ten news sites that mentioned corruption most frequently (sorted by Alexa ranking)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Corruption mentions</th>
<th>Alexa rank in Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><a href="http://www.adevarul.ro">www.adevarul.ro</a></td>
<td>3350</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><a href="http://www.stiripesurse.ro">www.stiripesurse.ro</a></td>
<td>3037</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><a href="http://www.antena3.ro">www.antena3.ro</a></td>
<td>7806</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><a href="http://www.mediafax.ro">www.mediafax.ro</a></td>
<td>2390</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ziare.com">www.ziare.com</a></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><a href="http://www.agerpres.ro">www.agerpres.ro</a></td>
<td>3102</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><a href="http://www.jurnalul.ro">www.jurnalul.ro</a></td>
<td>2289</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Twitter specifics
As mentioned earlier, Twitter is not as visible in the Romanian discussions on corruption as it is in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, 4,757 mentions have been recorded, and they still provide an insight into the audience and the way the discussions are conducted.

One thing that is noteworthy about Twitter in Romania is that the main topics of discussion are quite different from the overall mentions (which are mostly news and blogs).

The Panama Papers feature much more strongly on Twitter, outlining the platform’s international profile and the fact that people using it are much more likely to be focused on international rather than domestic issues. In fact, the National Anticorruption Directorate and Hexi Pharma are barely mentioned.

Exhibit 30 Breakdown of weekly mentions by sub-topics

Blogs
Although blogs are losing in relative importance across western Europe (and, in particular, smaller blogs), they still represent a fairly influential share of the Romanian online discussions. While an accurate trend of corruption mentions on blogs cannot be provided, there were several blogs identified in which discussions on corruption took place.
### Exhibit 31 Top ten blogs mentioning corruption (sorted by Alexa ranking)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Corruption mentions</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Alexa rank in Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.blogsport.gsp.ro/">www.blogsport.gsp.ro/</a></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>The blog section of a sports-related daily newspaper (gsp.ro). While it might be surprising to find it in this list, it has several articles discussing corruption in sport in Romania. In addition, the Hexi Pharma scandal was uncovered by one of its (most famous) journalists, Cătălin Tolontan.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.zoso.ro/">http://www.zoso.ro/</a></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>The blog of Vali Petcu, a long-time blogger and social media writer. It is also one of the biggest Romanian blogs.</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.cetin.ro">www.cetin.ro</a></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>The blog of Cetin Ametcea. One of the most popular blogs in Romania, it allows him to also be an independent publisher.</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.biziday.ro/">www.biziday.ro/</a></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>A blog set up by a team that produces several successful news shows. Its initial focus was on economics and finance, but now it covers other topics.</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.tolo.ro">www.tolo.ro</a></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>The blog of Cătălin Tolontan, the journalist who broke the story on Hexi Pharma.</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.nwradu.ro/">www.nwradu.ro/</a></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Blog on new technologies and gadgets.</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.contributors.ro">www.contributors.ro</a></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Civic platform for opinions and analysis.</td>
<td>1,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.radu-tudor.ro/">www.radu-tudor.ro/</a></td>
<td>188</td>
<td>The blog of Radu Tudor, a famous Romanian talk show host and political analyst. Works for the Intact Media group.</td>
<td>1,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.revista22.ro/">www.revista22.ro/</a></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Weekly magazine issued by the Group for Social Dialogue and focused mainly on politics and culture.</td>
<td>1,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.cristoiublog.ro/">www.cristoiublog.ro/</a></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>The blog of Ion Cristoiu, a well-known Romanian journalist and talk show host.</td>
<td>2,069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

Based on this very preliminary and partial analysis of the online sphere in the United Kingdom and Romania, we can tentatively draw a number of conclusions.

For the United Kingdom

- Twitter was by far the most significant platform used for discussions on corruption in the United Kingdom.
- David Cameron had a very significant impact on the discussions surrounding corruption. Not only did his name come up very often in discussions, but also a lot of different people were tweeting at him about the topic.
- Organisational Twitter accounts are the most influential ones for disseminating messages on corruption. As expected, newspapers are particularly popular. It should be noted, however, that their audience is not purely domestic. Furthermore, some other organisations, such as Oxfam and the Carroll Trust, are having a similar impact.
- Despite the strong influence of organisational accounts, the United Kingdom hosts a good deal of very influential individual accounts that discuss corruption. These accounts are also more likely to cater to their British audience (though there were some accounts with a much larger foreign audience).

For Romania

Romania saw a fair number of stories related to corruption in the six months or so of analysis.

- Apart from the Panama Papers, all the scandals discussed in Romania were local. Furthermore, the Panama Papers were mainly trending on Twitter, which in Romania seems to serve a more internationally focused demographic.
- In Romania, around half the mentions of corruption were also related in some way to the National Anticorruption Directorate.
- The Hexi Pharma scandal was the single biggest scandal, driving the most discussions.
- News platforms were the place where most of the corruption mentions were identified. It should be noted, however, that Facebook is probably the most popular platform on which discussions take place. Due to technical limitations, though, these are only limited insights, which would need much further exploration to be validated.
- Blogs still play an important role in Romanian online discussions.
- Twitter seems to be dominated by a more internationally focused audience. This is plainly visible both in the topics they discuss most often and in the most shared articles.
- The topics and terms people mention in Romania are a lot more diverse than in the United Kingdom.
- Interestingly, in several of the Romanian corruption scandals, terms that are in the same semantic field as corruption (mostly the ones in the initial query) are not used so much in the coverage of the scandals, despite the big role it plays (even if the issue is more complex). Unlike in the United Kingdom, there is almost an implicit understanding that corruption plays a role, and thus it becomes almost pointless to mention it explicitly.

Overall, the analysis confirms that social media provides a more events-driven space for discussing and reacting to corruption issues, with limited buzz around more systemic or structural issues, though the rare event, such as the Panama Papers, that is closely related with systemic deficiencies may briefly highlight
these underlying issues. Moreover, institutional accounts, often maintained by traditional media outlets, seem to dominate the debate and overall visibility, particularly in the United Kingdom, where this is also driven by an international audience. Yet in both countries there is still a sizeable group of non-institutional bloggers and commentators who do attract public attention and claim some share in the corruption debate.

The potential of social media analysis in anti-corruption research

This first excursion into the corruption conversation on social media has offered a good sense of how important corruption as a topic is in the country in relation to other societal issues. The results dovetail squarely with related survey-generated insights.

Very interestingly, we can also identify key organisations or individual influencers of corruption at the country level – who are talking about it and how frequently they are talking about it, as well as how many people are following these topics. Tracking shifts in central nodes and influencers over time through more advanced network analysis should offer interesting insights into how corruption conversations are shaped, framed and cross-fertilised via traditional media and government interventions.

Combining scans of different social media channels, plus search trends, can help validate and contextualise specific findings, and also highlights interesting differences between channels.

More advanced social media listening and analysis tools that include semantic analysis capabilities could perhaps at some point offer the ability to further understand people’s sentiments, and could be a useful tool to have in anti-corruption researchers’ repertoire of tools to complement survey work when probing how hopeful or pessimistic people and institutional players assess the (anti-)corruption situation in their countries. It remains to be seen, though, whether this is really an efficient way of gauging these questions, given that a lot of manual recoding and checking might be required.

Whether social media drives news and can be used to identify corruption issues cannot be discerned through this preliminary analysis. The former seems feasible, through some methodological refinements, but the latter comes with a big question mark. Given the dominance of institutional accounts and highly visible individual bloggers and the event-driven character, it remains doubtful that social media channels could evolve into a general corruption complaints platform.

It is also worth noting that, without any pre-existing capabilities to capture and analyse social media data, it was much more cost-efficient to use an off-the-shelf application, with all its limitations and data capture restrictions, rather than develop these facilities in-house. There are significant economies of scope, with considerable learning and set-up costs, for this type of analysis, and it might be worthwhile thinking about pooling some resources across governance research organisations to build a social media analysis facility that can be deployed much more flexibly and also can procure the data much more cheaply than is the case for one-off research trawls such as this one.

Finally, it is also worth noting that the future power of social media analysis is also very much in flux. Younger cohorts tend to flock to very different and ever-evolving new social media spaces. Image cultivation and public relations tactics are increasingly seeking to steer social media debate, often with automated means that make it progressively more difficult to do research on these conversations and
zoom in on ‘authentic’ contributions. Feed curation and algorithmically generated personalisations of content streams by dominant social media platforms become ever more pervasive and sophisticated in the era of social media overflow, putting these pivotal gatekeepers at the centre of shaping social media visibility and making generalised research much less relevant or feasible.

All this will require keeping a critical eye on these very promising tools for social media analysis and constantly adapting them to changing circumstances. Yet, given the centrality of social media for social communication, organisation and the flow and visibility of news, it is essential to closely follow these developments and use social media analysis as an essential complement to conventional anti-corruption research instruments.

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66 According to some reputable estimates, more than sixty percent of all social media content is already driven by automated content generation tools. Imperva Incapsula: BOTS&DDOS. December 9, 2013 (https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2013.html).
Focus groups (A1–3)

Theme
Taking action and reporting corruption – an in-depth qualitative exploration of individual motivations, drivers and constraints.

Scope and approach
The use of focus groups is a rather novel and infrequently used approach for exploring citizen action against corruption. In order to maximise the learning from this exercise and also gauge the potential for using this approach more frequently in the future to complement our survey diagnostics, we decided to carry out an unusually large number of 11 focus groups, spread across three countries and involving primarily people who have reported corruption and been clients of Transparency International’s anti-corruption help centres.

The idea was to go beyond the few prominent ‘big scandal’ whistleblower cases that widely circulate and are extensively profiled in the media and, instead, focus on the everyday acts of resistance against corruption, which never make the headlines but might in sum, arguably, be much more consequential for advancing the integrity agenda at local and national levels. A focus group approach was also selected to unpack the very limited information that can be gleaned so far from survey research on anti-corruption reporting, which is typically confined to a couple of structured multiple-choice questions on people’s willingness to report or take other possible actions against corruption.

More specifically, the following schedule was implemented.

- Three focus groups in Macedonia (A1) were organised between May and September 2015, each with five participants from different regions, selected from a pool of people who had contacted the ALAC run by Transparency International Macedonia to obtain advice and support on a corruption case; the participants had a diverse range of professional backgrounds, were predominantly male (nine men versus six women) and rather evenly spread across the age range, from 30 to over 60.
- Four focus groups in Romania (A2), with four to eight participants each, were organised between July and September 2015. The first group, as a test group, consisted of a mix of people all of whom had experienced a case of corruption; the other three groups targeted three distinctive communities: students, health sector workers, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) owners.
- Four focus groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (A3) were organised, each with six participants, in three towns (Banjaluka, Sarajevo and Tuzla) between June and September 2015, with the participants selected from clients who had approached the Bosnia and Herzegovina ALAC to seek assistance on corruption issues. Most participants were male (15 versus nine females) and between the ages of 40 and 55, corresponding to the age bracket that reports most frequently on corruption to Transparency International’s help and legal advice centre.

67 For an exception in the anti-corruption field, see the ethnographic work in ANTICORRP WP4, which included focus groups but primarily with a focus on eliciting general attitudes and beliefs about corruption without a focus on anti-corruption engagement and reporting. See D. Torsello (ed.), Corruption in Public Administration: An Ethnographic Approach (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016).
68 See, for example, Bauhr (2016) (using a composite index of six possible anti-corruption actions from the 2012 and 2013 GCBs) and Peiffer and Alvarez (2015) (using four actions from the same set and wave of the GCB as Bauhr).
All three focus groups were carried out by the local Transparency International chapters in the respective countries, with the help from expert moderators. All the implementing chapters had some focus group experience but had not used the method more systematically prior to this exercise. The participants were granted anonymity, and some specific pieces of information were generalised in the quotes to avoid indirect identification.

Key findings
The following sections discuss some of the pertinent key findings. The references in quotes (A1–3) refer to the related case study reports, which have been published as separate deliverable and discuss the focus groups in more detail.

Motivations
It is worth noting at the outset that the focus group participants most likely represent some of the most committed people taking action against corruption, since they have not only actively resorted to an NGO-run help centre to help pursue their case but also belong to the even smaller band of people who agreed to partake in the focus group and openly talk about their situation. All the following insights should therefore be seen in this context.

Motivations to report or take other action against corruption include the expected mix of concrete ambitions to protect one’s rightful interest or gain compensation for being wronged due to corruption, at one end of the spectrum, and invocations of higher normative principles, at the other.

Not your classic corruption type for reporting
With regard to personal material interests, many individual cases appear to involve dramatic harm, from not being able to practise in one’s preferred profession to being pushed into closing down a business to being denied social housing.

One of the largest categories of corruption that seems to have prompted people to take action and eventually pushed them towards seeking help from an NGO concerns employment-related issues, when promotions were denied or jobs went to cronies and party affiliates.

Corruption is present in all social spheres...but what bothers us the most is the corruption that takes place in our communities, our small communities. That is nepotism, then: hiring people on the basis of their political and family relationships; that is the first thing, and then everything else.

(A3)

This is very interesting for a number of reasons. First, it puts the spotlight on office patronage as a corruption issue that is usually viewed as absolutely crucial for the entrenchment of systemic corruption, yet at the same time it is often eclipsed by a focus on bribery or embezzlement when thinking about how to set up mechanisms for corruption reporting. Second, it violates a sense of fairness in a particularly egregious way, since it is not just about paying extra or seeing someone steal community money, but often it is about a positional good situation: I have been unfairly deprived by my boss or institution of a position or promotion and one of my less deserving peers has made a fool of me and taken advantage of the situation. As a result it should not be so surprising that this turns out to be a corruption issue that is pursued with the utmost tenacity, and may thus provide interesting entry points for campaigns and

mobilisation efforts that have so far focused more on service-level corruption issues. Third, patronage and preferential treatment can be empirically captured at the macro level, yet they are extremely difficult to prove in a legally sufficient way in individual cases.

At the same time, the number of difficulties in proving these irregularities is also growing, because at first sight everything was done in accordance with the law. That means that our clients, even with the help of our lawyers, can hardly come to the precise facts that prove bias, non-objectivity or the criminal offence of the Competition Commission members, while at the same time the number of expressed doubts and confirmed reports about irregular public competitions for announced job openings in public sector is constantly growing.

Many different ethics, including some very egotistical ones
All these cases that involve considerable corruption-induced harms notwithstanding, it is quite remarkable, however, that all the reporters from the three countries noted that, on the whole, non-pecuniary motivations and principled beliefs seem to trump purely material incentives for pursuing a specific case against corruption. Invoking a higher purpose for what is often an epic struggle might be a natural and essential reflex to justify the sacrifice and keep going. Yet the intensity with which such higher purposes are invoked – to spare others harm, to further the common good, to build a better future for one’s children, to help save the country – point to a high degree of internalisation.

We are all responsible for the functioning or non-functioning of the system and for the development of values.

