EU Grant Agreement number: 290529
Project acronym: ANTICORRP
Project title: Anti-Corruption Policies Revisited

Work Package: WP7, Individual values and motivations to engage against corruption

Title of deliverable: part of D7.6 Academic Article
Due date of deliverable: November 30, 2016
Actual submission date: November 29, 2016
Authors: WP7

Organization name of lead beneficiary for this deliverable: Transparency
International

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme		
Dissemination Level		
PU	Public	X
PP	Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)	
RE	Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission	
Co	Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission	

The following article was published in the peer-reviewed journal Policy & Internet under the following reference:

Crowd-Sourcing Corruption: What Petrified Forests, Street Music, Bath Towels and the Taxman Can Tell Us About the Prospects for Its Future

Dieter Zinnbauer, Transparency International (International Secretariat Berlin), [d.zinnbauer@gmail.com]

This article maps the prospects of crowd-sourcing technologies in the area of corruption reporting. Despite a flurry of initiatives and media hype in this area leading to hopes of an effective tackling of corruption, the potential of crowd-sourcing has so far been mainly approached from a technology-centric perspective. Where challenges are identified and worked on they are primarily technical and managerial in nature, such as challenges of privacy protection, data management, information validation and fundraising. However, little attention has been paid to insights from a growing body of multi-disciplinary literature on how corruption works, how it can be tackled, and more generally how observed logics of collective action and social mobilization interact with technological affordances to condition the success of these efforts. Linking the technology-centric experience of crowd-sourcing more closely to our evolving understanding of corruption makes it possible to move beyond common-sense conjectures in this area, to identify some little-discussed challenges, and develop some fresh ideas around the future of crowd-sourcing corruption.

Introduction

This article seeks to map out the prospects of crowd-sourcing technologies in the area of corruption reporting. A flurry of initiatives and concomitant media buzz in this area has led to exuberant hopes that significantly curbing corruption is no longer such a remote possibility—at least not for the most blatant, ubiquitous and visible forms of administrative corruption, such as the bribes and extortion payments faced in their daily lives by almost a quarter of citizens worldwide (Transparency International 2013). Only with hindsight will we be able to tell if these hopes are justified. However, a closer inspection of the multidisciplinary body of literature on corruption and social mobilization can help shed some interesting light on these questions, offering a fresh perspective on the potential of social-media based crowd sourcing for better governance and less corruption.

So far the potential of crowd sourcing has mainly been approached from a technology-centered perspective. Where challenges are identified and worked on, they are primarily technical and managerial in nature, ranging from issues of privacy protection and protection against hacker attacks to challenges of data management, information validation and fundraising. In contrast, short shrift has been paid to insights from a substantive, multidisciplinary and growing body of literature on how corruption works, how it can be fought, and more generally on how observed logics of collective action and social mobilization interact with technological affordances to condition the success of these efforts.

This imbalanced debate is not really surprising, as it seems to follow the trajectory of the hype-and-bust cycle that we have seen in the public debate for a variety of other technology applications. From electronic health cards to smart government, to intelligent transport systems, all these and many other highly ambitious initiatives start with technology-centric visions of transformational impact. However, over time—with some hard lessons learnt and large sums spent—they generally arrive at a more pragmatic and nuanced view of how social and economic forces shape the implementation of such technologies; thereby demanding a shrewder design approach in order to ensure that potential translates into impact and sustainable success. At a minimum, a trawl through this literature makes it possible to move beyond some of the most common-sense conjectures in order to develop some granular guesses on the future of crowd-sourcing corruption reports. At best, this approach may help identify some not so obvious challenges that may arise along the way, and ensure that they are considered in the design process of any future crowd-sourced interventions to fight corruption.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section introduces the concept of crowd sourcing for good governance, providing a brief overview of some related initiatives in this area, as well as some of the challenges and reservations commonly raised in the debate. The section that follows casts the net a bit wider, seeking interesting insights in the broader social science literature on social mobilization and corruption. Based on this, it seeks to gain a better understanding of the fundamental challenges that may lie ahead for crowd-reporting corruption. These anticipated challenges are followed in the final section by some ideas on how to address them in both the design and implementation stages, drawing on emerging insights from impact assessments of conventional social accountability mechanisms as well as the lessons learnt within Transparency International's own global network of anti-corruption NGOs, some of which already run crowd-reporting platforms.

Crowd-Sourcing Corruption Complaints: A Death Knell to Impunity?

Ushahidi, See-Click-Fix and Fix My Street may not have been the first, but are certainly the most impressive and visible demonstration of how dots and sprinkles of individual experiences and observations can be captured and amalgamated into powerful collective accounts of anything from dysfunctional local services and flawed elections to ethnic violence and humanitarian crises, and—rather recently—corruption. From Armenia to Zimbabwe a new crop of tools promises to put the power of social media at the service of making salient the scale, scope, geographic spread and human experience of corruption—mostly in the form of bribe payments.[1]

The idea is very straightforward. Easy access to such reporting mechanisms will empower citizens to complain loudly, visibly, safely and nearly instantaneously when corrupt officials and public service providers abuse their positions of entrusted power to extort bribes from citizens. In the pre-crowdsourcing era the covert and rather confidential nature of dyadic social exchanges that typically characterize corrupt transactions (Granovetter 2007) provided a fertile ground and cover for this type of extortionary practice. Now, the threat of being publicly shamed for corrupt practices serves as a strong deterrent. The power of visibility and public shaming, and the strength in numbers of victimized citizens, is assumed to effectively redress the power balance between bribe requester and bribe payer. The power-in-numbers argument is particularly striking and promising, when considering how ubiquitous bribes are in many

---

[1] A commonly used definition of corruption is "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International 2009). The focus in practice and for large parts of this article is primarily on the narrower subset of "bribery" issues.

countries. Surveys confirm that on average one in four citizens in contact with key public services has been asked for a bribe in any given year, a number that reaches half (or more) of the citizenry interacting with public institutions in high-corruption countries (Transparency International 2013).

In essence, crowd reporting breaks the silence around the daily occurrence of victimization and humiliation through corruption. The realization that so many fellow citizens are facing and are concerned and outraged about the very same challenges as oneself has long been identified as a tremendously empowering effect. It helps to overcome what social movement scholars such as McAdam, McCarthy et al. (1996) call the general error of attribution, the tendency to see problems not in their systemic nature, but in rather self-centered fashion as related to individual experience. And the potential to empower through making disapproval of corruption more salient also gains plausibility from the vantage point of social psychology, since it may help overcome a situation of pluralistic ignorance where a silent majority of community members disapproves of a specific practice, but where no-one takes any action in the misguided belief that the practice is actually supported or at least tolerated by the majority of one's fellow citizens (Darley, 2004; Bicchieri and Fukui 1999). With the cover of secrecy gone, a groundswell of public outrage and empowerment of potential victims makes stealthy acts of extortion all but impossible. Or so the thinking goes.