The focus groups also shed some very interesting light on the large spectrum between material interest and pure ethical devotion, where personal values and practical ethics mix. Two source of motivations stand particularly out in this regard.

First, there were several references to values derived from a specific role or professional community.

What motivated me was the injustice, the unprofessional relations of a professor.

I fight against corruption as president of my unit’s union... [for] the community in which we feel as if we’re in a second family.

As a professor, I cannot address the professors in criminal law if I have detected some irregularity and failed to report it; for me, that would mean letting down the profession itself, and well as my personal ethical values.

Revealing a major crime in such a context, where you do not have any personal interest in the matter, but you keep in mind that the interest of the institution where you work is a public

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70 See, for example, P. S. Martins, Cronyism, Discussion Paper no. 5349 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, 2010).
interest; my motive has been to respond to the values of the professional integrity I have been building through years of experience.  

(A1)

This type of professional ethics is typically considered as part of anti-corruption and compliance efforts only for a small band of critical professions, such as business leaders and accountants. Anti-corruption awareness and training is much less prominent, however, in the education curricula and professional bodies that set related standards for other professions, from academia to engineers, architects, doctors and teachers. This points to some under-explored opportunities for fostering professional norms of integrity that appear to be a vital motivating factor for resistance to corruption.

Second, there is a very interesting cluster of motivations that veer from personal ethical values into framing corruption as something like a personal insult, a competition for who is right, a challenge to one’s dignity that provokes a fierce reaction to restore self-respect, gain public validation for one’s claims and restore a sense of self-respect and moral power/superiority without necessarily gaining financial compensation.

And at that very moment when you start feeling the fear because of the things they might do to you, you realise what damned creatures you’re fighting against, and here I am talking about simple, human, ordinary attitudes, and that is the thing that motivates me as an individual. Oh no, I won’t let you walk over me, I won’t let you do it because you are worse than me. It is a simple matter of my acceptance to be walked over or not. This is highly personal, but also motivational for me.

(A3)

It makes me happy that I have attended many debates relating to the case and none of them resulted in any criminal charges against me or refuted me. This indicates that the institutions have no chance of pressing charges for libel if something said is true.

(A1)

I wanted to prove to myself that I can earn it [a driver’s licence].

(A2)

If you’re in the right, no one is allowed to make a fool of you.

(A2)

[T]here weren’t any economic constraints; I simply didn’t want to ‘freely’ pay that money.

(A2)

[T]his is my reaction to injustice; it is not good for me, but it is the way I react.

(A3)

Now, the question is: how to find ways to fight against it? I, for one, do not recognise false authorities, and I am ready to fight to the end when I know with certainty that I am right. This is why I have sought help from you. This has inspired me to fight.

(A1)

This fierce commitment to regain and assert one’s autonomy, dignity and at times moral superiority mix ethical considerations with a strong, psychologically very powerful dose of self-regarding motives around
maintaining a positive, empowered self-image.\textsuperscript{71} And these personal values and motives have been invoked more saliently than both material incentives and more generalised ethical principles. This emphasis on the selfish side of being and doing good provides useful cues to revisit and rework mobilisation efforts that try to instil more everyday resistance to corruption, and may at times focus disproportionately on emphasising material arguments or higher ethical principles and overlook this middle ground of self-regarding goodness.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{The practicalities of taking action}

Significant parts of the focus group discussions revolved around the practical experience of taking action against and reporting corruption. Several aspects are worth highlighting. First, several participants described going through a ‘learning by doing’ process. They started with a basic level of knowledge about their rights when deciding to resist or report, and during what were often years of struggle involving several different institutions learnt the ropes and developed some kind of ‘street smartness’ and sophisticated tactical aptitude along the way.

\begin{quote}
I do not repent for everything that happened. This was a great experience; I would repeat it, but I would be much, much better trained for this fight than I was this time.
\end{quote}

(A3)

Calling upon NGO support and approaching the Transparency International legal advice centre turned out to be a path that most took only as a kind of a last resort, after they had exhausted all formal complaints procedures and unsuccessfully petitioned the authorities.

This speaks to and helps unpack for the issue of corruption reporting the very interesting interplay between top-down government-provided and bottom-up NGO-supported social accountability mechanisms. Quite surprisingly, the formal, institutional complaints mechanisms appear to have been very much the first option for everyone, even though all the petitioners reported very low levels of trust in formal institutions\textsuperscript{73} and had experienced frustrating setbacks time and time again while working with the official complaints apparatus.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{quote}
I have decided to address you after I have exhausted all possibilities contacting the institutions where I have been supposed to report the case, but which have failed to provide any assistance.
\end{quote}

(A1)

\textsuperscript{71} On the motivational power of a positive self-image, see, for example, N. Mazar, O. Amir and D. Ariely, ‘The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance’, \textit{Journal of Marketing Research}, vol. 45 (2008), 633–644. It should be noted, however, that the authors focus in this paper on the adverse route to retaining a positive self-image: the stretchable ability to rationalise and morally justify unethical behaviour in warped ways.

\textsuperscript{72} The broader literature on whistleblowing is also increasingly settling on transcending the egoistic versus altruistic dichotomy and finding a fluid, mixed set of motivations that contain self-interested, prosocial and generalised ethical elements as relevant for motivating whistleblowing; see P. Roberts, ‘Motivations for Whistleblowing: Personal, Private, and Public Interests’, in A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. Moberly and W. Vandekerckhove (eds.), \textit{International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research} (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 207–229.

\textsuperscript{73} In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the focus group countries, for example, only 4 per cent of people think the government is doing a reasonably satisfactory job in fighting corruption, one of the lowest percentages across Europe (Transparency International, \textit{Global Corruption Barometer}, forthcoming, deliverable D7.1).

\textsuperscript{74} This paradoxical situation of taking action and working official reporting channels despite extremely low trust in the anti-corruption efficacy of the government stands in contrast to the statistical findings by Peiffer and Alvarez, of a significant reduction in willingness to report corruption in non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries when perceived government effectiveness is low: Peiffer and Alvarez (2015).
There is no institution left where I have not filed petitions, complaints and other submissions. I have informed the Ministry of Justice, the Chamber of Enforcement Agents, the State Judicial Council and any other institution I deemed necessary, but they all are slowing the processes down.

(A1)

NGO support mechanisms are thus very much a last-resort option in helping to escalate the struggle to a legal level that may otherwise not be available to the petitioner.

Closely related, most acts of reporting were described as very individualistic endeavours: a citizen alone, or perhaps with the help of a lawyer or, at times, the media, trying to gain justice, but not an approach that would be carried forward as collective action by a group of people who share the same grievances or are championing some meso-level social, professional or community association that the claimant would be part of. Most resisters were literally going it alone and displaying true grit. With hindsight, participants viewed the support from NGOs as very positive, and wished they had had more support and solidarity earlier on.

It would be good to have somebody stand behind you, some political party, a non-governmental organisation, to have somebody to be with you if something happens and offer you advice. If you are left on your own, they could crush you.

(A1)

When it comes to the best form of response, in my case, I have eliminated the possibility that I know everything. First of all, it is important to have some knowledge of the subject matter; for instance, if we are dealing with an individual human right, the person, provided he/she has no knowledge, should have to consult a lawyer.

(A1)

When it comes to my own fight, I often wonder whether it was worth it. And whether it is still worth it: it takes a lot of time, knowledge, resources, nerves and frustration. I wouldn’t have succeeded...without...Transparency.

(A3)

This combination of a very individualistic effort, learning the hard way and involving specialised NGO support as a last resort points to untapped opportunities to foster more collaborative support mechanisms and early-stage NGO assistance that might help to significantly lower the practical and psychological hurdles, as well as the exacting demands on time and persistence for pursuing a claim through the formal system.

Peer effects
One of the most fascinating new growth areas of enquiry in anti-corruption research is the influence of peer effects on fighting against corruption. Does a free-rider problem inhibit more active engagement by certain portions of the population when they think their fellow citizens are already engaged in the fight?75

75 Bauhr (2016).
Does a (perhaps false) sense that corruption is accepted by the majority deter individuals from resisting or taking action against it and lock countries into high-corruption equilibria?  

So, is the strong motivation to take action perhaps based on a belief – delusional or not – that others would do the same? No. The impressions from the focus groups clearly point towards a rather weak inhibiting impact from a very clear perceived lack of peer outrage about corruption and a lack of enthusiasm to fight it.

Un fortunately, I am the only one in the institution who has realised that; I hoped that others might notice it, too, but they did not want to step forward.

(A1)

Over here, for instance, a lot of people see it as normal that, when somebody takes up a position, that person is entitled to ask for money in order to provide you a service.

(A1)

But, unfortunately, we’re very few. If one in a thousand did this in Romania we’d be rich, I’m telling you. We’d be rich. People are not aware, and they don’t go.

(A2)

These bleak assessments of how others in society view and (do not) take action against corruption also corresponds with the beliefs expressed in our household survey on the issues: only 1.3 per cent of the survey respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1.7 per cent in Romania and 6.5 per cent in Macedonia believe that most people do report incidents of corruption.  

These assessments have not deterred the focus group participants from taking action, however. On the contrary, it might even have spurred more resolve and activated a stubborn insistence on proving them wrong.

Most people start from the fact that nothing can be done and give up from the start, without initiating any actions – yeah? So, there’s such a lack of confidence that anything can be done...

I was told too, everyone told me, ‘You won’t be able to achieve anything. Anything.’ Everyone.

For everything. They told me, ‘You won’t solve anything,’ and I said, ‘Let’s see. I want to see.’

(A2)

**Optimism and efficacy**

The perceived efficacy of taking action is commonly regarded as a potent driver of political engagement. In the context of corruption reporting, this efficacy also depends on expectations about the responsiveness of the state and trust in the judicial system. How well the government is believed to be doing in tackling corruption has been found to positively correlated to the propensity for taking action against corruption in non-OECD countries.

Reporters seemed to have mixed expectations about positive resolutions of their cases. On the one hand, they exhibited a general sense of optimism that the world/their country could be made a less corrupt place

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76 Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013); on pluralistic ignorance more specifically, see Darley (2004) and Bicchieri and Fukui (1999).
and that some kind of tipping point could be reached for a path towards more integrity at some point in the future.

*There is no simple way that one can point to and use to make this disappear, but it may be alleviated by raising citizens’ awareness about the manipulations they have been facing. Then, when people say ‘No’ to such practices, things would start to change.*

(A1)

*I still believe in the day when we’ll be both correct and honest, and corruption – eradicated!*  
(A2)

*Each of us who goes into a legal or political battle must have faith that justice will see the light of day and that all who have transgressed the law will be meted out adequate punishments.*  
(A1)

*I have always had faith; I may be an incorrigible optimist, but I have faith that the professional mentality of certain people who work in the institutions will start to function, even if that may seem impossible knowing all the forms of pressures exerted these days, starting with those on the police and the judiciary.*  
(A1)

On the other hand, they did not harbour great expectations that they might be able to get full redress on their own case or achieve transformational change any time soon.

*To be honest, I did not expect to see any results. However, I had to do it so as to keep my conscience clear and to be able to say to myself that I have taken some action in the given circumstances.*  
(A1)

*This corruption – we can talk about a political party, in public institutions at all levels – is a disease of this society, which will not be cured in the next ten years; there is no cure for this disease.*  
(A3)

As the A3 participant noted, many corruption reporters seem to embrace a very pragmatic sense of progress. They seem to recognise and derive continuous motivation from small wins along the way, from the public presentation and validation of their case in the media, and the fact that they have not been countersued for libel. Overall, none of the focus group participants seem to have embarked on their struggle with a clear expectation to be successful and make a significant difference – a set of sentiments that also confirms the analysis of motivations earlier, whereby material considerations seemed to be important but were ultimately trumped by moral or more self-regarding psychological drivers towards action.

*Outcomes, impact – and would you do it again?*

As mentioned earlier, several of the cases and acts of reporting shared in the focus groups are still ongoing, attesting to the laborious, drawn-out nature of the struggle, with unclear prospects of arriving at a redemptive outcome. Some notable wins were recorded, for example securing a place in social housing that had previously been denied, and some smaller gains along the way also found mention (see above).
Overall, then, the picture is mixed: the jury is largely still out, yet the occasional lighthouse effect from successfully resolved cases with significant media attention can already be recorded.

Besides achieving resolution and sending a ‘no impunity’ message, another very important marker for thinking about the ultimate impact of acts of corruption reporting relates to the impact on the petitioner him- or herself, and the ripple effect that this experience can have on the social surroundings. A central question in this context is whether reporters would do it again. And, despite all the struggles and problems along the way, the answer is a rather resounding ‘Yes’.

*The motivation was, first, fighting for my rights, then, for keeping my job and my heartfelt pain because of the injustice that I did not want to allow it just to happen. I do not repent for everything that happened. This was a great experience; I would repeat it, but I would be much, much better trained for this fight than I was this time.*

(A3)

*My life experience showed this to me: when I reacted, when you are faced with more or less open hostility, ... when you show that you have guts (pardon my language), then all of a sudden there appears the famous political pragmatism and the 'let's have a deal' attitude.*

(A3)

Some participants in Romania are even reported to have taken on additional responsibilities in this area, acting as informal monitors of the performance of local authorities, for example (A2). And the rapporteur for Bosnia and Herzegovina summarised related insights as follows:

*Concerning the conclusions, the final judgements of our participants, as well as the answers to question as to whether they would do the same again, most of them answered with great fervour that they would. Some of them said that they would maybe do some things differently, or that they would be even more active. Only a few participants answered that they would not repeat the same procedure and fight, but it is evident that most of them do not feel the fear of the consequences they are suffering, suffered or could eventually suffer, and they even considered the question about their fear inappropriate.*

(A3)

**Reflection on focus groups as a research method in anti-corruption research**

Give the very infrequent use of focus groups in anti-corruption research, it is useful to reflect in more detail on the experience with the research methods as an important insight in itself.

In line with ex ante expectations, it turned out to be rather difficult to recruit participants for the focus groups, as (i) they require much more time and commitment from the participants than surveys, (ii) they deal with a very sensitive topic that may implicate participants in illegal activity and that is rife with social desirability bias and (iii) they focus primarily on people who have actively resisted corruption (in two of the three countries), thus applying an additional very restrictive filter.

Using the local Transparency International anti-corruption service centres and their clients as a pool for recruitment was therefore the only way to secure a sufficient number of participants, but even with this unique service infrastructure to draw on recruitment was still not easy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, many help centre clients did not want to participate, and participants were described in some focus groups as very reluctant to share with a broader group what are considered very personal
experiences. The team in Bosnia and Herzegovina also raised concerns that people might feel cheated, since they had been offered free legal support service and were now asked to join a focus group, which might come across as some late payment in kind. Then again, the research team in Romania expressed surprise that they had found it rather easy to recruit into the health professional focus group and promote an open discussion about a very sensitive topic.

Other lessons learnt included the suggestion to carefully programme the focus group so that it is not dominated by a discussion of current news events, which could drown out the sharing of deeper experience, and to use a lot of complementary research insights as inputs into the debate and analysis (Romania).
Case study Portugal: whistleblowing and official online corruption reporting (B1)

Theme
Procedures and developments to encourage whistleblowing: a study of the online mechanism for reporting corruption to the authorities in Portugal.

Background and rationale
As our stock-take exercise found out, the efficacy of citizen reporting and complaints mechanism is highly contingent on institutional responsiveness and the integration with formal institutional accountability mechanisms (S2). Official corruption-reporting platforms thus play a very important role in this area, and Portugal presents a particularly interesting case study in this context, for several reasons. As many as 88 per cent of Portuguese respondents express a willingness to report corruption, and 50 per cent of Portuguese citizens state that they have actually reported bribery when they were exposed to it – the third highest and the highest rate across the region, respectively. In contrast, no respondents think that the majority of people do actually report corruption. And only 36 per cent indicate that they would report to an official hotline, the lowest rate across the region.

This very contrast-rich situation makes an analysis of the major official reporting platform highly interesting.

Approach
This case study focuses primarily on an online reporting mechanism for corruption, set up by the Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal (DCIAP), named Denúncia de Actos de Corrupção e Fraude, perhaps best translated as ‘Corruption: Report Here’.

The mechanism has been established specifically to receive reports and handle complaints about corruption. It is administered by the national Portuguese authorities. The role of complaint platforms such as the DCIAP’s is perceived as highly important: they are expressly dedicated to promoting a change of culture, mobilising citizens both to report corruption to the competent authorities and to contribute more generally to monitoring and stewarding for the common good.

The analysis consists of the following elements:

- desk research: a legal analysis and history of whistleblowing and reporting frameworks in Portugal – legal provisions and their assessment in international monitoring and assessment reports
- key informant interviews with staff of the reporting platform, clients of the Transparency International Portugal legal advice centre and anti-corruption experts
- a focus group/survey with a class of business students who were invited to test the usability of the online platform
- online content analysis of the design and presentation of the reporting platform

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79 GCB 2016 (S1), though this is based on a very low base population of only the 2 per cent of people in the sample who had indicated that they had been exposed to bribery.
80 GCB 2016.
81 GCB 2013, combining the results for reporting to an institution directly with reporting to a general government hotline.
Key findings

Varied duties and norms for reporting – and gradual progress
Despite 40 years of democracy, the legacy of dictatorship and authoritarianism in Portugal can still colour the perception of whistleblowing negatively and associate it with despicable acts of public denunciations, rather than legitimate reporting to detect wrongdoing and protect the public interest.

There are general provisions on protecting whistleblowers for public and private sector employees, but there are no specific mechanisms in the public institutions to ensure the protection of whistleblowers in practice. Without specific legal protections, acts of whistleblowing in Portugal may end up being criminalised on the basis of theft, violation of confidentiality and secrecy laws, breach of trade secret protections or illegal access to databases.

In the Portuguese case, the obligation to denounce/inform the public about alleged irregularities is not of a general nature (for all citizens). Only Portuguese officials have an obligation, under article 242.1b of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), to report to the prosecutor any offences that come to their notice in the course of their duties.

With regard to whistleblower protection, the law invokes a broad concept of protection but has many shortcomings, due to a lack of clear and specific provisions and implementation procedures – problems further aggravated by a lack of evaluations and impact-oriented data collection and by weak enforcement. Moreover, there is a high bar for the admissibility of anonymous reporting. All this means that essential protections for reporters are ill-designed and inadequately implemented, and therefore do not offer a reassuring sense of trust and protection.

There are very few assessments on the number of public bodies that have internal reporting mechanisms within their organisations, or on their quality and performance.

Encouraging developments in the private sector
The extant legal framework also means that, for private sector employees, reporting irregularities is of an optional character. In other words, some specific high-risk professions excluded, private sector employees are not subject to any reporting obligation unless it constitutes a contractual duty or breach of an applicable code of ethics. And, under the Employment Law, private sector employees are subject to a general duty of loyalty towards their employer. Nevertheless, Portugal has made some progress in implementing mechanisms for the reporting of irregularities within companies. The influence of the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act was important for corporate reporting, with the November 2005 Recommendation 10-A of Portugal’s Securities Market Commission (CMVM), which proposed the establishment of mechanisms for the internal reporting of irregularities. While initial analyses found a low compliance rate of only 28.8

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83 Thus the Portuguese legislation adopts the liberal perspective enshrined in some other European countries – such as Italy (article 333 CPP) and Germany (§138 StGB). In contrast, adopting a different perspective is, for example, Spain, where article 264 LEC imposes, in general terms, the duty to report.
84 According to article 242 of the CCP, the mandatory reporting was conceived with specific character under note 1: a) Para as entidades policiais, quanto a todos os crimes de que tomarem conhecimento; b) Para os funcionários, na acepção do artigo 386.º Código Penal, quanto a crimes de que tomarem conhecimento no exercício das suas funções e por causa delas.
per cent,85 more recent assessments, such as an empirical study from 2010, attest that the compliance rate for companies listed on Euronext Lisbon had reached almost 80 per cent by 2010.86

**Whistleblowing as an essential tool for tackling corruption in Portugal**

As a recent European Union report notes, ‘[A] large number of public entities have set up anticorruption plans, but there is still the need to improve the evaluation of corruption risks and identify staff in charge of plan implementation.’87

Against this backdrop of inadequate anti-corruption systems, mechanisms for reporting within institutions are vital. This in turn requires having clear procedures and internal rules to protect whistleblowers. The actual evidence base on the efficacy of such reporting is very weak, though. There are very few assessments on the number of public bodies that have internal reporting mechanisms within their organisations, or on their quality and performance.

More broadly, the importance of whistleblowing is further confirmed by case analysis from the broader environment. Evidence gathered by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners in their 2016 *Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse* shows that tip-offs are by far the most common form to detect corruption schemes, accounting for the detection of more than 46 per cent of all cases. In contrast, internal audits, the second most frequent detection method, helped detect only 16 per cent of corruption fraud cases.88

**A diverse reporting landscape**

The establishment of channels for facilitating the reporting of suspected acts of corruption (internally or externally, private or public sector) has made substantive progress in Portugal, but the (r)evolution towards effective performance has not taken place yet.

Public sector entities are meant to develop internal channels for reporting fraudulent activities. Since 2009 the Conselho de Prevenção da Corrupção (Council for the Prevention of Corruption: CPC) has addressed the issue of preventing corruption through related risk management plans for public administration entities.89

There are several external mechanisms for external public sector corruption reporting.

The most prominent and fully developed mechanism for external reporting is the DCIAP/PGR one examined later in detail. It is also worthwhile mentioning a couple of other reporting channels, however. One is provided by the judicial police,90 but it requires authentication via citizen card or digital signature and provides little information with regard to feedback, confidentiality or other protections for whistleblowers.

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88 This study (biannual) is based on the results of an online survey opened to 34,615 certified fraud examiners (CFEs) from October 2013 to December 2013. See www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf.
89 See www.cpc.tcontas.pt/documentos/recomendacoes/recomendacao_cpc_20150701_2.pdf.
90 See www.policiajudiciaria.pt/PortalWeb/page/%7B5BFC28DE-D200-4BCC-9422-F495EEBEE82A%7D.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs\(^91\) has developed an electronic complaint system, though, unfortunately, it is also subject to several constraints. Its use is narrowly confined to the types of crimes and subjects reporters to digital identification. On the plus side, it offers some functionality for hiding visits to the site, thus offering some degree of protection to whistleblowers and the tracking of their activities. There is no further information about alternative reporting mechanisms, however, such as any more specific to corruption cases.

Several supervisory or regulatory bodies have also established reporting mechanisms that offer some degree of confidentiality. The Inspectorate General of Finance,\(^92\) for example, runs a reporting system that requires identification, but allows as an option anonymity upon request by the complainant. Furthermore, the Working Conditions Authority (ACT) maintains a related reporting mechanism that also seeks to ensure confidentiality. The office of the Portuguese ombudsman also has several channels for reporting, makes some specific provisions for confidentiality/anonymity and publishes information on complaints and follow-up in its activity reports.\(^93\)

The actual evidence base on the efficacy of such reporting is very weak, however. There are very few assessments on the number of public bodies that have internal reporting mechanisms within their organisations, or on their quality and performance.

Another challenge is the promotion of such reporting channels. None of these reporting systems are particularly visible.

It should be borne in mind that the Portuguese anti-corruption body\(^94\) has as mission ‘to collect and organize information on the occurrence of acts of corruption’ (article 2, paragraph a, of Law no. 54/2008). As such, this includes the task of alerting the citizenry as to the availability of reporting mechanisms and supporting them in this social control function. This is of particular relevance, since information received might also be of interest to the prosecutor.\(^95\) Unfortunately, the CPC does not feature the relevant reporting mechanism prominently on its website.\(^96\)

To fully tap their potential to involve citizens in tackling corruption, such reporting mechanisms should be subject to much more promotion and awareness-raising, as well as publicly documenting their activities and impact in detecting and punishing corruption and fraud.

**Analysis of the major public online corruption reporting mechanism: the DCIAP reporting platform**

The Central Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Department was established in 1998 and located within the prosecution services. With a team that is specially trained for and focused on combating serious, highly

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organised and complex crime, the DCIAP is a body of fundamental importance to tackling many forms of corruption.

In this context, the DCIAP’s reporting platform, established in 2010, is a very important mechanism for collecting information that might lead to investigations of corruption-related offences.

**User profiles and reporting practices: anonymity and mission creep?**

In the six years from 2010 to 2015 inclusive the DCIAP received more than 9,000 complaints on its website, of which 4,376 were anonymous. More than 64 per cent of the submissions were filed right away, 411 triggered preliminary investigations while 121 (1.34 per cent) gave rise to full investigations.

**Exhibit 32 Contacts**

![Bar chart showing contacts from 2010 to 2015]

Source: Data made available by the DCIAP.

The highest level of cases was recorded in 2013. It is worth noting, without attempting to establish a cause and effect link, that in 2012 and 2013 the government introduced new packages of austerity measures, including freezes and cuts in pensions and tax benefits. Also significant is the high volume recorded in 2014, which coincided with the lottery of the ‘lucky invoice’, which encourages citizens to obtain official receipts and invoices for their purchases that can then be entered into a draw for big-ticket prizes and thus significantly raise the level of awareness about tax fraud. The DCIAP team noted that the tax fraud allegations reported on the platform rose considerably in volume when the ‘lucky invoice’ was introduced. As it turns out, tax fraud is the no. 1 issue reported on, with close to 1,400 received reports over five years, followed by corruption, with 577 complaints. Such a trend towards reporting tax fraud rather than genuine corruption was also experienced at the Transparency International Portugal legal advice service. The reasons for this high number of tax-related cases might also be related to an unclear idea of what is covered by the phenomenon of corruption, some unclear expectations about the remit of the DCIAP or simply that the platform was just the first (or last-resort) channel found to report such issues.

In 2015 the DCIAP received information on 647 anonymous cases related to crimes of corruption and fraud. On average, the Portuguese reported about 54 cases per month. While high, the number represents a decrease compared to the 914 anonymous reports made in 2014. The DCIAP director and his team pointed out during their interview that most of the submissions received have a very general character and are

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therefore followed up with requests for additional data, which typically remain unanswered. To improve the quality of the information, the DCIAP sets out to provide relevant forms and other tools.

Unfortunately, the extraction of more detailed qualitative data cannot be carried out, so the disclosure of patterns of cases etc. is not possible.

Mixed marks on visibility and usability
The ad hoc focus group (the open class at the University Institute of Lisbon) noted both positive and negative aspects about the site.

One-third of the students did indeed know about the existence of the reporting platform. No one had used it, however, and one student had already used a different mechanism to file a complaint. A visit to different websites of other key institutions that might be approached by potential complainants finds that almost none of them provide information on and cross-references to this main reporting mechanism. To revive usage, it would be necessary to implement an integrated promotion strategy for both public and private entities and devise a much more wide-ranging promotion both offline (with posters strategically placed in public departments, shops, communities, etc.) and online (via a host of websites of relevant institutions).

With regard to the information context on the site, a clear need for improvement was identified by the student visitors: the information was regarded as confusing at times and did not strike a tone conveying empathy and a degree of reassurance as to the security of potential complainants. With regard to the options to remain anonymous yet provide contact for follow-up, the students perceived some confusion and no clear presentation of the rules and safeguards, as well as protection limits that one is entitled to. The institutional reassurance that personal information will not be unnecessarily publicly disclosed was regarded as very weak and not encouraging for personal identification. The two features of the platform that were assessed most positively were (i) the functionality to provide anonymous feedback and (ii) the ability to track what happens with the reports.

Overall, students felt that the platform and its format were quite discouraging, because ‘people are being confronted with very specific or technical issues…’ and ‘[i]t is almost necessary to be a lawyer to file a complaint’.

Overall conclusion: more integration, visibility and performance feedback and a holistic notion of support for reporters
The introduction of this online reporting mechanism in 2010 was undoubtedly a remarkable step by the Portuguese justice system. The DCIAP’s platform is an essential tool for the twenty-first century in mobilising citizens to contribute to justice and help prevent and tackle corruption.

The analysis has found that, after a difficult starting period, from 2010 to 2013, there was a gradual and significant improvement of the platform, which at present is being overhauled once more. 2016 marks another crucial step in the evolution of the platform.

More than ever, in the current economic and social situation, it is essential for the platform to be firmly refocused on its core mission of receiving complaints about corruption, and handle tax-related cases only in very serious instances, either by virtue of geographical size or the amounts involved and/or the nature of the fraud (fraud carousel, European Union funds, etc.).
Over the years the platform has been underpinned by an increasingly capable and more effective structure, and it is now viewed as a prime source for receiving information that can trigger or assist investigations into ‘big corruption’ cases – complex corrupt transactions of a trans-district or transnational character.

Even so, more needs to be done besides refocusing reporting on the core corruption issues. Encouraging more of a trusted two-way environment and a culture of sharing will require improvements for the platform on the DCIAP website and the introduction of an educational module with information and links to other operational reporting channels for other types of offences. It will also require more visibility for and explanations of the DCIAP platform on other key institutional websites and institutions.

A stronger feedback loop with people submitting complaints will also have to entail more proactive information on status, follow-up, turn-around timelines, reasons for specific decisions, etc. Such an enhanced dialogue should also extend to the psychological needs and personal life challenges that arise from the difficult position of the whistleblower, thus working towards a more integrated and holistic service that enhances confidence and trust and reduces the inconveniences of whistleblowing, addressing psychological, material and social concerns that are all pieces of the puzzle, so as to instil a stronger culture of integrity. Last but not least, much more information on uptake, performance, follow-up rates, patterns and trends in reporting should be published proactively and in a consolidated manner.

Communication of this nature is an important part of any reporting policy, in order to mobilise employees, workers and society at large to take on corruption and promote a culture of valuing the public interest and those who defend and protect it.