This powerful storyline has inspired or at least been closely tracked by a surge in related crowd-sourcing initiatives. Some of these provide an open reporting window for any complaints about public services.[2] Others are focused on particular types of corruption, such as bribes, or on particular sectors, institutions or public works projects. Some try to appeal to the general public; others directly target specific geographic or professional communities. Some fashion themselves as a complaints mechanism, other more as monitoring tools. Some are stsandalone web applications, other fuse web with mobile and/or offline reporting mechanisms.[3] But they all have in common that they invite the public to share experienced or witnessed problems and incidences of wrong-doing, in order

---

[2] For example the various SeeClickFix applications in the US (Mergel 2012; http://gov.seeclickfix.com/customers.html) or the FixMyStreet implementation in the UK (https://www.fixmystreet.com/) or variants thereof in Australia (http://www.fixmystreet.org.au/) and Georgia (http://www.chemikucha.ge/en).

[3] For a bribe-reporting focus see for example Macedonia (http://www.transparency-watch.org/), India (http://www.ipaidabribe.com/) or as a global application Bribespot (http://bribespot.com/); for an initiative specialised on reporting procurement irregularities see Kosovo's My Tender (http://www.tenderi-im.org/), for a university corruption focussed imitative see NotInMyCountry (https://www.notinmycountry.org/) in Kenya and Uganda, for an initiative focussed on French bilateral aid projects in Mali see http://transparence.ambafrance-ml.org/.

to ultimately hold administrations and service providers to account for their (mis)performance.

These are exciting times for corruption fighters. Never before have the floods of bribe payments and extortions that plague people's day-to-day lives in so many countries been made so visible—unfiltered and almost in real time. And given the speed with which these new tools evolve and spread, this seems to be just the beginning. Crowd-reporting from the perspective of the anti-corruption practitioner looks like a very promising addition to the toolbox for fighting corruption, which over the last twenty years has evolved from a focus on stricter laws and law enforcement to a more systemic approach that considers the role of other stakeholders (business, auditors, investors) and that also puts high hopes on citizens themselves being much more active fighters of corrupt behavior.[4]

Some Initial Challenges—And Progress Made in Tackling Them

So will this "People Power 2.0" finally put an end to corruption? The opportunities are certainly huge, and only somewhat tempered by a number of concomitant challenges that have been flagged more or less from the outset. Digital divide issues are perhaps the most prominent concerns. How can we ensure that web-focused reporting platforms are not only sufficiently accessible but can also be effectively used by large segments of people around the world for whom ICT access, affordability, literacy and general civic engagement skills pose significant challenges—and who precisely as a result of this relative disempowerment might present particularly attractive targets for corrupt extortions?

Other frequently raised concerns pertain to the question of how to protect open reporting streams from noise, nuisance, malice and manipulation. A closely related discussion revolves around issues of cyber-security and risk-management: how to protect such platforms (which potentially highlight sensitive issues) and the privacy of users from hacking attacks, government censorship, potentially ruinous private legal challenges, etc. (Gigler and Young, 2014).

These three issue-clusters around inclusion, accuracy, and technical as well as legal risk-management, are already high on the agenda. They are being thought about and worked on by activists, technologists and scholars in many different ways. Online platforms are complemented by multi-modal reporting channels: walk-in, write-in, phone-in and text-in reporting lines reach beyond the digital natives, while rising mobile phone penetration and literacy levels further ameliorate inclusion issues. Accuracy and verification issues benefit from increasingly sophisticated approaches borrowed from crowd-report management

---

[4] For a brief overview of the recent history of the anti-corruption movement see Sampson (2010).

in other fields, including triangulating data, curating sensitive issues, and mixing reports with expert judgment or attaching greater weight to trusted, verified power contributors.[5] Finally, a very active group of specialized NGOs, often supported by hacktivists and other experts, helps the operators of reporting platforms up their game in terms of cyber-security and risk-management issues.[6]

None of these three primary challenges have been completely solved and they in some way represent continually moving and changing targets. However, the crowd-sourcing corruption community seems very aware of them—many people are thinking and working on solutions, and progress is being made in many areas.

Taking a Broader View

The remainder of this article focuses on a few other challenges that are somewhat different in nature and that have as yet not enjoyed the same level of attention. These are challenges that are not immediately obvious from a socio-technical or information management perspective, but that come into focus when considering crowd-sourcing corruption in the context of broader experiences of corruption reporting, and more general insights into the dynamics of collective action and social accountability initiatives.

Competing for Attention and Critical Mass—Approaching a Fallacy of Composition? (The Individual Bandwidth Problem)

The first question is what this growing landscape of reporting tools actually looks like from a civic participation and mobilization perspective. The starting point looks pretty promising: close to two-thirds of people indicate that they would be willing to report corruption. This is a finding from the largest representative survey on corruption in more than 100 countries, the TI Global Corruption Barometer, which periodically surveys more than 100,000 households on their detailed experience with corruption in different sectors (Transparency International 2013; Peiffer and Alvarez, no date).

On closer inspection however, several caveats are obvious. Engaging in accountability actions might seem an entirely reasonable investment by citizens in the abstract, for example when asked in a survey. However, things become more difficult when they are not only expected to run for the school committee and sit in on the social auditing team of the waterworks, but also to help monitor the building of that new road, report on corrupt practices in the local hospital, police

---

[5] See, for example, Ushahidi's Swift River Project:
http://www.ushahidi.com/blog/product/swiftriver/.
[6] See, for example, Tactical Tech: https://www.tacticaltech.org/.

and tax office, and periodically check in on the communal budget disbursement process.

Adding up all these demands on a citizen's time, expertise and commitment quickly raises concerns about how feasible and exciting it is—even for a committed policy wonk, let alone the average citizen—to turn themselves into a super-watchdog. And, even if the commitment is there, how realistic is it to fit all these activities into a busy life? The latter seems particularly tricky, given that the most impactful social accountability mechanisms seem to require rather advanced and time-consuming levels of engagement to achieve community ownership; and reaching out beyond a small group of local elites to attract marginalized community members to these initiatives is essential for inclusive impact and protection against elite capture (Olken and Pande 2013).

Put another way: assessing the potential of social accountability mechanisms may fall prey to the fallacy of composition. What might make sense for an individual case—a school, a hospital, a road project; any one of which would put big demands on people's time and altruistic spirit—looks even less achievable for the whole, when a citizen is meant to engage with not just one but several of these services and projects.[7] Where are we going to find all these citizens with so much time, tenacity and skill to undertake all this reporting, monitoring and tracking, from procurement processes to health services, from elections to electricity grids? This is a concern that pertains to social accountability mechanisms more generally and is increasingly being flagged in that community of practice (Institute for Development Studies, 2011).

Online crowd-reporting does not seem to offer a panacea for this problem. Already (with crowd-reporting still in its early days and more tools being developed every day) there is a growing sense that gaining critical mass in usage is perhaps the central problem, even for such low threshold applications. After the initial media buzz and spike in activities that typically accompanies the launch of a new platform, sustaining longer-term uptake is a serious issue. Many crowd-reporting platforms have seen reporting streams slow to a mere trickle (e.g. I Paid A Bribe, Pakistan: http://www.ipaidbribe.pk/), some have gone largely dormant or folded altogether (e.g. Corruptiontracker.org; Monitor de Corrupción, Colombia: http://monitordecorrupcion.org/). A mapping exercise by Ushahidi and Transparency International, for example, shows a large number of low-volume and dormant anti-corruption reporting platforms,[8] while a broader stock-take of

---

[7] Mayer 2003 provides a good introduction to the fallacy of composition and some examples from trade policy. It is worthwhile noting that all rigorous assessments of social accountability mechanisms that the author is aware of (such as the large set summarised in Olken and Pande 2013) only assess individual projects and do not even begin to take into account a broader spectrum of engagement demands that might arise in a specific setting.
[8] http://blog.transparency.org/2013/05/02/ushahidi-an-introduction-to-anti-corruption-mapping/

crowdsourcing initiatives in the corruption area finds a distinctive long-tail distribution with a small number of very popular initiatives accounting for the large bulk of reports, and 90 percent of more than 12,000 scanned crowd-maps boasting less than 10 reports, and almost two-thirds no activity beyond the initial installation (Crowdglobe 2012).

This poor uptake is even more problematic when considering that these are some of the least-effort crowd-sourcing exercises. They do not require any particular specialized expertise or a trip to a specific building site to check up on progress. All they do is invite citizens to comment on the annoyances they face in their daily lives as city dwellers or voters. To be fair, however, many of these initiatives are in their infancy: once technical teething problems are ironed out, outreach is stepped up, and citizens grow more comfortable with these systems, numbers may surge. At the same time it must also be conceded that the headline buzz and air of viral success that surrounds these initiatives in the media is far from reflected in the current usage numbers.

Reporting Corruption—More Delicate and Difficult Than We Think? The Threshold Problem

Talk of a long-tail—that is, some highly visible star performers and a long tail of crowd-reporting initiatives with rather negligible usage numbers—might underestimate the challenge of sustaining high usage rates for the best initiatives. Even popular and established crowd-reporting platforms tend to experience large swings and a rather significant drop-off in use after an initial surge in popularity and high growth (Ramanna 2012, exhibit 1). And perhaps what might technically look like low-threshold engagement (or more polemically, slacktivism; Morozov 2011) may still constitute for most contributors quite a big deal for several reasons. First, it is worth remembering that people are asked to report something that is in most cases illegal and that possibly implicates them in a criminal offence. Even the (fragile) promise of anonymity and ease of reporting might not completely offset this understandable reluctance to report something that is morally and legally objectionable. A closer look at the aforementioned Global Corruption Barometer confirms this general reluctance: while close to 70 percent of respondents indicate that they would hypothetically be willing to report corruption, respondents that have actually experienced (i.e. participated in) bribery are significantly less likely to express a willingness to report (Peiffer and Alvarez, no date). Translated into crowd-reporting environments this would suggest the emergence of a rather skewed account: the ones that experience corruption the most might actually be the ones who are least likely to participate and post reports.

Second, even if people are willing to report, they might still want to opt for reporting channels other than online platforms, or they might not know where

to report and/or have no way to assess at short notice which of the growing list of similar online reporting initiatives would be the best and most trusted for what is a very sensitive use. A proliferation of available reporting platforms and other reporting mechanisms such as whistle-blower hotlines might on the one hand mean more overall visibility for and choice in corruption reporting. On the other hand, the fragmentation and bewildering diversity of mechanisms without a clear and trusted front-runner can also make things more confusing, and increase search and selection costs and therefore thresholds for use.

But even when the choices are limited and clear, NGO-run crowd-reporting platforms might not fare that well. Again, the Global Corruption Barometer provides some interesting insights for novel crowd-reporting initiatives. Reporting to an independent organization is unfortunately the least preferred choice of respondents, selected by around 11 percent. The large majority of surveyed citizens would prefer reporting to a governmental anti-corruption hotline, while a sizeable portion of respondents could imagine reporting to the media or even directly to the institution involved (author's own analysis; Transparency International 2013). Such sentiments do not bode well for the prospects of independently run crowd-reporting initiatives. This picture is to a large extent consistent with findings from focus group research. In Uganda, for example, Hellstroem (2013) examined the reluctance of students to use a corruption crowd-reporting platform dedicated to corruption issues at universities. He found that an online platform was not the best fit, and that students seemed to prefer other modes of communication to complain and take a stance against incidences of corruption that they experienced. What's more, establishing a foothold for crowd-reporting corruption has also been found to be extremely difficult in contexts where civil society groups are neither particularly strong nor professional. A study about related initiatives in China—with its fragmented landscape of crowd-reporting platforms, often just run by individuals—shows how public trust in NGO-led reporting platforms is not only difficult to establish but also often undermined by opportunistic behavior: for example when operators abuse their gatekeeping position to blackmail accused officials into paying to have complaints removed or blocked (Ang, 2013).

The Ambivalence of Success—Succumbing to the Gravity of Norms and Collective Reasoning?

Let's assume that all these problems are solved and an online reporting platform gains community traction. It sees its usage numbers grow to a steady stream of reports that attract attention from the media and the broader public. As a result this buzz encourages more people to use the platform, ushering in a virtuous circle of visibility and use and leading to a sizeable flow of corruption reports that are

brought to public attention. Yet, even if (or precisely *when*) a trickle of reports grows into a tidal wave, the actual impact of such a successful platform might still be less desirable than that we might wish for.

This might seem like a very strange concern: isn't this collective experience—the discovery that one is not alone with one's grievances—the most empowering and motivating aspect of crowd-sourcing corruption information, as mentioned earlier (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996)? The very same dynamics might, however, actually take a different turn as suggested by other strands of research, particularly on the logic of corruption and collective action. Making instances of bribe payment more visible (together with a sense of its full scale and scope) may indeed be not all together desirable, for at least four reasons:

1. It makes the price for bribe payments more transparent and easier to figure out, and thus corrupt transactions more efficient and easier to carry out.
2. It highlights the collective action nature of the situation and—along the lines of the Prisoner's Dilemma—may actually increase incentives to fall in line by greasing the palms of public officials.
3. It adversely alters the calculus of likely risks and sanctions, as well as the prospects of successful resistance, making bribery appear less risky and action against it less likely to succeed.
4. It influences what is regarded as common practice and normal behavior and could potentially reduce not only direct material incentives, but also moral inhibitions to engage in corrupt activities.