With regard to the bigger picture of understanding official reporting mechanisms, research and policy practice might have to focus more on looking beyond individual reporting mechanisms and considering how to promote, integrate and strengthen reporting interfaces across the board of an entire ecology of reporting mechanisms for employees, public sector workers and citizens. There is very little cross-promotion and strategic interlinking of reporting mechanisms, thus lowering the information threshold for reporting.
Case study United Kingdom: citizen participation in open government (B2)

Theme
The open data revolution and citizen engagement for accountability: the (non-)engagement with government spending data in the United Kingdom and Wales.

Context and scope
Big hopes ride on the open data movements and its ability to help unlock access to entire classes of important accountability data, thus boosting social accountability mechanisms. This case study for the United Kingdom and Wales focused on spending data by local governments in the country and examined the extent to which it was actually used or not used and the factors that accounted for the observed patterns.

Over the past decade the UK government has been keen to devolve powers and service provision downwards to local authorities. The control and oversight mechanisms to ensure these new powers and resources are used appropriately have been weakened, however.98

In 2010 the UK government announced its intention to abolish the Audit Commission, the independent body that had been responsible for overseeing local authority auditing since 1983.99 The move was intended to save £50 million in public spending a year and radically change the framework for auditing the activities of local authorities. Under this new framework, citizens would be empowered to hold their local authorities to account by the greater availability of data on public spending.100

In 2010 the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) announced that local authorities in England should start publishing the details of spending over £500 in value.101 In 2011 it published a non-binding Code of Recommended Practice outlining what these authorities should be publishing, which also included a recommendation for councils to publish contracts and tender notices.102 In 2014 this recommended practice was made a mandatory requirement.103

This deluge of new spending data was explicitly intended to increase local government accountability by providing citizens with more information about spending decisions made on their behalf. The UK government hoped that this new data would lead to an ‘army of armchair auditors’ scrutinising public

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spending decisions. In the wake of these developments a number of tools were developed to help make this data more accessible for the public, such as Open Spending, Spend Network and AppGov. It is unclear, however, whether this policy of openness has encouraged greater citizen scrutiny of public finances.

In 2014 the UK Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee undertook a review of the current arrangements for local accountability and audit. During the review it asked the Department for Communities and Local Government what evidence it had to show its call to arms had been taken-up. The department was unable to provide any evidence or figures on the uptake of these new accountability systems, however. Despite an isolated local example in Barnet, there has been little in the way of news of armchair auditors using the new spending data or the tools that are intended to make it more accessible.

It has been suggested that there has been little, if any, take-up of this data. Reasons for this lack of take-up include poor data quality, the way in which this new financial information is displayed; citizens’ inability to analyse or contextualise the data; and their lack of interest in local government finance. Our research explored what evidence there was to support these claims and why citizens are not engaging in this oversight and accountability work.

**Approach**

The primary objective of the research was to examine what possible reasons might explain why there does not appear to have been widespread public usage of local government spending data. The focus was placed on transaction-level data and how it is or is not being used by citizens to hold their public institutions and officials to account.

Within the relatively small amount of literature on this subject there are, arguably, three main potential reasons why citizens have not been using this data on a large scale:

1. **Structural** issues relating to policies, processes or laws

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105 See https://openspending.org [accessed 6 October 2015].

106 See www.spendnetwork.com [accessed 6 October 2015].

107 See www.appgov.org [accessed 6 October 2015].


2. **technical** issues relating to the publication or presentation of this data
3. **personal** issues internal to citizens, such as lack of motivation, skill or competence

These three categories directed the lines of enquiry through semi-structured interviews and a data dive. To examine structural issues, interviews were conducted with a data producer (a local authority information officer) and policy officials working in the area of audit and accountability.

To examine potential technical issues, interviews were carried out with producers of tools that were designed to make this data more accessible and intelligible for the public. Taken together, seven expert interviews were conducted to examine structural and technical issues.

To examine potential issues with users, the research team engaged with members of the public who were unlikely to have used this data or engaged with it in a professional capacity. This was done through a focus group in the format of a data dive with a group of around 20 masters and PhD students from the University of Sussex, held on 25 November 2015. The students were given the task of using public spending data and contract portals to identify potentially suspicious transactions based on selected corruption indicators produced by the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office. The group then discussed their experiences and the challenges they thought members of the public would find when undertaking this kind of work.

**Key findings**

The findings broadly support the reasons previously given as to why there does not appear to have been widespread use of local authority spending data by the general public. There are issues at the structural and technical levels that mean this data is not useful for those wishing to hold public bodies and officials to account. There are also some significant personal barriers to participation that could be deterring widespread participation in the monitoring of public spending at this level.

**Public engagement with public spending data**

Although the NGO OpenCorporates has facilitated data dive using this data involving members of the public, most interviewees were sceptical about its widespread use by the public or their general involvement in audit and accountability work at local government level.

*Are they [the public] playing that role [of citizen auditors]? Absolutely not.*

(Alan Bryce, non-executive director, the European Institute for Combatting Corruption and Fraud: TEICCAF)

At the moment the primary users of this data are reported to be organisations, trying to use it to help increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending decisions, and journalists. Potentially, however, the biggest beneficiaries could be public bodies themselves.

*I think there’s this idea that only citizens can benefit from this data...but most importantly the prime beneficiary of this stuff is the government.*

(Ian Makgill, managing director, Spend Network)

Three of the interviewees identified parallels between the perceived lack of public engagement with spending data and low levels of participation with older accountability tools. Local authorities have been required to make their annual accounts and spending receipts available for public inspection since at least the nineteenth century. These interviewees claimed that hardly anyone took advantage of this right, however.

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I used to work in local government, and there was a day every year when the accounts are published and people can come in and go through the accounts and ask councillors and people who work for the council questions...and on that day when it was open nobody ever came in.

(Rachael Tiffen, head of Counter Fraud Centre, Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy: CIPFA)

Uses of public spending data

Interviewees identified four primary benefits for public spending data:

1. detecting and deterring corrupt behaviour
2. increasing value for money in public sector procurement
3. providing greater information for businesses tendering for public contracts
4. increasing understanding about what public money is spent on

The mere fact that public spending decisions were more open to external scrutiny was seen by some as a deterrent against potentially corrupt behaviour.

Others focused on the potential value it could bring to those making public procurement decisions. Spend Network, Data Diligence and OpenCorporates have all used the data to help flag potential spending irregularities or where public bodies can make savings. Although they did not give specific amounts that could have been saved, open data from elsewhere has identified potential savings of tens of millions of pounds\footnote{E. Thwaites, ‘Prescription Savings Worth Millions Identified by ODI Incubated Company’, Open Data Institute, 6 December 2012, \url{http://theodi.org/news/prescription-savings-worth-millions-identified-odi-incubated-company} [accessed 25 January 2016].} and increased efficiencies in procurement processes involving tens of billions of pounds worth of public contracts.\footnote{E. Thwaites, ‘ODI Startup Reveals UK Business Starved of £22bn in Cash Flow by Government Inefficiencies’, Open Data Institute, 9 March 2014, \url{http://theodi.org/news/new-data-analysis-by-odi-startup-shows-uk-businesses-starved-of-22bn-in-cash-flow} [accessed 25 January 2016].}

Most interviewees cited a number of problems with the accuracy, accessibility, intelligibility and meaningfulness of the data, however, which inhibited these potential benefits from being fully realised. These issues are expanded upon in the sections below.

In addition, there were some concerns that the data had been used by some to commit mandate fraud. In this, fraudsters submit false invoices to authorities based on information they have managed to gather from public spending data. Vulnerabilities to this appear to be highest when organisations failed to have robust anti-fraud processes and procedures in place, and when the details of supplier reference numbers were included in the spending data.

*The presentation of financial information on local authority websites in itself doesn’t necessarily lead to...appropriate information for fraud investigations...and in fact, counter-intuitively, may increase the prospect of fraud.*

(Drew Cullen, executive director of public affairs, CIPFA)

Overall, despite the concerns about its potential use for mandate fraud, the response of interviewees was that it was a good thing to have public spending data made publicly available. Their main concerns were about improving it and making sure that there was a better match between the supply of the data and the needs of its users.
Barriers to participation
Interviewees identified barriers to citizenship participation across all three of our lines of enquiry.

The biggest challenge to realising the potential of public spending data was the data itself.

_We’re doing a piece of research at the moment that’s identifying significant savings in areas such as mobile phones, utilities, agency staff just from the data that’s available, but we can’t do anything with construction because the data is so bad._

(Ian Makgill, managing director, Spend Network)

Interviewees cited spending data as being inaccurate, inaccessible, often unintelligible and sometimes lacking sufficient detail to be meaningful. Although this has been primarily categorised as a technical issue, it appears to have its origins in some structural problems with the framework for audit and accountability, and open data within the public sector. The net result of this is that local authority spending transparency is not as good as it is intended to be, which inhibits citizens’ ability to hold councils to account.

_When you start using it [the spending data], it’s absolutely not [transparent]._

(student, data dive participant, University of Sussex)

Structural
Overall, the main structural obstacle interviewees identified was that there were relatively few avenues for citizens to pursue suspicious activity they might identify in the data. Even if a member of the public identified an issue with a local authority’s spending, the recent changes to the audit and accountability arrangements in local government make it less likely that it would be taken up by an external auditor. Derek Elliott, a former head of governance and counter-fraud operations at the Audit Commission highlighted that, even under the previous system, there was a lot of pressure on auditors.

_To be a public auditor and to speak up yourself can be a very frightening thing... [W]hen you stand up publicly against a council, in my experience, nine times out of ten the council’s immediate reaction is to turn on you and challenge you. So it’s a very isolating world._

(Derek Elliott, former head of governance and counter-fraud, Audit Commission)

Nevertheless, Elliott thought the new audit and accountability regime for local government would mean that local authority external auditors – who under the new system will be appointed by the councils themselves – may be too worried about having their contract renewed to raise issues flagged by citizens.

_If you were just a private firm selected by the council, your main job as auditor for the firm you’re working for is to bring in work._

(Derek Elliott, former head of governance and counter-fraud, Audit Commission)

We also identified this as a significant issue with the new system of audit in our 2013 report _Corruption in UK Local Government: The Mounting Risks_.

The other major structural issue raised was about who ‘owned’ the initiative to publish spending data within the state. Although the Cabinet Office leads the UK government’s transparency initiatives within central government, the Department for Communities and Local Government is the department that actually mandates local authorities to publish their spending data, and the data itself is owned by councils. This means it has been difficult for those looking to improve the quality of the data to know who to talk to.

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Rowson, Makgill and Wright all had concerns with central government’s responsiveness to the demands of users. Rowson noted that, despite several attempts to highlight issues with the data to civil servants, he did not feel as though he had been able to find its ‘owner’ within Whitehall.

*I’m constantly trying to find the owner [in government] of this initiative.*

(Andrew Rowson, director, Data Diligence)

Although some authorities were reported to be responsive to outside suggestions as to how to improve their data, including the publication of mandatory data that might have been omitted by accident, a significant number were not. This raises questions about the enforcement of the mandatory code. If an authority does not publish its spending data on time in accordance with the mandatory code, there does not currently seem to be a mechanism for redress other than requesting the disclosure of information through freedom of information (FOI) requests.

*Technical*

There were three main technical barriers that interviewees identified: data quality, the context for data that is available and limitations in using spending data to find corrupt or suspicious behaviour.

The accuracy and completeness of spending data was cited as a major problem by both Rowson and Makgill. Rowson alleged that one authority alone hid at least £1 billion of disclosures over a four- to five-year period, while another seemed to be reporting only a fraction of its actual total spending.

*When you looked at that spend and compared it with their gross expenditure in their accounts, that’s only 15 per cent.*

(Andrew Rowson, director, Data Diligence)

Alongside missing records, both Makgill and Rowson identified missing fields as a major problem with the data. This included data not including credit notes, large-scale redactions of key fields of data and missing contract numbers.

According to initial analysis by AppGov, between 2011 and 2016 London boroughs alone redacted around £1.8 billion worth of records. 118 Although there may be legitimate reasons why many records are redacted – such as data protection – there are concerns that a significant amount is being redacted unnecessarily.

With regard to accessibility a number of sites have been developed to make this data more accessible to the public. These fall broadly into three categories of data portal:

1. **internal**: produced and maintained by the authorities themselves (for example, Redbridge Council’s DataShare119 and the Open Barnet data portal120)
2. **third party**: produced and maintained by another organisation on behalf of the authority (for example, LG Inform Plus121, DataGM, Spikes Cavell122 and data.gov.uk123)
3. **external**: produced and maintained by another organisation (for example, Spend Network124 and OpenSpending125)

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118 See www.appgov.org/apg/la/redact [accessed 31 March 2016].
120 See https://open.barnet.gov.uk [accessed 31 March 2016].
121 See http://datasets.opendata.esd.org.uk [accessed 31 March 2016].
123 See https://data.gov.uk/data/search [accessed 31 March 2016].
Although having numerous portals could, in theory, make it easier for members of the public to access spending data, there is also the possibility that it might make it more confusing. One of the interviewees questioned the effectiveness of the UK government’s central data portal, data.gov.uk, which is supposed to host data sets from all parts of the public sector, including local government. Spend Network claimed it was not updated regularly enough to be useful for users.

As well as some data being out of date on data.gov.uk, some local authorities were also unable to publish their data in a timely manner on their own sites. Spend Network mentioned one particular council that had to be subjected to FOI requests every month before it released its data. This was not an isolated incident, however, with the company having to invoke the FOIA with numerous authorities every month in order to get access to data that is required to be published by law.

After a short survey of one of the numerous third-party sites, DataGM\(^1\) – a central data portal for authorities in the Greater Manchester area – there appeared to be data sets for only seven of the area’s ten local councils.\(^2\) None of the files on the site appeared to be up to date as of 1 February 2016, though some did include links to newer files on the council’s own website.

Although we are not aware of any comprehensive analysis of the timeliness of data releases across local government, these examples suggest that some of platforms designed to make this data more accessible are failing to do so.

Alongside issues of accuracy and accessibility, all the data users we interviewed reported continued problems with the intelligibility of what is being published. This ranged from categories in the data being changed on a regular basis, making it difficult to compare figures over time, to erroneous values. Both AppGov and Spend Network have to spend a significant amount of time reformatting and cleaning the data before it can be published on their sites.

_One in five files is so technically poor. For example, what am I supposed to do with a transaction that occurred in 1900? […] Over the five years of publishing the data not one entity [public body] has published consistently… I have to have someone working virtually full-time on this to make that data available for analysis._

(Ian Makgill, managing director, Spend Network)

One of the issues highlighted by Rowson is that there is no standardisation in how items of spend are categorised, either across authorities or within councils themselves. For example, under the Transparency Code, authorities are required to include a summary of the purpose of expenditure, the department that incurred the expenditure and the merchant category for the item (for example, computers, software, etc.).\(^3\) There is nothing in the code to ensure that councils report the purpose of spending consistently, however, and the use of merchant categories appears to be sporadic at best.