More detail on these four potentially very problematic dynamics follows below.

Getting the Price Right for Corruption

Economist have long argued that transactions involving bribes, analogous to transactions in formal markets, can be made more efficient by helping match buyers and sellers more effectively, when transaction costs are low and price-setting is transparent. In plain language: if I know the 'price'—the amount to pay in order to illicitly obtain a specific benefit—I will find it easier to engage in such a corrupt transaction. This is not just a theoretical premise as prominently conceptualized by Husted (1994) or Della Porta and Vanucci (1999), but is borne out in practice. Empirical investigations confirm that price setting for bribes by corrupt officials follows price-setting behavior in regular markets (Olken and Barron, 2009). Corroboration also comes from anthropological studies that find that swapping stories about corruption in communities in India, for example, serves at least partly to compare notes on the amount of bribes paid and to discover the actual market rate for corruption (Torsello 2011).

It is against this backdrop that detailed information about corrupt transactions, and the going rates of bribes in specific areas and situations, can be rather problematic. This is particularly the case when crowd-sourcers set themselves the aim of discovering and comparing the price of bribes across different cities in a country, as for example I Paid A Bribe is trying to do in India. The laudable ambition of raising awareness about and putting pressure on the most corrupt can thereby turn into a price discovery mechanism that could easily fuel more bribe paying and taking.

Keeping Up With the Corrupt Joneses

Certain corruption situations are best understood as collective action problems: I am paying a bribe because everyone else around me does as well. Should I refuse, I am the fool who is losing out. Again, this is by no means just a theoretical concern. Consider paying bribes for jumping the queue in some office or greasing palms when participating as a business in a tender process. If no-one bribes it makes it easier for you to stick to the rules. If everyone around you bribes and seems to be able to get away with it you will be a lot harder pressed to act honestly. The incentive to fall in line in a corrupt context is strong for services or goods that are scarce and competed over. But the pressures to conform are even stronger when it comes to what economists call positional goods (Hirsch 1977, Frank, 1985), i.e. things whose very value depends on others not getting them or getting them later, thus setting up a race for the coveted good or service.

Consider education in a meritocratic context (Adnett and Davies, 2002): only students who score in the top one percent of their class will qualify for some scholarship or secure entry to a specific elite college or workplace. Now, once I realize, for example via a clear trend on a corruption reporting platform, that many other parents are "forced" into paying bribes to secure extra tuition or to directly pay for better, manipulated grades for their children, I will be under a lot of pressure to at least keep up with or even outcompete the Joneses, in order to not disadvantage my children.

Altering the Risks and Rewards Expectation Matrix

However, even when bribes help gain access to benefits that are neither positional nor competed over, a sense of widespread corruption can further incentivize individual corrupt behavior. The reason is related to a more favorable assessment of the risks of being discovered and punished. Perceived high levels of bribe paying communicate that large numbers of complicit, corruptible officials are out there. This in turn lowers the bribe-payer's risk of encountering an official who acts with integrity and denounces them; a phenomenon that scholars of corruption

in economics call the frequency-dependent equilibrium property of corruption (Mishra 2006; Andvig and Moene 1990; Rothstein 2011).

This type of corrupt behavior is further encouraged and locked-in when large volumes of bribe reports seem to have no obvious follow-up or consequences, conveying a strong message that the most likely outcome for the bribe payer is impunity. This also engenders a sense of despair and frustration that trying to do something about the problem is doomed to fail anyway, thus setting up another collective action dilemma: if I know that others are also exposed to the same rather paralyzing message that impunity is the norm, I do not expect anyone else to take action either, and will thus not be the first to stick my neck out.

To summarize, a sense that bribe paying is pervasive and lacking in much negative consequence to the bribe-payer or taker can fuel three types of adverse collective action logics: it prods the individual to engage in corruption in order to not fall behind; makes such behavior seem less risky, since the chance of encountering an honest counterpart and being reported seems limited; and it discourages collective anti-corruption action by creating a perception that no-one else is likely to do so either, since critical mass and success look very unlikely. Such a perception of widespread impunity for ubiquitous corruption can potentially be reinforced or even generated when thousands of bribe reports are all of a sudden out in the open on a highly visible platform.

The Normative Power of Common Practice

Many different research streams in social and political psychology, social movement studies, and marketing, provide compelling evidence of how descriptive social norms—those things that are perceived as common practice—exert a gravitational pull on human action that can weaken moral reservations and reconfigure rationalization of individual decisions.

Specific transmission mechanisms vary and are encapsulated in concepts like ethical fading, moral contagion, broken windows theory, moral licensing, etc. that are summarized by Moore (2009) for organizational corruption dynamics. But the implications are the same: making what is regarded as common practice salient provides a powerful (often unconscious) inducement at the individual and collective level to converge to the norm. When told or shown that their peers do the same or more of the same, people re-use more hotel towels, give more to street musicians, and conserve more energy. But likewise, when the norm (inadvertently) communicated is a negative one, and an admonishment to adopt a specific good practice comes with information that others are also currently failing to live up to that standard, individuals are often induced to fall in line and dodge more taxes, take more protected items from national parks (such as twigs from petrified forests), save less energy, and engage more in bribery

(Griskevicious, Cialdini and Goldstein 2008; Cialdini, 2003; Frey and Meier 2004; for an overview and experiment related to Internet platforms see Margetts, John, Escher et al. 2011). So with regards to popular online reporting tools one could plausibly argue that making corruption payments salient online can create an impression—whether or not this is correct—that it's a common practice; with a self-fulfilling tinge.

Where To Go From Here? Some Promising Avenues

There is no reason to despair, even if concerns about low and decreasing usage rates, the downsides of salient corruption, and the risk of growing frustrations, if reported incidences do not get acted on are real and significant. A better understanding of the dynamics at play also opens opportunities for creative policy and advocacy interventions that help tackle and overcome these shortcoming, and that tip the balance towards the upside potential of crowd-sourcing. Here follow some ideas for where this could be going, and what is already being tried out at the cutting-edge of crowd-reporting corruption.

Design for Empowerment, Not Corruption Encouragement

When does the mobilization and empowerment effect of crowd reporting outweigh the countervailing dynamics of price transparency, collective action dilemmas, and negative norm salience? What can be done to tip the balance even further towards taking action against corruption? These questions give rise to an interesting experimental and research agenda around crowd-sourcing corruption. A plausible premise to explore could be to look at the degree of perceived victimization and agency that characterizes a specific bribe context. Where the corrupt transaction contains elements of threat and extortion (a teacher threatening to fail a child), and where coordination costs for victims are very high, the downside risks of entrenching corrupt payments may be relatively stronger.

At the same time the positive mobilization effect may be stronger in settings where speaking out against and denouncing corruption is considered something of a taboo and/or has been actively repressed. The empowering effect of finding one's voice, sending a strong message to public officials that impunity cannot be taken for granted, and particularly the social discovery that others are equally frustrated and bold enough to speak out, might in such a setting outweigh the risk of resignation associated with exposing the ubiquity and deeply entrenched nature of the practice.

A number of strategies could help and are increasingly being deployed by some of the leading crowd-reporting platforms. They include:[9]

- Highlighting action options on what to do to help tackle corruption
- Profiling success stories on how reporting had a specific impact, how people effectively resisted corruption, or made a difference in fighting it
- Moving beyond negative reporting and adding a more symmetric positive rating system to showcase also the prevalence of integrity.[10]

As a Transparency International chapter operating a crowd-reporting platform in an Eastern European country put it: *"Advertising the follow-up—what did we do with the reported issues—was crucial and we could have done more to promote this issue. This would encourage the same reporters of corruption or others to report more on this issue"* (TI, 2014).

A particularly promising strategy can also be to develop the platform from a simple reporting mechanism into an accountability and citizen–government conversation tool that encourages public officials to provide feedback on complaints, and highlight remedial action that has been taken and cases that have been resolved, etc. Fix My Street in the UK and See Click Fix in the US are applications that put a strong emphasis on this type of two-way communication facility. It is after all a prerequisite for translating reports into impact that the stakeholders that can make a difference start paying attention, which in turn will make reporting more attractive and useful.

Evidence shows that engaging in this type of conversation should be a compelling proposition for well-meaning governments, since it can help them showcase efforts and achievements that often go unnoticed. In the words of Mettler (2011) it would help make visible the "submerged state"—government services and achievements that when brought to the attention of the public can significantly boost trust in and recognition of public service performance. Buell and Norton (2013) for example document this effect of what they call *operational transparency* in an online experiment that exposes viewers to information about potholes filled and other public works performance achievements, which results in significantly higher levels of trust in and appreciation of government. Good

---

[9] I Paid A Bribe, for example, one of the most innovative and popular platforms for corruption reporting offers a range of action and impact-oriented features to complement the bribe reports on display. These features include: two positive reporting channels (I did not pay a bribe; I met an honest officer); practical how-to cheat sheets that explain specific administrative procedures and how to navigate them; a Champions of Change section that highlights remedial and reform actions; and a helpline to advise people with corruption issues.

[10] Aybolit, a crowd-reporting initiative in the Ukraine, for example, invites positive reporting on professionals in the health sector that acted with integrity.

design can help to encourage these uses. It can make feedback and interactivity easy and provide functionalities to compile report cards that summarize completion rates, turnaround times, etc. and that can also be used to spur some positive competition between different local authorities.

Several other strategies can be envisioned to encourage civil servants to pay attention, and make the active engagement with crowd-reporting platforms part of their work routines. An analogy from the reporting of potholes helps to illustrate this point. The city of New York can only be held liable for damage resulting from potholes if such deficiencies had already been brought to its attention. Pre-Internet this prompted some entrepreneurial lawyers to actually pay people to map and report potholes so that the city could be sued more easily when damage occurred. In the age of online crowd reporting this might now be much easier. One option for NGOs could be to push city governments or public service providers to write into their rule-books that reports on corruption as disclosed on a top independent reporting site should be regarded as "brought to the attention of the respective authorities" and thus should trigger specific follow-up duties or specific liability in the case of ignorance. In the context of less cooperative authorities another option could be to seek a court ruling through strategic litigation that establishes that complaints published on a highly visible website count as brought to the attention of officials.

All these strategies that embed the actual stream of corruption reports into a broader information platform that guides towards action options, showcases real impact, flags positive examples, and stimulates responsive follow-up can help tip the overall impact of the crowd-reporting platform from entrenching a paralyzing sense of corruption as an inevitable evil to a mobilizing message of change as achievable and actual. Such platforms can then plausibly be expected to trigger a virtuous cycle of attracting more reports and more anti-corruption action, very much in line with how a social mobilization expert describes one of the key drivers of movement success: "Hopeful anticipation of an impact is perhaps the greatest spur to action" (Jasper, 2011 paraphrasing Gupta 2009).

Partner and Bundle—The Options and Tactics Are Many

Stand-alone corruption-centric reporting platforms run by a specialized anti-corruption NGO might have a special niche to fill, such as Transparency International's Advocacy and Legal Advice Centers that help people with corruption-related grievances make their way through the institutions to seek redress on a case-by-case basis. Yet, when considering the standard approach of a stand-alone crowd-reporting platform, it might be more suitable to move away from a rather insular model and instead to bring in partners with complementary skills and expertise and perhaps even more importantly, deep roots in and

capabilities for reaching out to particular professional, geographic or socio-economical communities.

"Working with local partners works best" is one of the main messages from a first crop of comprehensive reviews of conventional social accountability initiatives that seek to engage citizens in reporting and monitoring functions (IDS 2011). And the importance of building alliances and partnerships that have local or tailored-audience traction is also a central insight from a first batch of stock-takes and more comprehensive reviews of tech-based civic action tools (Avila, Feigenblatt et al. 2010; Fung, Russon et al. 2010; Knight Foundation 2014).

There are many civic and public collaboration opportunities that can be explored for crowd-reporting corruption. One option is to team up with and build a distinctive corruption-reporting component into established civic helplines or hotlines that already dispense legal aid, offer consumer protection advice, help in the case of witnessed or experienced crimes, provide leads for investigative journalists, etc. The actual division of labor could vary depending on organizational context and particular skillsets. In some cases the focus could be on jointly operating and co-branding platforms with other NGOs, news outlets, consumer associations, etc. Teaming up with media outlets, for example, also offers vital benefits of free advertising and cross-media promotion, which is deemed essential for attracting a critical mass of corruption reports (TI 2014). In other contexts it might be more appropriate to agree on a different division of labor, with the anti-corruption partner focusing upstream on building anti-corruption capacity for other helpline providers; so that they can handle and actively solicit corruption complaints or agree on a referral system where corruption-related complaints are passed on for further follow-up to the anti-corruption partner without however co-branding or rebranding the established complaints platform.

In yet another context an established anti-corruption hotline could be the anchor initiative that brings on board other civic partners as more professionalized monitors of specific projects. Systematic monitoring of big infrastructure projects or the building of new schools and health centers could be undertaken via collaboration with investigative journalists or an NGO that engages with pro-bono engineers, in order to train and deploy expert monitors who can visit project sites and file their assessments as base content for the crowd-reporting site.