Related to the intelligibility of categories, Rowson noted that the descriptions of spending were often unhelpful for contextualising or providing meaning to the data.

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\(^1\) See http://spendnetwork.com [accessed 31 March 2016].
\(^2\) See https://openspending.org [accessed 31 March 2016].
\(^3\) See http://datagm.org.uk/dataset?tags=spend&_tags_limit=0 [accessed 31 March 2016].
\(^4\) Trafford, Rochdale, Oldham, Bury, Stockport, Wigan and Tameside.
Sometimes 85 per cent of them [lines of data] say “any other business” or “third party”...which isn’t much use.

(Andrew Rowson, director, Data Diligence)

Although Makgill didn’t comment on this in detail, he did note that the absence of contract numbers was a massive stumbling block for users trying to make sense of the spending data. This is an important link in the chain for understanding whether an item is good value for money, relevant to the project it falls under, or potentially corrupt or illicit activity.

_I cannot understand spend unless I understand the contract. So knowing what spend went through what contract is really important, because contracts give me context._

(Ian Makgill, managing director, Spend Network)

During the data dive with students at the University of Sussex we tested out how easy it was for them to understand the context of items of expenditure by getting them to try and link them with their related contract. Their experiences supported Makgill’s claims.

_You can’t find malpractice with the tools that have been provided._

_If you’re a citizen you would simply give up [trying to use this data]._

_We’ve got different pieces of a jigsaw but don’t know how to put them together._

(students, data dive participants, University of Sussex)

Makgill also noted that the contract numbers were also missing in local authorities’ tender data. This means that there is potentially a missing link between three important parts of the spending hierarchy. Without a link between these three pieces of data it would be extremely difficult for any member of the public to establish whether a council was acting appropriately or effectively.

**Causes**

Interviewees working with the spending data identified two potential causes of the poor-quality data being published: the lack of prescription in the current transparency code and authorities not using the data themselves.

Andrew Rowson recognised that the intelligibility and completeness of data was worse prior to the introduction of mandatory standards in 2015. This suggests that some of the problems with the data could be historical, and that the introduction of mandatory standards have increased the quality of what is being published.

When discussing issues around the categorisation of data and the inclusion of values such as company recognition numbers, some interviewees cited councils’ internal software as the problem. The local authority officer noted that, at present, the authority’s finance system was not set up to automatically include this field. Although adding another field to the data was possible, incorporating this into the finance system as a bolt-on could be difficult.

Rowson noted that some of the authorities appear to have struggled complying with the reporting requirement, partly because some of their finance systems have not been geared up to do so. He also claimed that, despite the code specifying the fields required in the data, there is no standard template for authorities to report to. In essence, the guidance provided to local authorities at the moment is not specific enough, which may be a contributory factor to the relatively poor quality of the data being produced.
In addition to the above, there was also a notable feeling that the supply of spending data and wider contextual information that could help give this data meaning – for example, the details of related contracts and tenders – did not meet the demands of those actually using it. In short, there appears to be a disconnect between potential users’ needs and what is being provided.

*There is an extraordinary gap between the government’s perception of what they’re doing and the usefulness of what they’re doing.*

(Ian Makgill, managing director, Spend Network)

Some of this disconnect appears to be because more work needs to be done to better understand potential users’ needs and the kind of information they’d like to find out.

When discussing the idea of a feedback loop for local authorities, the officer at Barnet Council suggested that civil society organisations could help fill this information gap. The idea would be that organisations that work on issues relating to transparency and accountability would help ensure that there was a better match between the supply and demand for public sector data more generally.

**Personal**

Interviewees identified four main obstacles to citizens substantively engaging in local government spend monitoring: skills and knowledge, access, motivation, and time.

**Skills and knowledge**

Overall, most interviewees who flagged this as an issue thought that citizens lacked the necessary skills to analyse much of the spending data published online and effectively audit what are seen as complex institutions. The type of skills the general public lacked were divided into two main categories: data literacy and auditing skills.

*We’ve got a really big job on our hands in terms of data literacy to get people to use spreadsheets properly.*

(Ian Makgill, managing director, Spend Network)

Students who participated in the data dive echoed these concerns.

*I think the sheer volume of the data is a deterrent, as most citizens do not have the skills to be able to navigate and make sense of the data.*

*I didn’t know where to start; there is too much data and not enough guidance.*

(students, data dive participants, University of Sussex)

Interviewees also cited significant challenges for anyone looking to identify potentially corrupt behaviour, however. For example, to try to identify corrupt procurement activity would require someone with a good understanding of how the process should work in local government and what might constitute a red flag for suspicious activity. These were cited as things the average citizen would be unlikely to have.

*Just because a contract figure is large or repeated might not actually be where the issue lies.*

(Alan Bryce, non-executive director, TEICCAF)

At the data dive, a number of participants elaborated on this by highlighting that you would need extra information to actually identify potential corruption in the procurement process, such as details of the options appraisal by the local authority, including its scoring system, and some background on all the potential suppliers. This is something that you would currently have to ask for under the FOIA.
Access
Several interviewees also highlighted potential issues around access to documentation that might help complement any analysis of spending data. Although FOI requests were cited by many of the interviewees as a complementary tool that could help citizens access relevant information that might help them scrutinise spending decisions, this in itself would not necessarily help in all cases. Elliott cited a particular example from his experience in which a procurement process had been skewed by an officer who had exerted undue influence over the selection of potential contractors before anything had been written down. In order to understand how this specific process had been corrupted, you would have had to sit in on numerous meetings at which these decisions were being made, which might not have been possible.

Motivation
There were mixed responses from interviewees as to whether citizens are motivated enough to want to examine the decisions made by their local authority. The local authority officer cited a number of examples when individuals had contacted the council about certain items of spending and decisions. The officer noted that some of those who did this kind of work were motivated by personal concerns, however, as opposed to the public benefit. This point was also made by Bryce, Elliott and Cullen.

> What the motivations are for people challenging public expenditure and so forth may be many and varied as well, and may not always be for the right reasons.
> (Drew Cullen, executive director – public affairs, CIPFA)

Elliott, a former district auditor, noted that many of the people who came to him or his colleagues made vexatious complaints. Drew Cullen from CIPFA also highlighted that the motives involved were often varied and not necessarily driven by reasons of public interest.

Despite these responses, Hussain also thought that there had been a number of people who had used this data at data dive because, compared to some other data sets, it was relatively clean. Alongside these one-off uses of public spending data, Makgill, Wright and Rowson have all used it either as part of their business or out of personal interest.

Time
Interviewees also noted time as a potential constraint for anyone who wanted to do public expenditure monitoring. One student at the data dive summed up the sentiment as follows: ‘They [the public] don’t have enough time. They’re not engaged with the subject. They don’t understand how to do it.’

Some interviewees noted that, in the past, local newspapers might have carried out investigations on public spending, which would have reduced the amount of time citizens would have needed to engage with the issue. It was also noted, however, that local journalism, especially investigative journalism, was either in decline or already almost non-existent.

Although the ‘average’ citizen may not have time to examine public spending in much detail due to time constraints, there are those who may have the time, such as those who are retired. Bryce noted that these were often the kinds of people who used to contact him during his time in local government audit.

> Very often what I was finding would be [an] old auditor, old former retired auditors or accountants...might be the only people generally who’d be contacting the external auditor.
> (Alan Bryce, non-executive director, TEICCAF)

Conclusions
There are a significant number of potential uses for public spending data, including:
• detecting and deterring corrupt behaviour
• increasing value for money in public sector procurement
• providing greater information for businesses tendering for public contracts
• increasing understanding about what public money is spent on

For these uses to be realised, however, there are a number of significant challenges that need to be overcome. Based on the information we have gathered, there are still:

• concerns about the structures for external audit in local government, which means that issues raised by concerned citizens may be less likely to be examined in detail
• significant issues with the quality of spending data being published by local authorities, including widespread redactions, that could hamper the identification of potentially corrupt or illicit activity
• significant issues with the lack of links between spending data and other information that helps contextualise it, such as tenders and contracts
• questions about whether citizens are the primary users of this data

Data producers, tech service providers and civil society activists seem to largely agree that the vision of citizens as primary data users and armchair auditors is incomplete and that the most avid data users are likely to be governments themselves and intermediary organisations. And, very importantly, the interplay with conventional checks and balances inside government is still essential. Even when suspicious transactions can be identified by civil society activists, the handover to and further follow-up by public auditors are far from guaranteed, considering that auditors may not enjoy the support and incentives to make a strong case.
Action research: social design for health service integrity in Lithuania (C1)

Theme
Innovative approaches for indirectly promoting norms of integrity and empowered citizens in healthcare service-level corruption: a role for social design?

Context
Over 50 per cent of the Lithuanian population believes that the healthcare sector is corrupt. Every second person admits to having paid bribes at the national level healthcare institutions, and every fourth at the polyclinics over a five-year period from 2009 to 2014, which makes the healthcare sector the most corrupt public sector in Lithuania. Compared to the EU level, Lithuania has the second highest percentage of bribery at healthcare institutions. Aside from monetary payments, giving chocolate, coffee or alcoholic drinks is also a widespread practice among patients. The main reasons for such additional payments of all forms are usually identified as the expectation of receiving better service, a desire to thank the medical personnel, indirect extortion from the personnel, the hope of speeding up the service and an indirect understanding that, without such additional payments, there might be no service at all. While the problem of corruption is attracting increasing attention in the public domain, there are no substantial signs of change thus far. There has been no firmly demonstrated interest from the policy shapers in changing the healthcare system, and the motivation of doctors to initiate change remains unsupported by systemic political will.

Since 2011 Transparency International Lithuania has been involved in various initiatives on the topics of good governance, transparency and accountability in this field, in order to promote a conversation about corruption in the healthcare sector.

Approach
Given the lack of progress in tackling healthcare corruption through conventional instruments, and as part of Transparency International’s overall research enquiry into citizen action against corruption, we developed an exploratory research project to examine a broader range of innovative citizen-centric mechanisms and their potential to change expectations and relations between customers and service providers with a view to indirectly rewiring the social dynamics around service-level bribery.

In order to understand which interventions to use and how to shape the environment to influence the behaviour of patients and doctors, a social design approach was chosen.

Social design can be described as a ‘practical learning journey taken by people including managers and entrepreneurs, to create useful, usable and meaningful ventures, services and products that combine

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130 Ibid. The numbers are squarely in line with the most recent data from the *Global Corruption Barometer 2016*. Here the health sector ranks as the most corrupt services, with 24 per cent of service users reporting that they had paid a bribe in the previous 12 months: Transparency International, *Global Corruption Barometer 2016* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2016).
resources efficiently and effectively, to work towards achieving desired outcomes and impacts on society in ways that are open to contestation and dialogue.  

To develop a promising intervention a design workshop was held in Vilnius on 19 and 20 March 2015, with Transparency International Lithuania staff, Transparency International Secretariat staff, social designers from Lithuania and the Netherlands and an expert from the Transparency International UK Behavioural Insights Team.

Based on these inputs two social design interventions were formulated and put in place at one of the healthcare institutions in Vilnius – the Lazdynai Polyclinic in the first and second quarters of 2016. One intervention – ‘Description of a Good Visit’ – was a visioning exercise aimed at the doctors, in order to strengthen doctors’ awareness of and attitude towards professional conduct and quality patient interactions, in line with well-tested, impactful mechanisms to enhance the salience and self-reflection on values that have been found to significantly enhance integrity under lab conditions.  

A group of doctors (all the family doctors in the building: 14 persons) were invited to the workshop in order to decide upon the words that, in their opinion, would best describe the service they would like to provide to their patients (these words reflect criteria according to which the quality of service provision should be evaluated and also the principle of good-quality service provision; some words were suggested by us, some by the doctors). As a result, family doctors chose these words as the most important in their work: professionalism, ‘We treat everyone’, empathy, attentiveness.

The photos from the meeting and the words they chose were used in order to produce large, clearly visible posters and display them on their floor (where only family doctors work). Small calendars and visit leaflets with the same messages were produced and doctors were asked to distribute them to their patients.

Moments from the workshop with doctors: doctors are choosing the most important words that describe the service they provide

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Design of calendars and visit leaflets, distributed to the patients by family doctors.

The other design intervention — ‘Vitamin Lab’ — consisted primarily of a visually engaging and playful feedback platform aimed at patients. Its aim was to gather patients’ feedback, understand how they evaluate the service and indirectly raise their sense of agency and entitlement related to health service provision.

Waiting area where the ‘Vitamin Lab’ was set up (before the intervention)

‘Vitamin Lab’

Categories filled out with vitamins

Volunteer with a bag of vitamins

Patients were approached by the volunteers (in total 18 volunteers took part in the project), who were always present at the Lab and given five yellow vitamins for the service evaluation. Patients were asked to
distribute the vitamins to either one or several categories, choosing from (1) thank you, (2) I did not like it, (3) I would recommend this polyclinic to others, (4) procedures were clear and (5) service was pleasant.

Moreover, patients also had an opportunity to explain their evaluation in writing or leave a general comment to the polyclinic; 199 written comments were received during the two-month period. This is the largest number of comments that the polyclinic has ever received. Out of this amount, the majority (122) were positive comments, and more than 100 comments were thank-you letters to the polyclinic’s doctors, nurses and other personnel. Content analysis of comments revealed that patients used this opportunity to evaluate the doctor’s communication and/or to evaluate the service received.

The main goals of this concrete intervention were to:

1. understand how the patients evaluate the service received and how the feedback-giving changes the way they act
2. understand how the publicly shown ‘Vitamin Lab’ changes the way the medical personnel interact with the patients
3. increase patients’ satisfaction with the services provided by the polyclinic
4. create a culture of greater openness in the polyclinic

The key question of these research and social design interventions was whether mobilising reflections on and articulations of expectations and experience with service quality can indirectly also alter the level of mutual trust and patterns of corrupt exchanges at the Lazdynai Polyclinic.

To capture the results, the research team carried out baseline and end-line surveys, focus groups and interviews with patients and doctors. More specifically, this included a patient survey (representative survey, proportional quota sampling, two waves (N = 416, N = 380), total sample size: N = 776); a doctors’ survey (purposive sampling method, two waves (N = 30, N = 28); in-depth interviews with the personnel of the Lazdynai Polyclinic; a focus group with ‘Vitamin Lab’ volunteers; a focus group with patients of the Lazdynai Polyclinic.

Finally, visual documentation and a video clip have been produced so as to be able to share the social design interventions with other interested stakeholders with a view to inspiring more experimentation and research in this area.

**Key findings**

The social design interventions provided an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of doctor–patient relationships and how things actually work at the polyclinic. Thus, as the first initiative of this kind in Lithuania and, to our knowledge, the first to use this type of social design interventions in the context of healthcare sector corruption, it provided valuable insights about both the healthcare sector in the country and the potential of such interventions in the context of integrity reforms. In addition, the social design experiment initiated the first conversation on the values of the community of doctors in the polyclinic and encouraged a sense of co-ownership of the initiative, as the polyclinic’s administration agreed to financially contribute to one of the interventions (i.e. produced polyclinic patient visit leaflets). Some of the main insights from the research are as follows.