New reporting partnerships are not confined to NGO and media allies however, but could also involve cooperation with local governments or segments of the public sector beyond the dialogue and feedback approach mentioned earlier. For example, one could explore how to work with interested governments to make the sprawling use of government-run citizen information and reporting hotlines, such as the famous 311 systems in the US, more effective for corruption reporting. This could include NGO-led efforts to assess, monitor, periodically

probe and compare the institutional integrity, organizational effectiveness and performance of public reporting hotlines, all with the view of enhancing public trust in the usefulness of reporting and incentivizing better helplines. Another collaborative approach would be to open existing 311 reporting streams to further filtering, visualization, syndication and analysis by civil society and anti-corruption groups. The city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, already provides an open API for its citizen reporting that provides great opportunities to re-use the data in close to real-time, but which has so far not been used much by civil society (Matheus 2014).

In essence such approaches would mean that civil society groups engage in a division of labor with local governments and focus on advocating for, strengthening and leveraging the impact of existing reporting channels, rather than building out their own reporting platforms. Again, such ideas are not germane to tech-based reporting but are very much in line with the lessons learnt from conventional social accountability impact assessments, which find great success when receptive governments work with (or politically savvy local coalitions are built to support) citizen-centric accountability efforts (Fox 2014; Guerzovich and Poli, 2014).

Finally, it might be worthwhile to explore partnerships with a growing number of new Internet-based citizen feedback initiatives. In the US alone a scan found 18 new technology-based resident feedback systems that had been developed during the last decade (Knight Foundation 2013). Perhaps even more leverage could come through teaming up with one of the large online consumer rating platforms such as Yelp, Google Plus or Jameda. These platforms are perhaps the most popular and advanced architects of user-friendly rating systems. Many of them are continuously expanding into new countries and in some places also gradually into rating public and government services, thus offering interesting opportunities for integrating a corruption-reporting component.[11]

Four Bold Ideas for the Future: Mash, Mesh, Chatter, and Go Ambient

The current ecology of crowd-reporting corruption looks a bit like that presented in Figure 1: many unconnected platforms, big and small, serve as corruption reporting hubs. Here follow four ideas or avenues for exploration on how the current landscape of crowd-reporting corruption could be transformed in the future.

Figure 1. The "Now".

---

[11] Yelp, for example, provides some opportunities to rate government services in the US.

From Fragmentation to Mash-up

The symbolic and practical power of a large numbers of reports that could potentially populate a reporting platform is diluted when too many competing platforms vie for attention, confuse potential users, and fragment and dissipate reporting momentum. At the same time crowd-reporting corruption is still in its early experimental stages and probably benefits from the let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom landscape. Such diversity not only allows for broader experimentation and learning on what works when and why, but also allays the high threshold for reporting challenge outlined earlier, since it means that different operators, embedded and trusted in different communities can reach different audiences with tailored platforms, and thus raise the overall number of corruption reports submitted. This the basic trade-off between a client-friendly diversity of platforms and fragmentation of reporting streams in corruption reporting. One approach that would help respect the need for diversity and different, tailored initiatives, but also keep in check the negative fall-out from fragmentation could focus on establishing an agreed-on micro-standard for corruption reports that captures basic attributes of a corruption incident. Committing some major crowd-sourcing and corruption-reporting platforms to integrate appropriate interfaces with APIs and RSS would also make it easy to filter and syndicate individual reports (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Future 1: Corruption Earth Report.

Future 1
Corruption
Earth Report

Taken together this would make it possible to filter, merge, compare, re-combine and re-publish key information from reports received by a large number of reporting platforms. One could, for example envisage gathering all education-related corruption reports from Africa or investigating and displaying close to real-time the corruption burden reported by women. Given the many taxonomic challenges that come with classifying incidences of corruption, not to mention the diversity of vernacular expressions of the phenomenon, no perfect, comprehensive standard would be feasible. But even just agreeing on some core attributes and ensuring consistent integration into submission forms would already make a huge difference. This is a model that closely follows the development of an open incidence-reporting standard (Open311) in the US, which has already gained considerable momentum (Offenhuber, 2014).

Bringing on board some of the major crowd-sourcing platform developers and reporting initiatives might already generate the critical mass of stakeholders needed to get the micro-standard off the ground. Such an effort could possibly also be facilitated by some of the emerging umbrella initiatives in the area of technology for accountability, such as Datashift led by Civicus or the Transparency and Accountability Initiative convened by a donor collective in this area.[12]

---

[12] See http://civicus.org/thedatashift/ and www.transparency-initiative.org/

From Hub and Spoke—To Mesh and Social Discovery

The current architecture of crowd-reporting typically conforms to a classic hub and spoke model: a dispersed crowd of citizens reports to a central hub, a website that compiles and processes all received information. Such a system however foregoes one of the potentially most transformative mobilizing functions of a reporting system: finding like-minded people that have or care about similar issues and perhaps even live around the corner. Crowd-reporting has a great potential to support this type of social discovery and could thus be a very important initiative to help seed self-help groups, catalyze lateral link-ups between people with similar issues and thus foment collective action with or without any directional authority exerted by the hub (Figure 3). Technology scholars may note the ironic analogy when tracing the architectural evolution from the plain old telephone system (POTS) to the modern Internet network topology.

Figure 3. Future 2: Weave Collective Action.

While POTS was a classic hub and spoke system where a central switchboard and control hub routed all traffic and dictated further technological and organizational directions, the Internet with its decentralized, mesh-like structure offers significant advantages in terms of reliability, traffic routing efficiency, upgradability, lateral collaboration, adoption of innovations, etc. So

moving crowd-reporting corruption more towards a mesh-like model where the reporting hub serves as a catalyst to help concerned citizens build relations with like-minded individuals might be a very interesting change in perspective and direction. The redefined function of the hub to support such social discovery and lateral connections could comprise both online and offline efforts, including offering reporting citizens the opportunity to gather anonymously in a chat room or discussion group, and convening meetings on corruption issues that are frequently reported in particular hotspots, and thus make it easy for concerned citizens to participate and start networking.

Fusing crowd-reporting with online tools for deliberation and collaboration (currently undergoing an explosion of development) could thus be a promising strategy to activate the social discovery value of crowd-reporting corruption. It could also contribute to making the scale of corruption—and practical possibilities for taking action against it—more salient, thus addressing the bad-norm-promulgation challenge of making corruption more visible, discussed earlier.[13]

From Reporting to Listening In On Chatter

All corruption crowd-reporting models discussed so far are, as the name suggests, premised on information briefs, prepared by citizens for the very purpose of reporting, directed to and pre-structured by the submission form of a specific recipient platform; be it an NGO crowd-reporting initiative or a public complaints mechanism. But the era of online social chatter might increasingly offer alternatives, or at least complements, to such approaches (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Future 3: Social Sentiment Analysis.

---

[13] A very interesting field experiment offers some cautious hope about this potential. Experimenting with different intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to encourage crowd-reporting on health service issues in UNICEF's highly successful U-Report initiative in Uganda, Blaschke, Carroll et al. (2014) find that the incentive to become part of a thematic interest network around the reported issue of corruption or sanitation increased reporting participation rates, albeit at a lower rate than extrinsic incentives such as being entered into a lottery.

Future 3
social sentiment analysis

Citizens are likely to talk about, complain about, and discuss annoying incidences of corruption much earlier, more often, more spontaneously and in narratively much richer terms (compared with complaints platforms) in the myriad micro-conversations that flow via twitter, Facebook and the many other social networking platforms that are popular around the world. In other words, big data and the increasingly refined approaches of sentiment analysis offer some very interesting and as yet largely unexplored opportunities to spot concerns about corruption in a much more granular, immediate and real-time way. [14] And extracting corruption issues from social chatter also helps to address the limited individual bandwidth for feedback and reporting threshold problems discussed earlier. Citizens interested in complaining about an incidence of corruption need not spend time searching for a trusted reporting platform—and actively submit a complaint in what is often a very structured and formulaic way—but can simply vent their frustrations in free text via a channel of their choice.

Get Out, Go Ambient!

Finally, crowd-reporting platforms currently live primarily online. All the information, energy and creativity that flows onto these platforms is mainly displayed, discussed and responded to online. This makes it very difficult to reach out to and meaningfully involve the disconnected or less digitally literate. Moreover, it forgoes the possibility that people encounter such information in a

---

[14] For an example of a study that uses a simple form of sentiment analysis in corruption research see Marquis and Yang, 2013.

certain type of serendipitous way: when they happen to walk, or drive past it. And finally an online-only presence fails to bring all this information and accountability back into physical public space with the potential to generate new social dynamics and thus further leverage its impact. These are major limitations and it's worth thinking about strategies to bridge the gap between the virtual and the physical in more systematic ways. How can we use public space for targeted interventions that make crowd-reporting visible and annotatable in a public square or other popular location and to confront the culprits in more direct ways with their (mis)performance? I have recently coined the term "ambient accountability" to kick-start a broader brainstorm on how to use the built environment through design, architectural, information and creative interventions in order to empower people and help them assert their rights (Zinnbauer 2012)..

Creating a physical presence for crowd-reporting by both low- and high-tech means is one stream of investigations. There are many related ideas that could be experimented with, ranging from real-time reporting feeds projected onto the office buildings of the institutions that are most affected by corruption, to annotatable data murals that provide statistics and individual reports in a visually engaging manner in popular public spaces, and that invite people to comment and contribute (Zinnbauer 2012, 2014; Figure 5).[15]

Figure 5. Ambient Feedback of Corruption Reports.

(a) Feedback system: airport security check, Sweden, data directly transmitted wirelessly to service operators (cc: Zinnbauer).

---

[15] Also see for example, http://ambient-accountability.org.

(b) Findings from a community survey displayed prominently for serendipitous encounter and public discussion on city sidewalk, UK (c: Visualising Mill Road)

(c) Budget information projected outside Ministry of Finance, Liberia (c AP Photo/Abbas Dulleh)

These examples provide some inspiration for feedback and accountability mechanisms that have moved from a purely online presence into public spaces. The idea of ambient accountability is very much inspired by Weiser and Braun's (1994) thinking on "calm technologies." The ensuing literature on ubiquitous computing, as well as work and analysis by social designers and spatial practitioners partly summarized by Lockton (2013), provide a tremendous source of inspiration and ideation in this regard. And as a final advantage, ambient accountability mechanisms that conveniently offer feedback opportunities at the point of service experience (and that are therefore literally at the fingertips of the citizens who experience corruption or other abusive behavior) also go some way to addressing the individual bandwidth and threshold problems outlined earlier.

These are just some trends of how crowd-reporting corruption is evolving and how it could develop next in the coming years. The article has reviewed some of the early evidence and lessons learnt, but the proliferation and diversity of approaches provides exciting opportunities for much more systematic and comparative analysis and learning in the near future. Despite all the challenges identified here, there are cautious but compelling reasons to believe that a bright future may lie ahead for crowd reporting corruption, once it starts embracing more closely insights from a multi-disciplinary body of corruption and collective action research and practice. So in a few years' time, crowd-reporting corruption might no longer look like the early stand-alone reporting hubs that have been fuelled more by technological opportunity than by considered political analysis.

This is not to argue that this early tech-centric impetus has been counterproductive. On the contrary, it has spawned some bold, energizing experiments, and opened the anti-corruption field to new allies, and fresh new energy and creativity. At the same time it is a welcome development that a new generation of crowd-reporting platforms is becoming increasingly savvy in taking on board insights from corruption research and practice. Crowd-reporting corruption is gradually weaving itself into the fabric of citizen–government relationships, helping to shift expectations at both ends about expectations of proper conduct, and what one can and can't get away with. And as flagged in this final section, neither the technological nor the tactical governance opportunities have been fully exploited—they continue to evolve apace. So let's continue to experiment and learn!

Acknowledgments

References

Adnett, N. and Davies, P. (2002): "Education as Positional Good. Implications for Market-Based Reforms of State Schooling", in: *British Journal of Educational Studies*, vol. 50, no. 2.

Andvig, J. and Moene, K. (1990): "How Corruption May Corrupt", *Journal of Economic Behavior&Organizations,* vol. 13, no. 1.

Ang, Y. (2013): "Why 'I-paid-a-bribe' Triumphed in India but Fizzled out in China", SSRN working paper, November 2013.

Avila, R., Feigenblatt, H. et al. (2010): "Global Mapping of Technology for Transparency and Accountability", Transparency & Accountability Initiative.

Buell, R. and Norton, M. (2013): "Surfacing the Submerged State with Operational Transparency in Government Services", *Harvard Business School Marketing, Unit Working Paper No. 14-034.*

Bicchieri, C. and Fukui, Y. (1999): "The Great Illusion. Ignorance, Informational Cascades, and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms", in: Galavotti, C. and Pagnini, A. (eds.): *Experience, Reality and Scientific Explanation,* Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Blaschke, S., Carroll, P. et al. (2013): "Extrinsic, Intrinsic and Social Incentives for UNICEF's Crowdsourcing Development Information in Uganda. A Field Experiment" paper prepared for 6th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, University of Mannheim and Heidelberg, February 7-9, 2013.

Cialdini, R. (2003): "Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment", *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, vol. 12.

Crowdglobe (2012): *Mapping the Maps. A Meta-Level Analysis of Ushahidi & Crowdmap,* Washington DC: Internews.