- The experiment contributed to a change in the communication between doctors and patients.

The social design experiments opened promising entry points for a productive conversation around service quality, integrity and entitlements, both with doctors and with patients, and thus show promise in terms of
helping shift norms and attitudes towards more integrity in the longer run without counterproductively broaching the topic of corruption directly.

Regarding external communication, when asked in the survey, doctors stated that such values as transparency, integrity, trust, respect and openness are very important when communicating with patients.

Patients’ survey results showed that more patients than before (39.5 per cent, compared to 22.7 per cent) noticed the values declared by the doctors: on posters, calendars, visit leaflets etc. (table 1). More patients stated after the two months of the experiment that doctors communicated with them in a more polite manner (79.6 per cent before the experiment, and 87.6 per cent afterwards).

On the practitioners’ side, almost all the family doctors distributed special calendars and visit leaflets to the patients. One in four doctors agreed that patients communicated differently and noticed some changes in communication among doctors. Ten out of 25 doctors stated that their communication with patients had changed (table 2).
• More feedback use is associated with a lower inclination to give gifts, yet is this impact or self-selection?

The ‘Vitamin Lab’ impacted the patients’ perception of the corruptibility of the staff at the Lazdynai Polyclinic. The survey results show that patients who participated in the ‘Vitamin Lab’ were less likely to believe that the unofficial giving of gifts (such as sweets, coffee or any other small presents) or money/any other material reward helps them to receive better treatment in the Lazdynai Polyclinic: 10.6 per cent of those who participated in the Lab believe that gift-giving helps, while among those who didn’t participate the number reaches 19.6 per cent. In the case of material reward, 20.3 per cent of participants believe it helps, in comparison with 31.4 per cent among non-participants.

Was the ‘Vitamin Lab’ successfully disrupting established practices, however, or is it just that particularly responsible individuals were more prone to use it than others? The patients who used the playful feedback system were significantly less likely to see gift-giving and informal payments as a tool to obtain better service; this is encouraging, but it also presents a caveat for such novel feedback systems: perhaps this type of innovative feedback mechanism is somewhat ‘preaching to the converted’, since it might disproportionately engage the service clients who are already less likely to bribe and happy to offer feedback in the first place.

• A cautious welcome for new feedback opportunities.

One-third of the surveyed patients participated in the ‘Vitamin Lab’. For the majority of them, it was the first time they had been asked for feedback about the services they received in the polyclinic. Two-thirds (68 per cent) of those who took part in the ‘Vitamin Lab’ liked this initiative, which in the final focus group discussion was described as comprehensive, yet simple and playful.

• The perception of the corruptibility of the polyclinic’s personnel strongly correlates with the patients’ willingness to recommend the polyclinic to others.

There is a significant difference in the willingness to recommend the polyclinic to others among the patients who believe that gift-giving helps them receive better treatment as opposed to those who believe it does not. Those patients who believe the giving of gifts or money/material rewards helps them receive better treatment are more likely to spread negative verbal stories about the polyclinic. The difference in
the Net Promoter Score between such patients and those who believe this is not the case is tremendous: it is –11.2, as opposed to 42.4 (when asked about gift-giving practices), and –6.5, as opposed to 44.6 (when asked about unofficially giving money/material rewards).

- The participants in the ‘Vitamin Lab’ are more likely to recommend the Lazdynai Polyclinic to others.

Those patients who offered feedback in the ‘Vitamin Lab’ are more likely to recommend the polyclinic to others, with a Net Promoter Score that is 12.2 points higher (40.6, as opposed to 28.4) than the average score given by all surveyed patients. According to the participants of the final focus group, the invitation to give feedback increases the prestige of an institution. Having a feedback option was seen by patients to reflect very positively on the reputation of the clinic.

- The experiment confirms the sensitive nature of corruption in healthcare.

Corruption remains a sensitive topic for both patients and doctors, as they often self-censor themselves. Quite a few doctors (and in some cases the patients as well) refused to talk about corruption, and mostly marked the ‘Cannot answer’ option when surveyed. In some cases such answers amounted to one-third of all responses. For example, the majority of the patients (59.7 per cent) believe that healthcare institutions in Vilnius are partly or very corrupt, while one-third of them stated they could not answer the question. In addition, the conducted surveys show that, while gift-giving is a widespread practice in the polyclinic (83 per cent of the doctors surveyed say they were offered a small gift over the previous 12 months), only 13.3 per cent of the patients admit having given a small gift. As the focus group revealed, the patients may also tend to rationalise gift-giving as a friendly gesture, as a means of saying thank you and a part of their relationship-building with the doctor, and do not necessarily always link it with the expectation of receiving better service. Against this backdrop, the action experiment sought to address corruption more indirectly, in a playful, non-threatening and non-moralistic way.

Challenges and limitations for further research
As the experiments have clearly demonstrated, social design might be able to lower the sensitive edge of interventions related to difficult issues such as corruption. Yet this should not blind us to the fact that, despite the rather innocuous name, such interventions cannot remove that edge altogether and are themselves tools that can put people involved in corrupt exchanges out of their comfort zones. And such risks are amplified when social design interventions come with a layer of additional research activities to capture results.135

The views on and reactions to the social design experiments varied both among different groups at the polyclinic and over time. Because of the sensitivity of the topic, it may take more time to get the buy-in from the healthcare institution and its members to initiate the experiment. It may be quite difficult to convince the polyclinic’s community that social design methods can be useful, as they can be perceived as overly creative and abstract for those medical personnel not used to such interventions.

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135 It is also important to note that there is the risk of a large Hawthorne effect, since the research itself produces a degree of reflection, salience of values and qualities that can be a significant factor in distorting/amplifying the impact of the social design interventions. And, as noted in the related social accountability stock-take (deliverable 7.4), this effect is also not likely to be fully captured in randomised, controlled trials.
With regard to the design of the experiment, it is clear that one should be prepared for a lack of willingness to engage on the part of the medical personnel and doctors, as they may choose to isolate themselves from exercises they believe are aimed at changing their everyday routine.

The anonymity of patients and doctors is essential to the success of such initiatives. As this research was carried out in the polyclinic, some patients seemed to be concerned about the confidentiality and anonymity of their answers, and this might have affected the research findings, with those surveyed downplaying the actual extent of corruption-related problems in the institution in question.

What is more, during the interviews with the patients some respondents, especially the senior ones, would mark answers that contradicted their own stories told to the interviewers during/after the same survey. As quite a few doctors self-censored themselves and refused to get involved in the research by marking ‘Do not know’ answers, it is crucial to re-evaluate the research design to ensure that the data obtained during the research captures the real scale of the problem even better. Hence, it may be more rewarding to use survey techniques that anonymise answers – as, for example, discussed by Blair – or more in-depth, trust-building qualitative methods in such complex environments, even though they are more time-consuming and require considerable commitment from the administration and medical personnel.136

Finally, it became clear that it was essential to continuously keep in mind, manage and adjust the expectations of various actors involved in the initiative (the polyclinic’s administration and the social design team), as it was sometimes challenging and time-consuming to ensure that the activities agreed on were understood in the same manner – that is, that the social design interventions were measurable and the workshops well structured, with concrete, clear and well-communicated goals.

These limitations notwithstanding, the results provide a first proof of concept that social design strategies that seek to address corruption issues indirectly can set into motion positive dynamics of change. By reshaping awareness of, reflection on and practical feedback options with regard to provider–customer relationships and service quality, such interventions have the potential to rewire the social dynamics, sense of entitlement, trust and expectations that underpin corrupt exchanges.

Given this proof of concept, more expansive research strategies are clearly warranted that test variations in designs in more rigorous and systematic ways, across a broader range of different contexts, and that – very importantly – seek to capture more transformational, longer-term impacts on service quality and integrity.

Action research: mobilising public support for anti-corruption activities in Montenegro (C2)

Theme
Impact of public campaigns on citizens’ willingness to report illicit enrichment and high-level corruption.

Context
Governing elites in Montenegro have not changed in the last 27 years, since the former communist regime was removed through street riots. Therefore, key political officials held and still hold significant power and influence over institutions. During this entire time, while the lifestyles of many representatives of many of these elites began to differ significantly from the official incomes and assets reported, the public authorities never expressed any significant interest in investigating such issues. One of the most prominent cases was that of the current prime minister of Montenegro, who was discovered to have a wrist-watch worth over €100,000. And, in the last few years, several high-level corruption scandals have been discovered by civil society and media.

Unfortunately, criminal prosecution solely on the basis of illicit enrichment and unexplained discrepancies in asset/income declarations is not possible in the Montenegrin legal context. Moreover, fewer than one in ten people in Montenegro think that corruption reporting is generally acceptable in the country, the lowest proportion across the entire ECA region, for which the average is more than three times as high, above 30 per cent. At the same time, though, more than a third of respondents state that they would feel personally obliged to report corruption when they witness it, pointing towards a large discrepancy between personal convictions and perceptions of the generally applicable norms. In addition, one respondent in five considers reporting corruption as the most effective thing that ordinary people can do to help tackle corruption. This proportion is four percentage points higher than the regional average, and makes reporting the most favourably viewed citizen action against corruption in the country. Against this backdrop, Montenegro provides a good testbed for experimenting with campaigns for stricter laws against illicit enrichment and to encourage more reporting on and engagement against corruption.

Approach
MANS, the group in Montenegro affiliated with Transparency International) conducted an experimental campaign with different components to advocate for the development and adoption of a legal mechanism against illicit enrichment, consisting of investigative stories, a mix of conventional media and online campaigning, lobbying among institutions and public awareness of citizens.

More specifically, the research approach included the following.

- A design workshop in Berlin, on 26 and 27 February 2015, with Transparency International Secretariat staff, Transparency International Montenegro staff and experts on citizen reporting (the research director of MySociety, a leading crowd-reporting platform provider) and crowdsourcing information for investigative anti-corruption work (a specialist from Transparency International Russia).

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137 Vijesti, ‘Prince Charles, Medvedev and Sarkozy proudly own the same brand’, 2 November 2011.
138 GCB 2016.
• A mix of campaign strategies between March and December 2015, including: a high-profile investigative piece by Transparency International Montenegro placed in conventional media, online postings and street-corner booths in eight municipalities.

• An investigative story researched by MANS documented the secret foreign bank accounts of the wife of one of the highest-profile Montenegrin government officials, making it the biggest discovery of possible illicit enrichment in the history of the country.

• Interviews and a survey with more than 100 people who stopped by the MANS street-corner information booths.

• The tracking of corruption reports to the Transparency International Montenegro corruption reporting hotline (SOS), tracking of media coverage and information capture via in-street interviews with citizens over the same period.

**Key findings**

• Major campaign activities move in tandem with higher reporting numbers, but the effect seems to wear off over time.

In March 2015 the number of citizens reporting cases via the SOS reporting hotline significantly increased compared to the two previous months.

![Number of citizens reporting cases of corruption](image)

**Exhibit 36 Number of citizens reporting corruption to MANS via the SOS service throughout 2015**

*Source: MANS SOS database.*

During the rest of the year the number of citizens using the SOS service depended on public campaigns: in months when no campaign was conducted the number of citizens using the service dropped (such as April and August), but in other months it was higher (the highest being in June 2015).

• The pick-up in the media and the degree of positive orientation of related articles also moves in line with higher reporting numbers.
In order to better understand the ensuing discourse on illicit enrichment, we also tracked media coverage during the campaign period. As documented in the annex, in March, June and July, when most of the messages were positive, most citizens used our services – 56, 60 and 52, respectively.

- Conventional media, street campaigning and online reporting all appear to have an impact individually, but they are best deployed in combination, since they tend to reach different age groups.

Online campaigns represent a significant mechanism to reach mostly the younger and e-literate population in Montenegro with key campaign messages, bearing in mind that the overall penetration rate of high-speed internet in Montenegro is up to 27.2 per cent. Key online channels used for the purpose of this campaign were the publication of news on our website and distribution via social media accounts – Twitter and Facebook.

In the months when campaigns were most active, more citizens were using the SOS service to report cases, such as in March, June and July 2015. In other months, when conventional media campaigns were conducted but without online support, the number of citizens using the SOS service increased, but not to the same extent as in months when joint conventional and online campaigns were conducted.

Exhibit 37 provides information on the number of citizens reached via online campaigns – using the website, Facebook and Twitter – based on information provided from related internet services.\(^\text{140}\)

\(^{139}\) Out of this number, 16.8 per cent represents penetration by high-speed broadband internet, while the remaining 10.4 per cent is penetration by high-speed mobile internet. There is no official information as to what the ratio is between unique users (those who have only one type of high-speed internet access) and those who access high-speed internet from multiple sources. More details can be found in ‘Information on Access to Internet in Montenegro and Development Possibilities’, Ministry for Information Society and Telecommunications, Podgorica, Montenegro, September 2015.

\(^{140}\) Google analytics provided MANS with the information on unique website visits, while Facebook provided information on numbers of viewers, bearing in mind it was a paid Facebook campaign. Twitter also provided us with the information on how many users saw our publications/tweets.
A surprisingly large number of citizens at the street booths indicated that they would report illicit enrichment, yet a strong self-selection effect might have boosted these numbers.

In June 2015 MANS organised a field campaign in eight municipalities to raise citizens’ awareness of the issue of illicit enrichment of public officials and to support them in reporting such cases to MANS for further investigation. We have distributed printed info materials at ‘info corners’ held in Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro, as well as in old royal capital of Cetinje and the municipalities of Nikšić, Danilovgrad, Bar, Ulcinj, Kolašin and Mojkovac. Each info corner was held in the main square of the city, lasting at least three hours, at the peak time during the day. Although MANS has so far organised a number of info corners in various Montenegrin municipalities, this was the first time that they had been organised on the topic of illicit enrichment.

Information brochures provided details on how citizens can contact MANS to report illicit enrichment. In case they were willing to continue communication, in the second phase our activists provided them with more information on what illicit enrichment of public officials is and how it should be legally sanctioned. In the event that they were still willing to continue communication, in phase three they were interviewed. There was no disproportionate representation among those prepared to be interviewed with regard to age, gender, religion, etc.

Out of 121 interviewed citizens, the vast majority (86 per cent) claimed that they would report illicit enrichment if they were in possession of such information. Given that in the representative GCB sample only 33 per cent expressed a willingness to report corruption, this extraordinarily high commitment suggests that it is the most dedicated and easy-to-mobilise citizens who are being reached through the info corner approach. The minority of info corner interviewees who would not report such phenomena are

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**Exhibit 37 Number of citizens reached via online campaigns through website and social media in relation to the illicit enrichment in 2015**

*Source: MANS media clippings*
prevented by the fear of personal retribution, retribution to family members and friends, or both, while a significant number believed it was not their responsibility to do so.