Darley, J. (2004): "The cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption", *Brooklyn Law Review*, vol. 70.

Della Porta, D. and Vanucci, A. (1999): *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources and Mechanisms of Political Corruption,* New York: DeGruyter

Fox, J. (2014): "Social Accountability—What Does the Evidence Really Say?", presentation for Global Partnership for Social Accountability, March 3, 2014.

Frank, R. (1985): *Choosing the Right Pond*, Oxford: University Press.

Frey, B. and Meier S. (2004): "Social Comparisons and Pro-Social Behaviour: Testing "Conditional Cooperation" in a Field Experiment", *American Economic Review,* vol. 94, no. 5.

Fung, A.; R Gilman et al. (2010): „Technologies of Transparency for Accountability", Analytic Report for Transparency & Accountability Initiative.

Gigler, B-S. and Young G. (2014): *The Role of Crowdsourcing for Better Governance in Fragile State Contexts,* Washington DC: World Bank

Granovetter, M. (2007): "The Social Construction of Corruption", in: Nee, V. and Swedberg, R. (eds.): *On Capitalism*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Griskevicious, V., Cialdini, R. and Goldstein, N. (2008): "Applying (and Resisting) Peer Influence", in: MIT Sloan Management Review, vol. 49, no. 2.

Guerzovich, F. and Poli, M. (2014): "Picking Partners and Allies that Bolster Your Social Accountability Efforts", Global Partnership for Social Accountability.

Gupta, D. (2009): "The Power of Incremental Outcomes. How Small Victories and Defeats Affect Social Movement Organizations", *Mobilization*, vol. 14.

Hellstroem, J. and Bocast B (2013): "Many "Likers Do not Constitute a Crowd. TheCase of Ugana*s Not in My Country", In K. Sarajeva (ed.) (2013): ICT for Anti-Corruption, Democracy and Education in East Africa, Spider ICT4D Series No. 6, 2013

Hirsch, F. (1977): *The Social Limits to Growth*, London: Routledge.

Husted, B. (1994): "Honour Among Thieves: A Transaction Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third World Countries", *Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 4.*

Institute for Development Studies (2011): *Blurring the Boundaries. Citizen Action Across Sates and Societies,* Brighton: IDS.

Knight Foundation (2013): *The Emergence of Civic Tech. Investments in a Growing Field*, December 2013.

Knight Foundation (2014): "Civic Tech—What Works When. Preliminary Results", skype presentation on forthcoming report for Open Knowledge Festival 2014, July 2014, Berlin.

Lockton, D. (2013): *Design with Intent*, PhD Thesis, School of Engineering & Design, Brunel University.

Margetts, H., John, P. Escher T. et al. (2011): "Social Information and Political Participation on the Internet: An Experiment", *European Political Science Review*, vol. 3, no. 3.

Marquis, C. and Yang, Z. (2013): "Corruption: Chinese People Look for Action, but Words Matter Too", *China Policy Review.*

Matheus, R. (2014): "Presentation at Open Knowledge Festival 2014, July 15 to 17, 2014, Berlin.

Mayer, J. (2003): "The Fallacy of Composition: A Review of the Literature", UNCTAD Discussion Paper, No. 166.

McAdam, D, McCarthy, J et al. (1996): "Introduction", in:

McAdam, D.; McCarthy, J. et al. (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-20.

Mergel, I. (2012): " Distributed Democracy. SeeClickFix.com for Crowdsourced Issue Reporting", SSRN working paper, January 2012.

Mishra, A. (2006): "Persistence of Corruption. Some Theoretical Perspectives", *World Development*, vol. 34, no. 2.

Mettler, S. (2011): *The submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.

Moore, C. (2009): "Psychological Processes in Organizational Corruption", in Cremer, D. (ed.) *Psychological Perspectives on Ethical Behavior and Decision Making,* Charlotte NC: Information Age Publishing

Morozov, Y (2011): *Net Delusion. The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*

Offenhuber, D. (2014): "Infrastructure Legibility—A Comparative Analysis of Open311-Based Citizen Feedback Systems", in: *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, advance online access.

Olken, B. and Barron, P. (2009): "The Simple Economics of Extortion. Evidence from Trucking in Aceh", *Journal of Political Economy, vol. 117, no. 3, pp. 417-452.*.

Olken, B. and Pande. R. (2013): Governance Review Paper—J-Pal Governance Review Paper, October 2013.

Peiffer, C. and Alvarez, L. (no date): "Who will be the Principled Principals? The Determinants of Active Opposition to Corruption in Over 70 Countries", unpublished working paper.

Ramanna, K. (2012): "I Paid a Bribe (Dot) Com", Harvard Business School Case Study, No. 9-112-078.

Rothstein, B. (2011): "Anti-Corruption. The Indirect 'Big Bang' Approach", *Review of International Political Economy,* vol. 18, no. 2.

S. Sampson (2010): "The Anti-Corruption Industry. From Movement to Institution", *Global Crime,* vol. 11, no. 2.

Torsello, D. (2001): "The Ethnography of Corruption: Research Themes in Political Anthropology", Quality of Government Institute Working Paper Series 2011:2.

Transparency International (2009): *The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide*, Berlin: Transparency International

Transparency International (2013): Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Berlin: Transparency International.

Transparency International (2014): "Internal Micro-Survey on Crowd-reporting Corruption Experience by TI Groups".

Weiser, M. and Brown, JS (1995): " Designing Calm Technology", Pamphlet, Xerox Parc, December 21, 1995.

Zinnbauer, D. (2012): "Ambient Accountability. Fighting Corruption When and Where it Happens" working paper, Social Science Research Network.

Zinnbauer, D. (2014): "Fighting Corruption Where and When it Happens: Ambient Accountability", in: Offenhuber, D. and K. Schechtner K. (eds.): *Accountability Technologies. Tools for Asking Hard Questions*, De Gruyter, Boston.

Project profile

ANTICORRP is a large-scale research project funded by the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme. The full name of the project is "Anti-corruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption". The project started in March 2012 and will last for five years. The research is conducted by 20 research groups in fifteen countries.

The fundamental purpose of ANTICORRP is to investigate and explain the factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anti-corruption policies and impartial government institutions. A central issue is how policy responses can be tailored to deal effectively with various forms of corruption. Through this approach ANTICORRP seeks to advance the knowledge on how corruption can be curbed in Europe and elsewhere. Special emphasis is laid on the agency of different state and non-state actors to contribute to building good governance.

Project acronym: ANTICORRP

Project full title: Anti-corruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption

Project duration: March 2012 – February 2017

Theme: FP7-SSH.2011.5.1-1

Grant agreement number: 290529

Project website: http://anticorrp.eu/