### T6 Willingness to report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### T6.1 Why would not report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible personal retribution</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible retribution to family members or friends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible personal and retribution to family members or friends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not his/her responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won't bring any changes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 38 Statistical overview of citizens’ willingness to report illicit enrichment

*Source: MANS database with interview answers.*

- Mode and channel for reporting: shunning official reporting lines.

The large portion of interviewees who expressed a willingness to report illicit enrichment suggests there was a split right in the middle with regard to anonymous versus non-anonymous reporting preferences, with possible retribution to friends and family members the most cited reason given by those choosing anonymity. Interestingly, the interviewees professed by a large majority (67 per cent) to prefer reporting to an NGO hotline such as the one provided by MANS. Again, there might be some self-selection bias at work, since most interviewees actively approached the MANS info stand, but it is still a noteworthy discrepancy to the opposite patterns observed across Europe in the GCB 2013, when on average only 11 per cent of respondents suggested that they preferred reporting to an NGO hotline.¹⁴¹ This unusually low preference for reporting to official hotlines is also in line with the very low levels of trust in the three main institutions tasked with dealing with illicit enrichment issues: the police, the judiciary and the prosecution office.

### T9 Trust in the police

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
</table>

### T10 - Trust in the prosecution

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<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
</table>

### T11 Trust in the judiciary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

¹⁴¹ Montenegro was not one of the countries surveyed for the GCB 2013. Unfortunately, due to cost and scope reasons, it was not possible to include the same question in the 2016 edition.
Exhibit 39 Statistical overview on trust in three key institutions

Source: MANS database with interview answers.

- Summary: discernible campaign effects, yet unclear drivers and street-corner presence that attracts particularly committed and sympathetic citizens.

This exploratory action research project provides preliminary corroboration of the activating impact of specific anti-corruption campaigns on the actual reporting of corruption. Although the experimentation time frame and scale of reporting do not allow for reaching further statistical inferences, the research does support the cautious conclusion that the actual practice of reporting is not fully determined by given individual attributes and motivations, as well as by structural conditions, but can be influenced by relevant campaigning activities.

Higher contact and reporting numbers are associated with more campaign activity, and combining online and offline strategies offers the promise of maximising impact. More research and experimentation are clearly needed to firmly establish and further elaborate these effects. Given the significance of a relatively high level of corruption reporting to dispel notions of lethargic complicity and impunity, more in-depth research endeavours and more experimentation are clearly desirable. Furthermore, the research also suggests that street-corner information booths offer a very interesting strategy to connect with a particularly dedicated segment of the target population, highlighting the fact that impactful campaigning should not exclusively shift to online spaces, where, potentially, greater reach might appear in prospect, but ultimately they may not quite deliver more efficient activation strategies.¹⁴²

¹⁴² It should be noted, however, that this hypothesis also needs further testing, since (i) actual individual reports could not be directly attributed to either online or offline activation and (ii) the commitment and willingness to report of the online audience reached has not been assessed as a comparative benchmark.
## Appendix

### Detailed information on positive, neutral and negative news distributed through media in relation to illicit enrichment in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>January/February</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign/ type of information</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANS story on SSBA of S.M. in Switzerland (9/3/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment s of the Conflict of Interest Law proposed by the opposition (1/5/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP requests IEoPO to be criminalised (5/6/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MANS performance in Budva on IEoPO (1/7/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice requests IEoPO to be erased from the Draft OGP Action Plan (10/6/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dan investigaton on IEoPO (5/7/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC states the government should propose best model for criminalisation of IEoPO by end of September 2015 (7/8/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differen t MPs statements on criminalisation of illicit enrichment of public officials (20/9/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MANS initiative on ex-chief of the police unexplained wealth published: part 1 – the apartment (8/12/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MANS investigative story on ex-chief of the police unexplained wealth published: part 2 – BMW car (9/12/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC hearing on criminalisation of IEoPO (27/3/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of justice opposes the idea of criminalisation of IEoPO (16/5/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MANS initiates advocacy campaign on IEoPO (23/6/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The prosecution declares secret details from S.M. investigation on SSBA (17/7/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info corners about IEoPO – northern municipalities (26/6/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working group on 23rd chapter of the Acquis debated on criminalisation of IEoPO (25/7/2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: IEoPO – illicit enrichment of public officials; SSBA – secret Swiss bank account; ACC – Anti-Corruption Committee; SDP – Social Democratic Party of Montenegro; OGP – Open Government Partnership; MPs – Members of Parliament; S.M. – Svetozar Marović.
Some final notes

Individual acts of resistance against corruption

Who is reporting corruption and why?

We have triangulated this question via several research strategies.

The 2016 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB 2016 – S1) provides a good overview of the general patterns. Thirteen per cent of the citizens utilising public services across countries in the ECA region reported having paid undocumented payments in order to receive a service over a twelve-month period. The rate of bribery was high in many eastern European states, central Asian transition economies and the western Balkans, with over one in five individuals paying a bribe to receive a public service. According to the GCB findings, however, of those who experienced corruption 21.5 per cent claimed to have reported it to appropriate authorities. All issues with a possible social desirability bias related to this answer aside, one could have a spirited discussion whether this actually presents a high or low rate of reporting. If it triggered some kind of investigation or disciplinary action, it would surely already represent a very sizeable number of reports that are being made, resulting in a conservative estimate of more than 6 million reports for a base population of more than 640 million for the surveyed countries in Europe/central Asia.

Corruption reporting was lowest in Baltic countries such as Latvia and Lithuania, as well as in other post-Soviet countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, where fewer than one-tenth of the people experiencing corruption reported it to relevant authorities (S1).

Very interestingly, the GCB allows for a differentiation of reporting by sector, and here the differences are very significant. Reporting of corruption in emergency situations (medical treatment), for services in which service quality is difficult to judge and may hinge on commitment (education, health) or where the level of fear of retaliation is likely quite high (police), are much lower than reporting when specific, quantifiable entitlements are at stake (unemployment benefits, social security benefits, obtaining documents) or when a particularly strong expectation of fairness and justice is in play (courts).

Apart from cross-country differences, reporting seems to be spread quite evenly across socio-demographic categories. Neither gender, nor urban versus rural nor age factors seem to have a very significant association with actual reporting or willingness to report. The only exception is education, with higher education levels being associated with lower reporting and willingness to report. This relation will have to be unpacked further in future research.

Given that we can compare stated reporting with stated willingness to report under two scenarios and sets of beliefs about descriptive and prescriptive norms in this area, it is quite plausible to assume that the social desirability bias is rather low, given that claims on actual reporting are significantly lower than expressed willingness to report, even though the former would be expected to come with a stronger desirability bias, given the self-indictment of having participated in corruption that comes with it.

Calculations based on average EU household size and country household size for Ukraine, Russia and Turkey.

Our analysis of the vast survey dataset has not focussed on fixed country-level effects for the purpose of this report and the first round of data exploration that it includes. This will be an important task for future research on this dataset.

This is, on the surface, a rather surprising result, since higher education levels are commonly associated with stronger and more efficacious political engagement. The effect here might be spurious, however, and capture income effects that in this first analytical cut could not be unpacked in more detail, since only individual incomes are recorded.
Looking at who takes his or her case to NGO-run helplines, in this case the Transparency International network of legal advice centres, a somewhat different picture emerges. Here males outnumber female clients by two to one, there is a clear urban concentration in the client base (S3) and it seems to be the most tenacious and dedicated petitioners that seek such assistance after having exhausted many official options (A1–3).

A technology-induced bias in reporting or the choice of reporting channel, suggestive though it may be in the context of digital divide debates, does not seem to make itself felt in any significant way (S2, S3).

**Closer up: motivations, beliefs, drivers**

What drives (non-)reporting? Again, the GCB 2016 provides a first general overview and invites respondents to give the main reason why they think most people do not report corruption (or state that people do indeed report).

The following picture ensues.

![Exhibit 40 Why do you think most people do not report corruption?](image)

*Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2016.*

It becomes clear that, across the ECA region, **difficulties in reporting** (subsuming answers that point to a lack of time, no knowledge where to report and how to report, difficulty of proof, excessive costs), the **fear of retaliation** and a **suspected lack of impact** (subsuming the answers that nothing will happen and that officials to report to are also corrupt) are, by a large margin, the most cited reasons and account on average for more than 70 per cent of all replies given.

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in the GCB, and they need to be translated into relative country-level income group classifications to allow for further analysis.
The fear of implicating oneself is, on average, considered by 8 per cent of respondents as the main obstacle to reporting, but the level reaches close to 15 per cent in Azerbaijan and Belarus.

Are norms important?
Very interestingly, the sense that corruption is just normal practice (‘Everyone does it’) or not a big deal (‘It is just the government’s money’) plays only a very marginal role (combined, they are mentioned by, on average, 3 per cent of respondents as the main reason why people do not report). Neither does the general perception of high levels of corruption in the country significantly influence reporting behaviour. On the contrary, the stronger the personal exposure to corruption, the more likely that survey respondents will have reported it.

If descriptive norms are not discouraging action, how do prescriptive norms come into the picture? The GCB suggests that reporting corruption is on average not strongly ostracised, with 40 per cent of respondents indicating that they would personally feel obliged to report and 31 per cent in agreement that it is generally acceptable in their societies to report corruption.

One interesting discrepancy that may point towards important leverage points for positive behaviour change is the dim view that respondents have with regard to their fellow citizens: only 3.9 per cent believe that most people do report incidents of corruption, as against the actual stated reporting numbers of 21 per cent and the personal obligation to report expressed by 40 per cent of respondents. These numbers are compatible when we interpret the wordings of these questions very strictly. There still appears to be a situation of pluralistic ignorance, however, with a strong sentiment that others are not really committed to reporting, while articulated personal commitments and actual reporting practices are much higher. Such a poor view of peers is also shared by focus group participants (A1–3), but in these cases of very tenacious and dedicated corruption reporters the low expectations appear to have spurred rather than inhibited the taking of action, and the most strongly expressed motives for persisting are related to rather self-regarding, personal traits.

All this suggests that general norms, both in their descriptive and prescriptive variants, do not exercise a strong inhibiting influence on reporting corruption.

More localised and situated normative milieus are even found to encourage action: several of the tip-of-the-iceberg most committed corruption reporters participating in the focus groups invoke norms of integrity as the motivating force attaching to specific professional communities and positions, such as the professional responsibilities of being a professor, being a union representative (A1–3).

Personal ambition versus practised reality: a considerable gap closed by actual exposure to corruption
The GCB 2016 also offers unprecedented opportunities to examine how the generally stated willingness to report compares to the actual self-reported practice of reporting.

This is new in GCB data. Several previous waves have primarily probed only the stated willingness to report, and related analyses about the drivers of reporting behaviour were based on this willingness question. The 2016 data set has now given us the opportunity to compare the willingness and the (still, admittedly, self-reported) practice of reporting, when individuals have been asked to pay a bribe. At first, purely descriptive sight, it appears that the numbers are rather different. While, on average, 40 per cent of respondents...
indicate that they would feel obliged to report corruption when they witness it (and 33 per cent still say so even if it were to involve a day in court), only 21 per cent claim that they actually did when confronted with corruption.

Actual exposure to corruption seems to be narrowing some of this gap from both ends: as mentioned earlier, the more that people are exposed to bribery, the more they suggest they actually have reported it, while at the same time this exposure also somehow lowers the expressed willingness to report (S1).

**Greed, need and the government**

A key insight from previous studies pointed to the explanatory power of greed versus need corruption when it comes to taking action against corruption. This result is confirmed both for actual reporting patterns and the general pattern observed by previous research, that more facilitative kinds of corruption (‘I paid voluntarily to get things done’) are associated with less engagement – in this case, reporting – still holds when working with actual reporting numbers rather than with the willingness to report that was used as a variable previously. This might need more unpacking, however, since the distinction between extortionary versus collusive or need versus greed types of corruption is very fluid and often in the eye of the beholder, and it is plausible that both dynamics play into the pay-off matrix in many concrete corruption situations.148

Finally, the perceived effectiveness of governments in tackling corruption has been identified in previous studies as positively associated with reporting, suggesting that trust in government efficacy in this area encourages more reporting, at least when it comes to non-OECD countries. This effect is also confirmed by this most recent round of GCB data collection. And, as the focus group research shows, there might even be a paradox at work when it comes to the most dedicated whistleblowers on corruption: even when the government is viewed as highly corrupt and ineffective, this group of people has still gone to extreme lengths to use all official channels for complaining, before appealing to NGOs for additional support. This points to a very integrative and complementary role of NGO reporting channels as mechanisms of last resort, a picture that has also emerged from the stock-take of empirical evidence of social accountability initiative that are found to be most likely to succeed when closely integrated with official institutional mechanisms (S2).

**The force field of classic collective action and innovative social accountability**

Over the lifespan of the ANTICORRP project a sprawling world of social accountability projects, research and learning initiatives have come into existence. Parsimoniously conceptualised for the scope of this research as all the things that citizens can do to hold governments to account in addition to voting (S2), this heightened focus on social accountability has undoubtedly also been inspired by a complementary perspective put forward in the research community to approach many corruption situations as collective action problems.

**Going it alone?**

The GCB provides a first overview of what citizens across Europe and central Asia consider to be the main thing that ordinary people can do against corruption.

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148 The ‘perfect’ corruption exchange is one in which non-cooperation comes with a high threat potential (and is thus extortionary) but cooperation entails a collusive element of illicit advantage that guards against defection and reporting. Think of medical treatment being withheld in the event of non-cooperation, but being unduly prioritised, helping the patient jump a long queue, in the event of cooperation.
One thing that stands out from this admittedly very crude first overview is that the most preferred actions are more individualistic in nature (refusing to pay, reporting, voting) while more publicly oriented and collective engagements, such as speaking out publicly, talking to friends, joining organisations, signing petitions or demonstrating, are each considered by fewer than 5 per cent of the respondents as the main ‘weapon’ of ordinary people in the fight against corruption. At first sight this might look like discouraging news for social organisers, yet at the same time it is important to keep in mind that social movements and social change often do not require large-scale participation but, rather, the targeted involvement of a critical mass of actors who are particularly committed and strategically connected to influence incentives and effect change.\(^{149}\)

Resigned inertia or optimistic activation? A split right down the middle

It is also against this backdrop that the overall sentiment with regard to the perceived power of ordinary citizens to make a difference in tackling corruption should be viewed. The GCB 2016 reveals a remarkable three-way split on this admittedly very general question: on average, roughly a third of respondents either agree or strongly agree that ordinary people can make a difference in tackling corruption, while another third disagrees and roughly a quarter is not sure.

There are very high country variations for this question, as Exhibit 42 shows.

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This suggests that much more analysis, particularly a focus on country-level effects, is warranted to better understand these sentiments, and the GCB 2016 provides a rich data trove to probe this more deeply. For the scope of this research summary, it is important to flag this very varied landscape for mobilising opportunities.

**Integration is key – but hard**

A key insight by several major reviews of the evidence from social accountability interventions is that integrating bottom-up and top-down initiatives provides most promise for success. Yet the finding that social accountability is impactful where and when it meets with government responsiveness and links motivated citizens and their collective engagement into formal institutional mechanisms genuinely intent on strengthening accountability raises concerns about an almost tautological quality: social accountability delivers where it simply helps solve some minor coordination issues or information deficiencies, but otherwise offers limited hope of unleashing sufficient power of its own to be able to push back on and impose more discipline on vested interests (S2).

Several of the research activities shed further light on the complexity of engineering even a very basic level of integration and collaboration. The case study on local open data initiatives in the United Kingdom amply demonstrates that it is a very long way from lip service for enhanced openness to a practical realisation of this ambition. Despite the promise of technological opportunity and a band of intermediaries ready to facilitate access to data and its use, there are tremendous technical and organisational challenges to be tackled along the way, or – viewed from a more cynical perspective – that enable a mass of reluctant office-holders to fuse a commitment to openness with a persistent practice of opacity. The hope of direct citizen action, the armchair detective unearthing fraud in local spending transactions, is increasingly being shelved.
in favour of a more pragmatic, medium-term objective of at least making the life of data intermediaries and professional data users easier, and thus enable them to help strengthen accountability (B2). Similarly, the case study of the main official corruption reporting hotline in Portugal flags some of the organisational challenges to enhancing the efficacy of this reporting system, situated as it is in a complex and diverse web of laws, regulations, institutional competences and responsibilities. Even improving this one single mechanism, clearly communicating its ambit and instilling the trust and functions required for meaningful encouragement of whistleblowers turns out to be a hard task (B1). A related, yet somewhat different challenge is highlighted by the social design experiment in Lithuania. Here, the authorities, the management of a health centre in Vilnius that participated in the experiment, very kindly agreed to let an NGO set up a patient feedback mechanism and run focus groups with staff. The novelty of the experiment, however, and the unusual presence of NGO volunteers in the middle of the busy, strenuous daily practice of the hospital tempered the enthusiasm of some health workers, and eventually the management as well (C1).

No failure, no magic, yet an exciting present and promising future
Nonetheless, all these challenges do not detract from the fact that social accountability has a solid and growing track record of impact that bodes well for further experimentation.

The available evidence suggests that the proof of concept is certainly there, that social accountability initiatives in various sectors and countries, from low- to high-tech, from citizen-driven to government-instigated, from individual action to collective endeavour, have made and can achieve meaningful impact in strengthening accountability (S2). The evidence generated by several of the research streams in this work package confirm this notion. Millions of people across Europe are reporting bribery when they encounter it, and they do so irrespective of age or gender (S1). Whistleblowers in Portugal reporting online have triggered investigations and contributed to sanctioning corrupt acts (B1), open government in the United Kingdom has had some notable achievements and a crop of new data intermediaries is springing into action to work with the data (B2), campaigns in Montenegro seem to have raised corruption reporting numbers (C2) and the feedback system in Lithuania has been found useful by users and changed the conversation between patients and doctors in the health sector (C1). Civil-society-run support centres have provided a viable support base for people harmed by corruption to make progress on their cases and restore a sense of recognition, dignity and no impunity (A1–3).

Impact is highly contextual and contingent, full sustainability elusive and transformational scale still a distant, if not all too distant, ambition.

So, looking beyond the hype curve of social accountability, which has most recently swung back towards some more guarded caution after exuberant hopes have gone unfulfilled, the evidence and insights compiled and reviewed in this report suggest that there is indeed an essential role and significant future potential for citizen engagement and social accountability in the quest for better governance, more accountability and less corruption. And there are many promising avenues for further experimentation in this area, for example around the role of businesses in social accountability initiatives, experimentation

150 Collective action initiatives are already very high on the agenda of the business compliance and anti-corruption community, thus providing some good entry points for further collaboration.
with innovative community-based funding models and the inclusion of hybrid forms of accountability that fuse a citizen mandate and oversight with professional expertise.  

A few final ‘to-do’s’
As most of these research streams have shown, citizen engagement can consist of individual acts or concerted action, yet it is in its impact and efficacy a collective accomplishment driven by the contributions of many different stakeholders.

Anti-corruption activists should look to forging broader coalitions and linking their issues more firmly into other stakeholder’s agendas, from business to other community groups and NGOs.

Governments should genuinely recognise the hugely valuable and productive role that citizens can and will have to play in tackling corruption. And they can be enormously helpful in making social accountability work. Integration between bottom-up and top-down social accountability initiatives is the big rallying cry, backed up by evidence and learning, and co-production has become a celebrated meme for a new responsiveness and mode for collaboration on service delivery and accountability for citizens and governments. Enabling policies and action go far beyond the still vital establishment of the proper legal frameworks that make citizen voice, participation and engagement possible, respected, protected and promoted in the first place, and this message is as common-sense as it is urgent in times of shrinking civil society space.

Despite some significant improvements, whistleblowing protections are still at times woefully inadequate in many European countries and deep economic integration across borders also urgently calls for more European-wide protections. Much more can be done, however, from incentivising public officials to pay attention to and take seriously citizen reports, to paying more attention in conventional electronic governance reforms to opening related data and engagement interfaces in new enterprise IT systems across government. More promotion of reporting mechanisms, targeting particular services where corruption reporting is rather low, while feeding back performance data on cases followed-up and resolved will help instil a crucial sense of trust and agency among citizens that has been found to be rather limited in several countries. New modes of collaboration between local and central government that engage

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151 The model of the Testigo Social from Mexico is illustrative in this regard. This ‘social witness’ is a social monitoring role in big public procurement/public works projects, the role being filled by a professional with the expertise to actually effectively monitor the project or procurement process. See: http://www.tm.org.mx/tag/testigo-social/


153 Transparency International (2013). The situation has slightly improved since the publication of the report in 2013.

154 The reporting of potholes provides an interesting example. In some local jurisdictions, municipalities can be held liable for damage from potholes that had been brought to the attention of the authorities and gone unfixed. Establishing such a liability and explicitly recognising major reporting platforms as satisfying the ‘bringing to attention’ criterion can provide very strong incentives to follow up on filed complaints and reports.


checks and feedback systems for citizen complaints at different levels for maximum efficacy are also suggesting a promising path for the future.\textsuperscript{157}

It is nonetheless important to recognise that social accountability can also provide an outlet for those so inclined to renege on their responsibilities for more accountability and integrity. It offers many opportunities to engage in symbolic action built around shallow citizen engagement initiatives that pay lip service to inclusive governance and accountability but, essentially, overburden citizens with monitoring roles they are ill-suited to fill, simulate whistleblowing through fancy platforms that are not backed up by strong legal protections, feign legitimacy with consultation mechanisms that are ignored in practice in decision-making or put on a pretence of transparency with data disclosures that are incoherent and out of date. What is needed is a constructive yet watchful eye, and the stepping up of effective review and monitoring mechanisms as included in some of the related collective action initiatives, such as the Open Government Partnership or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Funders who are keen to support social accountability should watch out for the savviest local activists and entrepreneurs, rather than rigidly log-framed business plans, and should invest both patiently in long-term institutional support and opportunistically in creative interventions.

Future research on citizen engagement against corruption might benefit from paying closer attention to the ripple and peer effects around social accountability, which may offer interesting cues for longer-term transformational opportunities. Likewise, a richer conceptual account of citizens as embedded in particular communities, solidarity and professional networks could inspire new directions for research. Such a re-conceptualisation points towards other interesting opportunities for citizen mobilisation and engagement against corruption and the potentially very important role of professional norms, community organisers, faith-based organisations and other non-corruption focussed civic activities to help broaden the anti-corruption coalition.

Researchers might want to complement the current focus on randomised controlled trials with more ethnographic methods, a longer time horizon and a focus on positive outliers in order to broaden the horizon for more creative pathways to change. Most importantly, future research should devise and be built around adaptive learning mechanisms that feed evidence right back into project implementation and help to try out a much broader array of design variations, adjust on the go and leverage unexpected effects.

### Annexes

#### Annex 1 Survey questions

**Global Corruption Barometer MODULE**

**English-Language Questionnaire**

4.13) In your opinion, what are the three most important problems facing this country that government should address? MULTICODE; CROSS THE THREE PROBLEMS PROVIDED BY THE RESPONDENT, WITHOUT RANKING THEM And which is the most important? SINGLE CODE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CROSS THE THREE THAT APPLY</th>
<th>MARK WITH A CROSS THE MOST IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other -95; No problems -96; Don’t know -97</td>
<td>Other -95; Don’t know -97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1. Health
- 2. Crime
- 3. The economy
- 4. Education
- 5. Environment
- 6. Corruption/bribery
- 7. Transportation, roads, infrastructure
- 8. Immigration
- 9. Political instability and security
- 10. Unemployment

4.17) Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. READ OUT; SINGLE CODE FOR EACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Incomes should be made more equal</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</th>
<th>We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b) Private ownership of business and industry should be increased</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>Government ownership of business and industry should be increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) People should obey the law without exception</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>There are times when people have good reasons to break the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>There is no problem with the influence of wealthy individuals on the way government is run in this country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Financial support by companies to political parties and candidates should be banned completely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Don’t know -97
| 8.01 | In your opinion, how often do people like you have to make unofficial payments or gifts in these situations?  
SINGLE CODE FOR EACH  
1. Never  
2. Seldom  
3. Sometimes  
4. Usually  
5. Always  
Don’t know - 97; Refusal - 99 |
|---|---|
| 8.02 | During the past 12 months have you or any member of your household used these services?  
1. Yes  
2. No  
Don’t know - 97; Refusal - 99 |
| 8.03 | How satisfied were you with the quality and the efficiency of the service/interaction?  
SINGLE CODE FOR EACH  
1. Very dissatisfied  
2. Dissatisfied  
3. Neither  
4. Satisfied  
5. Very satisfied  
Don’t know - 97; Refusal - 99 |
| 8.04 | Did you or any member of your household make an unofficial payment or gift when using these services over the past 12 months?  
1. Yes  
2. No  
Don’t know - 97; Refusal - 99 |
| 8.05 | Did you report any of the incidents where you or a member of your household made an unofficial payment or gift to a government official/someone in authority?  
1. Yes  
2. No  
Don’t know - 97; Refusal - 99 |
| 8.06 | Which of the following happened the most recent time that you reported a bribery incident?  
1. Authorities took action against the government officials involved  
2. You suffered negative consequences from reporting the incident  
3. Both  
4. Nothing  
Don’t know - 97; Refusal - 99 |
| 8.07 | Why did you make an informal payment for services you should have received for free?  
SINGLE CODE FOR EACH  
1. I was asked to pay  
2. I was not asked to pay but i knew that an informal payment was expected  
3. I offered to pay, to get things done more quickly or better  
4. I was not asked to pay but I wanted to express my gratitude  
Don’t know - 97; Refusal - 99 |

| a. | Interact with the road police |
| b. | Request official documents (e.g. passport, visa, birth or marriage certificate, land register, etc.) from authorities |
| c. | Go to courts for a civil matter |
| d. | Receive public education (primary or secondary) |
| e. | Receive public education (vocation) |
| f. | Receive medical treatment in the public health system |
| g. | Request unemployment benefits |
| h. | Request other social security benefits |
8.12) How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? READ OUT LIST AND ANSWER OPTIONS. SINGLE CODE FOR EACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>Some of them</th>
<th>Most of them</th>
<th>All of them</th>
<th>Don’t know/haven’t heard enough to say [DO NOT READ]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The [PRESIDENT]/[PRIME MINISTER] and officials in his office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Members of the Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Government officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Local government representatives</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Tax officials, such as Ministry of Finance officials or local government tax collectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Judges and magistrates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Business executives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Religious leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.13) Some people say that many incidents of corruption are never reported. Based on your experience, what do you think the main reason is that many people do not report incidents of corruption when they occur? INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ OPTIONS, CODE FROM RESPONSE. SINGLE CODE.

1. Most people do report incidents of corruption
2. Because they would implicate themselves as bribe-givers
3. Corruption is too difficult to prove
4. People don’t have enough time to report it
5. People don’t know where to report it
6. People don’t know how to report it
7. Nothing will be done/it wouldn’t make a difference
8. It’s too expensive to report (e.g., due to travel or phone charges)
9. Corruption is normal/everyone does it/everyone is involved
10. People are afraid of the consequences
11. The officials where they would report to are also corrupt/officials are involved in the corruption
12. It’s government money, not the people’s, so it’s not our problem
Other -95; Don't know -97; Refusal -99

8.14) What is the most effective thing that an ordinary person can do to help combat corruption in this country? INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ OPTIONS, CODE FROM RESPONSE. SINGLE CODE.
1. Nothing/ordinary people cannot do anything
2. Refuse to pay bribes
3. Report corruption when you see or experience it
4. Vote for clean candidates or parties or for parties that promise to fight corruption
5. Speak out about the problem, for example by calling a radio programme or using social media
6. Talk to friends and relatives about the problem
7. Sign a petition asking for a stronger fight against corruption
8. Join or support an organisation that is fighting corruption
9. Participate in protest marches or demonstrations against corruption
10. Boycott a business that has been found guilty of engaging in corruption

Other -95; Don't know -97; Not applicable -98; Refusal -99

8.15) Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements? READ OUT A–D; SINGLE CODE FOR EACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither disagree nor agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Refusal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. In our society it is generally acceptable for people to report a case of corruption they witness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. If I witnessed an act of corruption, I would feel personally obliged to report it</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. I would report a case of corruption even if I would have to spend a day in court to give evidence</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

8.16) How well or badly would you say the current government is handling fighting corruption in government or haven’t you heard enough to say? SINGLE CODE.

1. Very badly
2. Fairly badly
3. Fairly well
4. Very well
Have not heard enough to say -94; Don't know -97; Refusal -99

Respondent demographics will also be supplied in the data file (including but not limited to age, gender, region, social grade/income, highest educational level, working status).
Annex 2 Interview numbers – LiTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of survey</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Count</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project profile

ANTICORRP is a large-scale research project funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme. The full name of the project is ‘Anticorruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption’. The project started in March 2012 and will last for five years. The research is conducted by 20 research groups in 15 countries.

The fundamental purpose of ANTICORRP is to investigate and explain the factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anti-corruption policies and impartial government institutions. A central issue is how policy responses can be tailored to deal effectively with various forms of corruption. Through this approach ANTICORRP seeks to advance the knowledge on how corruption can be curbed in Europe and elsewhere. Special emphasis is laid on the agency of different state and non-state actors to contribute to building good governance.

Project acronym: ANTICORRP
Project full title: Anticorruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption
Project duration: March 2012 – February 2017
Theme: FP7-SSH.2011.5.1-1
Grant agreement number: 290529
Project website: http://anticorrp.eu
Contact for this WP: Dieter Zinnbauer (PhD), dzinnbauer@transparency.org